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Introduction
Protection of intellectual property rights in computer
software,1 including prevention of unauthorized "home copy1. "Software" as used in this note refers to "packaged" or "canned" computer
programs which can be purchased by the general public for use primarily in the home.
Such purchases can be made over the retail counter, by mail or through any of the
newer distribution methods such as vending machines or electronic delivery.
The term "software" is often used interchangeably with the term "computer program." Section 101 of the 1980 Amendment to the 1976 Copyright Act defines a computer program as "a set of statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly
in a computer in order to bring about a certain result." Copyright Revision Act of
1976 § 101, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
The software referred to in this note consists of general interest application
programs.
Computer programs can be categorized by function as either application
programs or operating system programs. Application programs usually per-

\
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ing''2 of programs, is of critical importance to software "authors ' 3 as the software market expands. Advances in
technology have made unauthorized copying a feasible and economical option for consumers. Historically, the ability of the
copyright owner to control the reproduction and distribution of
his or her work has provided an opportunity for economic
gain.4 Any erosion of this control, whether by technology or by
form a specific task for the computer user, such as word processing, checkbook balancing, or playing a game. In contrast, operating systems programs
generally manage the internal functions of the computer or facilitate use of
application programs.
Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1243 (3d Cir. 1983).
2. "Home copying" is a puzzling term. Distinctions have been made between
"commercial" and "noncommercial" sale or use of copies. Goldstein v. California, 412
U.S. 546 (1975). See infra notes 200, 312 and accompanying text. The term "home"
implies a noncommercial use. Yet this distinction may not be valid with reference to
software copying. Copyright law does not define "home" but it does explain "publicly" in conjunction with the exclusive right to perform. A work is performed "publicly" if it is done "at a place open to the public or at any place where a substantial
number of persons outside of a normal circle of a family and its social acquaintances is
gathered." Copyright Revision Act of 1976 § 101, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982). This distinction is important in relation to the copyright owner's exclusive right to perform the
copyrighted work "publicly." Section 106(4) does not grant the copyright owner protection against private performances such as "sing[ing] a copyrighted lyric in the
shower." Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 155 (1975). It is critical to note that there is no use of the term "publicly" in section 106(1) which grants
the exclusive right to reproduce the work in copies. It therefore seems improper to
attempt to determine whether a given instance of copying is an infringement because
of where it is done. This point is confusing in light of the popular view that video
tapes, records, and computer software all seem to be in a similar generic "hi-tech"
consumer product classification. Each of these "hi-tech" products have a different
history in the copyright law and have each received very different treatment by the
statute as well as judicial interpretation. See generally Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984). This unresolved issue will contine to play
havoc with attempts to control unauthorized software copying as long as legislation
only refers to "commercial" copying. There have been four 'noncommercial' software
infringement cases to date. Lotus Development Corp. of Boston has filed and settled
3 cases in which it allged that companies were making copies of Lotus 1-2-3 for inhouse use. The Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. (ADAPSO)
and MicroPro International, Inc., one of its members, have negotiated a settlement
with American Brands and one of its subsidiaries over alleged copying of software for
internal use. ADAPSO et. al. v. Wilson Jones Co., No. 85-C-0400 (N.D.Ill., Eastern
Div.).
3. A software "author" as used in this note, is "one who produces, by his own
intellectual labor applied to the materials of his composition, an arrangement or compilation new in itself." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 121 (5th ed. 1979). For the purposes
of this note, it should be assumed that, unless otherwise stated, the software author is
the copyright owner and that the licenses granted are nonexclusive. It should be recognized that the chain of distribution between the software author and the public may
involve countless intermediaries and commercial and contractual agreements. See infra note 141 for a historical appraisal of the distribution chain.
4. The First Congress passed the first copyright statute which was entitled "An
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a lack of appropriate protective legislation, directly impacts the
copyright owner's ability to make a profit.5
Federal copyright law provides a major source of protection
for software. However, software developers feel that copyright
law is inadequate due to the rapidly changing nature of both
software and the software market. Frustrated by the perceived
inadequacy of licensing agreements used on software sold in
the retail mass market, software developers are asking states
for additional protection for software at the state level.
This commentary will examine a recent state statute which
purports to answer the software developer's inquiry in the affirmative. The Software Enforcement License Act 6 embodies a
recent attempt by the State of Louisiana to remedy the
problems faced by software authors in the mass market. First,
the dimensions of the current retail software market and the
increasingly diversified methods of distribution will be exAct for the encouragement of learning." Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124
(1790). The author was given "the sole right and liberty of printing, reprinting, publishing and vending" his "map, chart, book or books for a period of 14 years." I&L The
copyright statute was amended and revised to keep up with changing technology that
went beyond "publishing." The complete revisions were: Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, 4
Stat. 436 (1831); Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, §§ 85-110, 16 Stat. 198 (1870); Act of Mar. 4,
1909, ch.320, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909) (formerly codified as 17 U.S.C. §§ 1-801 (1976)); Copyright Revision Act of 1976, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (codified as 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-801 (1982)).
For a general overview of the evolution of the 1976 revision, see HOUSE REPORT NO.
1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 47-50 (1976) reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. AND ADMIN.
NEWS 5659 (1976). Countries in the Berne Union, of which the United States is not a
member, have followed prescribed minimum standards for the national copyright legislation since the 1886 Berne Convention. Peer, The Mechanical Right: A Pragmatic
Perspective, 31 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 409, 410 (1983) (citing Convention concerning the Creation of an International Union for the Protection of Literary and Artistic
Works, Additional Article and Final Protocol, Berne 1886). "The text of the 1908 Berlin revision of the Berne Convention in article 13 specifies that, '[T]he authors of musical works shall have the exclusive right of authorizing the adaptation of those works
to instruments which can reproduce them mechanically.'" Id. at 411. The mechanical
right was later absorbed into the broader category of "reproduction" in recognition of
new technology. Id. at 412 (citing Berne Convention, Stockholm Act, 1967, art. 9(1)).
5. An example of the difficulties that can be caused by the introduction of "new"
technology can be seen in the case of White-Smith Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209
U.S. 1 (1908), in which the Supreme Court held that making a copy of a piano roll was
not copying because it was in a form that people could not perceive. Despite the intervention of nearly 70 years and remarkable strides in technology, it was necessary that
the language of the 1976 Copyright Act and its legislative history remove this ongoing
distinction between humanly perceived works which were entitled to protection and
those works which could not be humanly perceived and thus not entitled to protection. House Report, supra note 4. See 1 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 2.03[B][1] (1983).
6. Tit. 51, Ch. 27, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 1951-56 (West Supp. 1985).
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amined. Against this background, the copyright law will be reviewed as a current form of protection available for software
and its production. This commentary will then examine the
Louisiana statute and the mechanism by which it seeks to protect software. The susceptibility of the Louisiana statute to
preemption by federal copyright law will be analyzed in light of
section 301 of the Copyright Act and recent case law. In conclusion, an alternative federal scheme of protection will be
suggested.
A.

The Origin of the Right to Reproduction

The copyright owner's exclusive right of reproduction
originated in the processes of mechanical sound reproduction
pioneered by the music industry.7 Music boxes, piano rolls and
acoustic phonographs utilized the movement of mechanical
parts to reproduce sound.8 This so called "mechanical right"
was "the ability of the copyright owner to exercise effective
control over the storage of a copy of a work in any form which
allows it to be later reproduced."9 Although technology has
changed the form of storage from piano rolls to tapes, records,
video cassettes, and "compact discs," 10 the right to receive eco7. Peer, supra note 4, at 411.
8. Id
9. Id.
10. Compact discs are among the most recent technological advances. As one
commentator has explained:
Compact discs are a marvelous technological development. The great step
forward here lies not so much in their staggering frequency range and signalto-noise ratio, nor in their indestructibility, nor in their laser pick-up technique--although all of these are indeed impressive-as in the fact that they
store music in digitalized form. With this technique the sound being recorded is sampled thousands of times each second and at each sampling a set
of characteristics is noted, such as relative loudness and "pitch." The information with respect to each sampling is consequently stored in a set of instructions that take the form of bits of information. One of the main
characteristics of digitally stored music is that it can be transferred to other
storage media in an almost infinite chain without the loss of fidelity.
Transmitting and storing data in bits is exactly the technique used by modem digital computers for the storage of programs and databases. Except for
the relative amount of information stored, there is no reason why digital music could not be placed in any of the memory devices used by computers.
Peer, supra note 4, at 423. Software, a young industry, currently is suffering from
some of the same piracy problems as the sound recording industry suffered during its
development and may thus benefit from protective legislation patterned after that
developed for sound recordings. As can be seen from this brief description of compact
discs, the distinction between a sound recording and computer data is being eroded.
In the future, sound recordings may in turn benefit from legislation devised for com-
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nomic consideration remains the primary incentive for creating
and selling copyrighted works. Despite technological advances,
there is still concern that when the software "author" loses
control of the dissemination of the "storage containers," he has
effectively lost control of the economic rewards. Realistically,
as the methods of software distribution expand to include delivery by phone lines, cable connection and satellite, the idea of
"control" may be stretched beyond its limits. Software authors
"welcome the possibilities new technology present[s] to disseminate their works to an even larger audience, but need assurance that this new use is not immune to the principles of
copyright."'"
B.

Divergent Views

As the software industry enters the era of mass marketing
and retail sales, it is experiencing problems which closely parallel the unauthorized copying and distribution encountered during the early development of the record and tape industry.
Software authors and consumers have opposing views regarding copying and other rights claimed by the authors.
Software developers are concerned with preventing unauthorized duplication and distribution of computer software and
are seeking solutions to problems arising from software rental,
resale of software, unauthorized copying by consumers and "pirates," "swapping" and the use of "dumb networks. '12 They
contend that the current protection available under the federal
copyright law and state trade secrecy laws is inadequate. It is
estimated that $700 million is lost each year as a result of
software piracy. 13 According to one spokesman, "[w]e're seeing
puter software as digitally stored and transmitted music falls prey to the copyright
problems associated with software.
11. Peer, supra note 4, at 414.
12. Dumb networks are devices which
connect a terminal without microprocessors, memory, or peripherals to a personal computer that acts [as] a host device. The boards essentially make...
[the personal computer] into the functional equivalent of a timesharing minicomputer system. The ...[personal computer] acts as a host computer, running programs and handling the transfer of information between computer,
disk drives, printer, and the four or more terminals connected to it at the
same time.
Shea, "Dumb Networks" Smart Idea, INFOWORLD, July 2, 1984, at 45, col. 1.
13. Watt, Software-ProtectionPush, INFOWORLD, May 7, 1984, at 14, col. 1 (quoting David Radoff, Vault Corporation spokesperson).
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the maturation of an industry that's been riddled by bandits."1' 4
The prevailing consumer attitude is that the industry has not
lived up to its responsibilities.'5 Consumers disbelieve the industry estimates that there are five or more bootleg copies for
every legitimate one sold, and are unsympathetic toward industry claims of economic duress. 6 Consumers want to be able to
"test drive" the software before they buy because of the expense involved in purchasing software and the youth of the industry.' Consumers blame the "licensing" practices of some
software companies for actually encouraging copying.
Software users feel that "swapping" among friends is harmless and can actually lead to a sale once the consumer is convinced of the usefulness of the program and the benefits of
updates and documentation.'" In light of the fact that consumers feel that there are useful reasons for copying, the attitude
by software companies that all copying is immoral has just added fuel to the fire.'9 "Software owners and users abuse one
another, and each side is using the excesses of the other as an
excuse for irresponsible behavior." 20 Consumers "have no respect for the disclaimers, disregard the license agreements, and
pirate companies' work all over the place. The ethic among too
many users is that only the naive pay their own way."2' Students are exposed to a "copying ethic" in school systems where
the inability of the school budget to cope with the cost of multiple copies of software has resulted in illicit copying as the only
22
"feasible" means of obtaining materials.
C.

The Changing Nature of Software and the Software Market

Software, which originated as a service performed by pro14.
15.
16.
17.

Id (quoting Dixon Smith, Vault Corporation's Senior Vice-President).
Steichen, Piracy Mania, INFOWORLD, Aug. 6, 1984, at 7, col. 1.
Id.
Id.

18. I&
19. Id. Prudent users insist on using a backup copy for critical software and feel
justified in circumventing any copy-protected scheme or copying prohibition in the
license which prevents archival copies.
20. Barrack, Sell Support, INFOWORLD, Aug. 20, 1984, at 7, col. 1.
21. I&
22. Brown, Software Crunch, INFOWORLD, May 14, 1984, at 5, Letters, col. 2. According to one reader, "[a] single copy of WordStar lists for $495, SuperCalc 2 for $295
and dBase II for $700. Outfitting a 30-station instructional lab with those three basic
pieces of software represents a cost of almost $45,000. Textbook prices, which often
seem unconscionably high, look like petty-cash items in comparison." Id.
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grammers on a customized basis or "bundled" in with the
purchase price of a computer, has changed in nature.2" Some
types of software are now fungible products available in the
mass market. Advances in technology and expansion of the
computer market into the home have brought both personal
computers and the realm of copying into the consumer's living
room. In response, technological innovations have been developed to protect software from unauthorized copying, but programs have been designed which "nibble" away the protection
and allow copying.24
The nature of the mass market has also "nibbled" away some
of the protection previously afforded by federal copyright law.
By necessity, software distribution originally involved a face-toface relationship which took the form of contracting for pro23. In the past, the term "software" referred to " 'support'-

that is advice, assist-

ance, counseling, and sometimes even expert engineering help furnished by the vendor in loading the machine for a certain program such as inventory control or
preparation of payroll." Honeywell, Inc. v. Lithonia Lighting, Inc., 317 F. Supp. 406,
408 (N.D.Ga. 1970). The changing nature of software has been explained as follows:
The evolution of relative independence for software was hastened by the
introduction of third generation hardware (built around integrated circuits)
which had the capability of performing multiple tasks simultaneously. This
dynamic development intensified the pressure on equipment manufacturers
to offer systems software that could optimize the hardware capability. The
most important boost forward, however, came from the development of
higher level programming languages which permitted 'machine independence, or at least .... ease of transferability from one computer to another.'
These languages expanded the effectivity of programming efforts in that programs, formerly written on an individual basis for a particular computer,
could now be utilized on many computers-both those within the manufacturer's 'family' and those made by competing manufacturers-with minimum
modification. In concert, these two developments ushered in the beginning
of a software industry. It was now possible for those systems and applications
programmers with an entrepreneurial bent to establish themselves in business without being irrevocably tied to one manufacturer's hardware.
Note, The Revolt Against Property Tax on Software: An Unnecessary Conflict Growing Out of Unbundling,9 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 119, 123-24 (1975) (footnotes omitted).
24. Davidson, Protecting Computer Software: A Comprehensive Analysis, 23
JURIMETRICS J. 413 (1983). An example of such software is CopyWrite marketed by
Quaid Software Ltd., a Canadian corporation. CopyWrite is software designed to circumvent the PROLOK program produced by Vault Corp. PROLOK diskettes contain
a unique fingerprint which must be matched in order for the program on the diskette
to run. The purpose of the PROLOK system is to prevent copying of whatever program is on the diskette. CopyWrite avoids the PROLOK protection and allows copying. Vault Corp. has filed suit against Quaid on a number of different theories
involving both federal copyright claims and state law claims under the Louisiana
Software Enforcement Act. Vault et al. v. Quaid Software, Ltd., Civil Action No. 852283 (E.D.La. 1985).
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gramming on an individual basis.2 5 It was possible for the
software author to choose the level of control he wanted to retain and to profit without selling a copy of the software. Of
course such transactions were time consuming and therefore
limited the possible number of such transactions and ultimately the profitability of the program. In contrast, the current retail software market provides an efficient system and
opportunities for broad dissemination. The author can charge
less per customer and compensate by dealing with more customers. The retail transaction involves a single price instead of
the periodic rental or lease payments which were a common
feature of custom programming contracts. By distributing the
software through the mass market, the software author has
chosen a retail transaction and all of its associated legal baggage
as the means of realizing economic gain.
A controversy has arisen over the nature of these retail
software transactions. Software authors claim to offer the
buyer a "license" but the buyer labels the transaction a "sale."
The critical distinction between the terms is that a transaction
in the character of a sale triggers the first sale doctrine of federal copyright law while a "license" does not.2 6 Under the first
sale doctrine, the owner of a copy can "sell or otherwise dispose
of the possession of that copy .... .,27 The significance of stepping over the first sale "line" is that persons who purchase the
copy may rent or resell that copy.28 In and of itself, such a possibility does not pose any more threat to the author than the
rental or resale of a used book, painting or any other form of
intellectual property which commonly enters the secondhand
retail or rental market. However, unlike many other copyrighted retail products, the nature of software lends itself to
"home copying," and rental and resale offer individuals economically reasonable access to a copy for the purpose of unauthorized copying.
Accordingly, the dilemma faced by the software author is
whether to take the time and expense to form binding agreements that do not result in "sales" in order to avoid the "first
25.

Software was in the form of programming and was supplied exclusively by the

hardware manufacturers. S.
LAW 4 (1984).
26. 17 U.S.C. § 109 (1980).
27. Id.

28. Id.

MANDELL, COMPUTERS, DATA PROCESSING, AND THE

COMM/ENT L. J.

[Vol. 8

sale," or to take advantage of the economic benefits of the rapidly expanding retail software market and accept the loss of
control triggered by the first sale. Of course, software authors
would prefer to take advantage of the lucrative retail market
and prevent copying induced by rental and resale. The question is, can they?

II
The Software Market
Appropriate legal protection for retail software needs to be
formulated with the understanding that the identity of the
software market and the means of distribution are rapidly
changing. A good starting place, however, is an examination of
the current market's identity and dynamics.
A.

The Current Software Market Profile

The relative youth of the software industry makes predictions of future trends particularly difficult. However, indications are that, because of pure economics, more companies will
be consolidating via acquisitions and mergers. 9
A software author's decision to enter the mass market means
interacting with a new breed of customer, selling more copies
at a lower price per copy and ultimately losing control of the
copy. 30 It also means venturing into an uncharted area where
the product life cycles of software have not yet been deter29. Gantz, Heebie-Jeebies in Software Land, INFOWORLD, Aug. 27, 1984, at 18, col.
2. The "number one" software firm "may ship 40,000 packages per month which, after
deducting dealer and middleman cuts, may hypothetically bring in $100 a package- $4
million a month, $48 million a year." Id. The number twenty software firm may ship
4000 packages per month. Id.
Until recently the market was a "cottage industry." Id. In 1983, the top seven companies only accounted for 36% of the industry revenues. The leading software firm
only held 7% of the market. Eleven companies earned $10 million or more in 1983.
Id. According to one source, "there wasn't an industry to speak of until VisiCalc was
introduced four years ago and kicked open the door to a complex exciting consumer
market that had to blend the elements of bigtime marketing strategies with technical
excellence." Caruso, Software Gambles: Company Strategies Boomerang, INFOWORLD, Apr. 2, 1984, at 80, col. 2.
30. When the industry got started, nobody really knew anything about how
to run a software company: there had never been any companies quite like
these. Before personal computers, a software hit used to run 1,000 units or so
and retail for $50,000 or $60,000. Now, with products like VisiCalc, WordStar,
dBase II, Bank Street Writer and Pinball Construction Set, companies could
sell hundreds of thousands of units for prices ranging from $50 to $700.
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mined with any degree of accuracy.3 ' Such information is just
now being gleened. Another consideration is the relationship
between the retail software market and the retail computer
market. 2 "The fact of life for software companies is that they
are volume driven; therefore, their products have to run on machines that have sold in large numbers and will be around for a
33
long time.
B.

The Economics of Information
The software market is basically an information market.3 4

31. "VisiCalc is the first successful software product to have gone through a complete life cycle, from conception in 1978 to introduction in 1979 to peak success in 1982
to decline in 1983 to a probable death, according to industry insiders, in 1984." Id. at
81, col. 1.
32. "[C]ompanies haven't paid enough attention to deciding which machines their
programs would make the most money on. In other cases, companies have directed
their attention to hot new product categories and failed to maintain the viability of
their original products." Id.
33. Id. The software industry has been faced with both good and bad news lately.
The bad news has been that some software firms are being reorganized under bankruptcy laws, while others are cutting back operations and laying off employees. Id. at
80, col. 2. It is rumored that some of the larger firms have run out of cash for their
operations and are searching for new money. Id. Unfortunately, "virtually every
respected venture capitalist and institutional investor says that they (sic) now refuse
to invest in software companies." Id.
The good news is that some companies are doing exceptionally well and market
researchers call for "fabulous growth for the micro software industry." Gantz, supra
note 29, at 18, col. 1. "During 1983," says International Data Corp. (IDC), "microcomputer software sales topped $1 billion for the first time, with the independents
(nonhardware vendors) selling $880 million." Growth was up 76% from 1982 for the
independents. Id. The top software firm in 1983 had sales figures totaling $60 million.
Caruso, supra note 29, at 80 (chart).
As a whole, industry forecasts show an increase from 110.5 thousand units at $207.6
million in 1984 up to 881.9 thousand units at $982.0 million in the newly evolving "vertical market." Chin, Vertical-Market Writers Find the Going Tough, INFOWORLD,
Jan. 30, 1984, at 35 (chart). The "vertical market" is made up of specialized software
which appeals to a limited market. Such software is usually priced above $1000. More
extensive customer support is provided, as well as training sessions and pre-installation planning sessions. The prices may range from $6000-9000 for property management software up to $15,000 for a bank budget planning package. Bergheim, High
PricedPrograms Sell, INFOWORLD, July 30, 1984, at 35, col. 1.
[O]ne analyst estimates that there are nearly 9,000 potential vertical markets.
So far, vertical-market packages have been most successful in the medical
and legal professions, relatively lucrative fields whose practitioners are eager
to automate paperwork. Also in high demand are packages designed for construction, farming and wholesale distributors. The common thread in programs designed for these markets is the automation of record keeping or
billing.
Chin, supra, at 34, col. 2.
34. The software market is therefore subject to some basic assumptions regarding
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Information is a unique commodity in that, unlike material
goods, the use of knowledge does not diminish the supply for
other potential users. 5 There is "little or no cost to society
'3 6
from use of available information, once it has been created.
The initial set-up costs may be high, but reproduction will reduce the cost per consumer.
This characteristic is the basis
for the current concern over unauthorized copying.
The software producer has to charge a price that will recover
both the initial cost and the cost of producing and disseminating each copy. 38 Because of technological advances, unauthorized copies can be made at a fraction of the retail price and can
displace potential sales.3 9 The non-exclusivity or appropriability of software as an information commodity makes it
difficult for the producer to ensure that the benefits of the
software will be restricted to consumers who purchased the
product at the full retail price.4 0 Inability to command the
"perfect competition" that, if fulfilled, will maximize the economic well-being of consumers as a group. The assumptions include the following:
Absence of externalities: the impacts of the industry fall entirely on the sellers and buyers of the goods involved, with no effects, either positive or negative, on third parties; such effects include pollution (on the negative side).
[Information pollution is where consumers are assaulted by an overflow of
irrelevant messages.]
Exclusivity or appropriability: only those consumers who purchase the product at the price set by the producer can obtain its full benefits.
Competition: producers are in close enough competition with each other that
no individual firm can raise the price it receives by reducing the amount it
produces and, hence, no producer can obtain (over the long run) profits above
a "normal" rate of return.
Comparability: the products of different firms in each market are identical
(undifferentiated), so that consumers purchase solely on the basis of price.
Marginal-Cost Pricing: the price at which a good is sold is equal to the cost
(including the "normal" profit) incurred by the firm in producing and selling
the marginal unit of the good.
M. Breslow, A. Ferguson, & L. Havercamp, An Analysis of Computer and Photocopying Copyright Issues from the Point of View of the General Public and the Ultimate
Consumer, NATIONAL TECHNICAL INFORMATION SERVICE 112, 140 (1980), reprintedin
4 COPYRIGHT CONGRESS AND TECHNOLOGY: THE PUBLIC RECORD, 111, 140 (1980)
[hereinafter Analysis].
35. Analysis, supra note 34, at 141.
36. Id. From an economic standpoint, information has value, part of which is attributable to the cost of production, storage, retrieval, processing and transmittal. Id.
Specifically, the setup costs in the production of software include accumulation and
categorization of data, analysis and programming. Id. at 143.
37. Id. at 141-42.
38. Id. at 144.
39. Id.
40. Id.
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short run marginal cost detracts from the guarantee that the
product will provide satisfactory economic incentives.4 1
C.

The Distribution of Software
Originally, software was distributed with computers as part
of a "bundled" system. 42 The price for the application programs for a particular computer was included in the computer's
total cost without being identified as a separate expense. 43 Antitrust laws now require that the software be priced separately
and be available as a separate product." Not until software
pricing was unbundled was its true value recognized. Previously, the expense of procuring a computer and software was
attributed in most part to the cost of the hardware. Subsequent
advances in technology have brought prices down in the hardware market,45 while prices in a diversifying software market remain stable.
While the cost of general-interest software is
predicted to decline, the cost of vertical software is expected to
be higher than average.46
41. Id. But "there is a strong presumption that, however much the copyright
holder receives, it is no more than what his/her ideas are worth to society." Id. at 138.
42. IBM played a large role in the unbundling of the previously "bundled" hardware and software systems:
The start of the development of software as a distinct entity can be traced
to 1969 when IBM announced a comprehensive plan for the separation of
prices for its computers and related services including certain types of
software. Prior to that time it was standard industry practice to price only
the data processing equipment itself (the hardware) and to include, at no additional cost, 'a variety of services.' Such services, furnished free by the manufacturer, normally included customer engineering-the adaption of the data
processing system to the user's environment both physically, in terms of
computer room layout and requirements, and conceptually, in terms of meeting the user's application needs. Maintenance of the equipment and training
of the user's personnel were also included in the equipment price. Most importantly, however, both systems and applications software were furnished
at no cost. This packaged price policy became known within the industry as
'bundled' pricing. Hence, after the 1969 IBM announcement, the price separation of hardware from software and services became known as
'unbundling.'
Note, supra note 23, at 123.
43. Id. See also Schmedel, IBM Discloses Plan for Separating Its Computer and
Service Prices, Wall St. J., June 24, 1969, at 38, col. 3.
44. S. MANDELL, supra note 25, at 4.
45. See Bergheim, supra note 33, at 35, col. 1.
46. Id. Vertical software packages "are expected to be the next hot sellers." Bartimo, Mainframes Deliver Software, INFOWORLD, Sept. 24, 1984, at 29, col. 30. The
term "vertical software" refers to specialized programs with limited markets. Examples include software written for medical, legal, construction and wholesale distribution applications. See Chin, supra note 33, at 34.
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The means of distributing software appear to be limited only
by the imagination. The following discussion is intended to
provide a representative sample of the diversity of distribution
methods already on the horizon of the software market. Any
solution to the home copying problem must consider the infinite means of accessing software currently existing in the
market.
1.

Retail Sales

Although software was originally purchased from hardware
dealers, usually in conjunction with a hardware purchase, independent software suppliers now lead the market.47 Currently, the consumer's most common means of access to
programs is by purchasing copies at a retail store.48
Most software sold at retail has a licensing agreement on the
package which purports to detail the consumer's rights. These
47. In 1983, hardware manufacturers supplied software to the tune of $570 million
in revenues. Independent suppliers took in $880 million in revenues, while system
houses were responsible for $145 million in revenues worldwide. Gantz, supra note
29, at 18 (chart).
48. Software developers depend heavily upon retail outlets for sales. Marketing
strategies are being developed around the retail concept, such as point of purchase
displays and colorful packaging. Bartimo, supra note 46, at 30, col. 1. Advertising
budgets are growing as the battle for the consumer's attention accelerates. Software
firms spent an estimated $22 million on advertising in the fourth quarter of 1984.
Jones, Competition is Fierce in the Fast Paced Computer Age, Sunday Star Ledger,
Feb. 3, 1985, § 10, at 17, col. 5.
Although most businesses have no problem justifying expenses for computers and
therefore don't balk at $400-500 prices for software, the average home computer consumer flinches when the cost goes over $100. Caruso, supra note 29, at 82, col. 3. In
response, software companies rely on mass-marketing techniques to overcome the
cost barrier and seek to cultivate repeat purchasers. Id. However, "SRI of Menlo
Park, California, just completed a study that claims the potential computer buying
market is much smaller than companies believe." If true, the competition should get
even stiffer in software sales. Caruso, supra note 29, at 83, col. 2. Retailers usually
purchase the software packages and resell them to the customer. Bartimo, supra note
46, at 30, col. 3. Limited shelf-space, however, reduces the variety of software that can
be stocked at one time. Id. Additional concerns for the retailer are that software can
become obsolete on the shelf or be physically stolen. Id. at 32, col. 3.
Consumers do not necessarily have to go to the retail store to buy software. Recently, a company which previously supplied children with goods such as candles,
candy bars and calendars to be sold door-to-door to raise money for school activities
began to supply software. The company advertised its program to schools by direct
mail and as of April, 1984, 100 schools had students selling software priced from $32.95
to $149.95. Although not common, this method of distribution serves only to illustrate
the increasing role of software as an everyday household item. Zientara, Software
Door-to-Door,INFOWORLD, May 21, 1984, at 14, col. 2. See Gampert, Home Input: the
ComputerMoves from the Corporationto Your Living Room, Wall St. J., Feb. 4, 1977,
at 1, col. 1.
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licensing agreements are commonly called "box-top" or
"shrink-wrap" licenses. 49 Although these licenses have been
utilitized since the infancy of the retail software market, even
the attorneys for the software companies have been concerned
as to whether these agreements would actually hold up in
court. 50 Many of these agreements attempt to retain title to the
copy in order to avoid the consequences of the first sale
doctrine.
2.

Mail Order Rental and Sale of Computer Software

Mail order has been part of the software industry for some
time. 1 It provides consumers an opportunity to buy name
brand software and hardware at discount prices.5 2
The singular aspect of the mail-order market which has
caused a major uproar in the software industry is software
rental. 3 This is the kind of operation that software developers
49. Watt, supra note 13, at 14, col. 2.
50. Id. The legal questions have centered on the "user's rights to a backup copy,
limiting a single program to one processor, problems of software rental and the legality of an unsigned license." Id.
51. Although there have been widely publicized mail order scandals which have
caused buyers to think twice, there are reputable firms. Engel, Mail-Order is OK,
INFOWORLD, July 2, 1984, at 7, col. 1. Mail order firms are in competition with the
retail outlets since they get their products from the same manufacturers and distributors that supply retail stores. Id. Mail-order houses are concerned because it is predicted that the customer base will start to erode as retail stores and chains stock a
wider range of products. Chin, Buying Mail Order, INFOWORLD, July 2, 1984, at 23,
col. 1. "In 1983, the mail-order business lured customers from 20 percent of the home,
15 percent of the business, and 5 percent of the school markets .. " Id. at 22, col. 1.
Additionally, "[c]orporate customers are bypassing the middleman and dealing directly with the manufacturer. Lotus, notorious for refusing to sell to mail-order
firms, is selling its 1-2-3 to corporate users who buy in volume...." Id. at 23, col. 1. In
reponse, some of the mail-order firms now offer "services such as technical support,
quarterly newsletters, in-house servicing and same-day service." Id. at 22, col. 1.
52. IBM has initiated a distribution experiment involving mail-order. Howitt,
IBM Pushes Mail-Order Software, INFOWORLD, Sept. 24, 1984, at 11, col. 1. The programs are described in a catalog and customers are encouraged "to place orders
through the toll-free number using a credit card or to send back an order blank with
payment." Id. "About half of the new programs fall into the entertainment and education categories, at prices from $15 to $45. The others, ranging in price from $15 to
$150, are classified as either productivity or business programs." Id. IBM's intent is
"to create a new line of affordable software that doesn't require a lot of support." Id.
"Unlike most consumer mail-order catalogs in other fields, 'The Directory' contains
no guarantee of satisfaction, nor a return policy. It warrants the software for 90 days
to be 'free from defects in materials and workmanship,' the standard guarantee in the
industry." Id.
53. "Software developers shriek if a prospective buyer borrows a friend's copy of
their latest package, and they aren't any happier with rental agencies that purport
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feel promotes copying.5 4 They question the propriety of allowing the consumer to try out a program for thirty days.55
For example, one company charges a one-time membership
fee and lets the consumer rent the program complete with documentation for thirty days.5 6 "If you become enamored of a
certain program during rental, you can apply the rental fee toward its purchase. If you want to return a program, you pay
the return postage and select new programs, which the company ships free."57 The conclusion reached by software developers is that the principle motivation for rental is to copy the
program despite any protective anti-copying technology incorporated into the program. 8 Consumers advocate this sort of
"test driving" because so many programs do not have the
"bugs" worked out yet.59
only to rent for review." Watt, 'Try Before You Buy', INFOWORLD, May 21, 1984, at 42,
col. 1.
54. Note, Software Rental, Piracy,and Copyright Protection,5 COMPUTER L.J. 125
(1984).
55. Id. at 128.
56. "Documentation" includes all of the user manuals and associated materials
which augment the actual software. Such materials should have a separate copyright.
57. Grapevine, Software for Rent, INFOWORLD, Aug. 13, 1984, at 27, col. 1. The
company promotes itself as "an inexpensive alternative to high priced software." Id.
Another variation on software rental is illustrated in the Consent Judgment and
Decree of Permanent Injunction at 5-6, MicroPro International Corp. v. United Computer Corp., Civil No. C 83-3019 WWS (Cal. Dist. Ct. App., filed May 25, 1984). The
plaintiff alleged that the software rental company was acquiring the software, opening the shrink-wrap package, removing the license, repackaging and renting the
software to the public. The software rental company's advertising proposed an opportunity to evaluate "original unrestricted software programs (complete with manuals
in original manufacturers' packages)" during a seven day rental period. The plaintiff
alleged that the rental fee was only 15-25 % of the suggested retail price and customers could easily unlawfully copy the software. Since the software rental company
would make little profit if the customer should decide to purchase the software package, the plaintiff alleged that the commercial success of the operation was predicated
on the multiple rental and unlawful copying of the plaintiff's software. Id.
58. Note, supra note 54, at 125.
59. Another alternative to the "try before you buy" idea is more palpable to
software authors. It involves the use of demonstration software samplers provided by
software developers for hands-on shopping. Some demos are free samples while
others are priced low enough, nine to twelve dollars, to encourage impulse buying.
The samples are a reduced version of the software which usually can create a limited
number of records. The developers encourage copying of the samples since that practice introduces the product to more consumers. Watt, supra note 53, at 42, col. 1. The
popularity of the software samplers is attributed to the fact that "people are being
more careful about their purchasing, and it's a more sophisticated market. They're
looking for specific capabilities and features." Id. See also Miranker, 'Software Samplers'LatestTrend in Publishing,San Francisco Examiner, Jan. 15, 1984, at D1, col. 2.
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Software Vending Machines

One of the more innovative distribution methods is the vending machine. ° Some of these revolutionary systems transfer
software over a phone line from a host computer to a "dumb"
terminal in the computer store.6 1 Other systems contain a
master copy of software that is reproduced onto the consumer's
blank cartridge. Such terminals have the benefit of avoiding
phone lines (and therefore access by hackers) but face theft
from a different source. A serious threat is posed by the possibility that one of the terminals would be physically stolen, containing hundreds of master programs. 62
The copying
opportunities through either scheme will be very tempting to
63
software pirates.

The theory behind software vending machines is wider distri60. The programs are written onto erasable ROM (read-only memory) cartridges
or diskettes. Mace, Start-Up Firms to Distribute Software Electronically, INFoWoRLD, Jan. 30, 1984, at 80, col. 1. The cartridges are sold for $10-30 at the retail
store where the dispensing machine is installed. Shea, Firm to Test Market Software
Vending Machine, INFOWORLD, Feb. 13, 1984, at 39, col. 2.
61. See supra note 12 (explaining "dumb networks").
62. Mace, supra note 60, at 80, col. 2.
63. The legal issues of license agreements become more complex as they become
entwined in such mechanisms. Since the cartridges that the software will be dumped
onto will be reusable for many different types of software produced by various
software developers, it appears that if any sort of license agreement is used, it will
need to be within the program itself. On the one hand, such a system may enable the
software author to "directly" distribute the software to the consumer and therefore
strengthen the argument that a contract is formed directly with the user. On the
other hand, the software may be coming in from phone lines controlled by a middleman or may be copied off of master copies in the machine, which raises all the contract formation issues presently implicated in retail sales.
A license agreement which appears on the user's screen would certainly give the
user notice of its terms. One problem is that the user would not get the notice until
the software is already purchased and loaded into the computer, after both opening
the package and "use." If the program required the user to "sign" his name to show
acceptance, before the program would operate, issues of validity of an electronic "signature" would be brought into play. On the practical side, what user wants to get
home from a shopping trip and have to deal with such an option? And if he doesn't
plan to accept the terms, the burden of returning the software to the store falls on the
consumer. The question is whether the product more closely resembles a retail item
that the consumer should have an opportunity to "try on for fit" or one that he must
take home before deciding he "does not like it." An interest in customer satisfaction
cuts in favor of allowing the consumer to "test drive" the software at the store.
The concept of placing restrictions on the use of a program (by retention of title to
the copy of the retail software) is stretched as software increasingly resembles fungible goods. Consumers are in the habit of purchasing fungible goods without restrictions. Their experience with purchasing mass-marketed products containing
intellectual property rights is commonly limited to books and records which do not
spell out restrictions on use. Consumers who are well educated as to copyright law
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bution through self-service, resulting in increased sales for the
software developers and lower prices for the public. 4 The typical vending machine scenario would go as follows:
The buyer will place the cartridge in the appropriate slot of
the machine and peruse the index to see what software is available. The large video screen continually runs random "attract
sequences" to lure customers. Upon request, it will run 20-segment action sequences from any of the available games so that
the customer can see what he's buying.

When the customer makes a selection, the machine tells him
the cost. The customer inserts money into the two paper
money slots (one for $1 bills and one for $5 bills). In less than a
second, the software is transferred to the cartridge.
The customer removes the cartridge, and the machine then
prints instructions for the software, a receipt and some promotional literature about what programs will be featured the following week.6 5

The cost to purchase the software that is reproduced onto
cartridges ranges from seven to nine dollars.66 Many software
developers are outraged and claim that vending machines will
"cheapen the entire software industry. 6 7 They express concern
that software will resemble "commodities" and fear giving up
"control in terms of the quality of it and the uniqueness of the
' 68
presentation of it at retail.
Software developers who approve of the systems are still con-

know they can not make copies but they also know that it is unlikely that they will be
caught if they do.
64. Shea, supra note 60, at 40, col. 1. There is some skepticism that software publishers will actually pass the savings on to the average user. Bartimo, supra note 46,
at 32, col. 3. Vending machine systems will benefit publishers who wish to test
software in the market since the distribution time is reduced from six to eight weeks
to only two, due to the elimination of the manufacturing process. The retailer benefits because the risk of having too much obsolete inventory is removed. Shea, supra
note 60, at 39, col. 3.
65. Shea, supra note 60, at 39, col. 2. According to the president of the vending
machine firms, "some people have called this [software vending machine] the ultimate
Coke machine." Id at 39, col. 3.
66. Shea, supra note 60, at 39, col. 1.
67. Id. Some retailers are concerned that the vending firws will bypass them by
setting up machines in shopping malls. Id. at 40, col. 1.
68. Id. at 39, col. 1 (quoting James Morgan, President and CEO of Atari). However, it is interesting to note that Atari and Activision announced their plans to form a
joint-venture company to directly distribute software electronically to homes. The
system will use FM-radio broadcast signals which transmit messages into encrypted
data. The scheme will, of course, bypass distributors and stores. Over 60 games will
be offered to selected Atari VCS 2600 videogame owners. Chin, Firms Plan to Distribute Software Electronically, INFOWORLD, Jan. 16, 1984, at 21, col. 1.
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cerned that the systems be uncrackable "to prevent unscrupulous dealers or hackers from making unlimited, unaccountedfor copies of software. ' 69 There is also concern that store employees might figure out a way to get past the vending
machine's accounting and billing system.7 °
4. Software Distribution Via Telephone Lines
Plans are being made by software producers to bypass both
distributors and retail stores by selling software directly, over
telephone lines to consumers in their homes. 7 ' Similar plans
are being developed by start-up software distribution companies.72 Under this approach, the home user dials a number to
69. Mace, supra note 60, at 80, col. 1.
70. Id. at 80, col. 2.
71. Electronic distribution has been around for years in the form of bulletin
boards and on-line databases which have offered public domain software (freeware)
and documentation without cost to users with modems. Bartimo, supra note 46, at 32,
col. 3. Alternatively, user-supported software carries a message within the program
asking for a donation ranging from $10 to $190. Watt, Software For A Donation, INFOWORLD, June 11, 1984, at 36, col. 1. Both freeware and user-supported software are
based on the philosophy of "swap and trade" which is contrary to the retail market
viewpoint of volume and profits.
The desire to swap and trade software had its origin early in the development of
programs:
Prior to 1969, when the industry was in its developmental stages, hardware
occupied the center of attention, while software was relegated to an incidental service supplied by the computer manufacturer in support of the hardware ....

[I]n this early period, computer users, as a group apart, were

noticably 'clubby' in that they formed associations oriented towards a particular manufacturer's equipment in order to share experiences and discuss
problems. A natural offshoot of these associations was the free interchange
of computer programs so that the other fellow would not have to 'reinvent
the wheel.' This milieu was in large part due to the fact that the earliest
computer applications were in the educational and scientific sectors of the
market, which are generally characterized by full and free disclosure and
immediate publication.
Note, supra note 23, at 123.
A successful user-supported software author, Jim Button, "says that 50,000 copies of
his PC-File program are running on IBMs and compatibles across the country, and
from each satisfied user he asks $45. He gets about $1000 in checks a day and sometimes twice that, though he didn't get paid for all 50,000 copies." Watt, supra at 36, col.
3. He estimates his copying to profit ratio to be 10 free copies to one profit-earning
copy.
72. The same sort of distribution scheme is being applied to retailers by Softyme
of San Francisco. The retailer downloads software for the customer to pick up at the
store. Abbreviated documentation is contained in a text file and full documentation
will be mailed to the user by next-day delivery. The store's receiving device will
download and store the software at up to 9,600 bits per second so that the disk is ready
in 20 minutes as compared to two hours for a user to download a similar program at
300 to 1200 bits per second. Bartimo, supra note 46, at 30, col. 3.
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reach a recorded message which tells her what to do next.73
The user types in her selections and information describing the
type of computer, the software format desired (cartridge or
tape) and an account number. Through use of a special modem,
the host computer then disables the keyboard of the personal
computer and sends the software.74 Only the users with the
special modem can connect to the host computer because the
company uses "a nonstandard communications protocol and
will even vary the speed at which it transmits, depending on
the quality of the phone line."7 The host computer also sends
an encryption key that changes from call to call so that hackers
who tap into the phone line with a tape recorder cannot decrypt
the key.76 Obviously, this system of distribution will cause even
further licensing headaches as it enters the realm of "home
copying." Because the purchased software is "packageless,"
any licensing agreements will need to be presented via the initial recorded message or contained within the transmitted program. Intriguing legal issues regarding offer and acceptance,
terms of the license and ownership of the copy are raised when
the transmission blurs some of the traditional commercial and
contract indicia. This note discusses such issues in the less nebulous mass-marketed retail software context.
5. Software Distribution Via Cable TV
Currently, at least one cable TV network enables consumers
to receive up to 90 software programs and plans to eventually
offer up to 500 programs. 77 "The company uses satellite tech73. Mace, supra note 60, at 80, col. 3.
74. Id. Another company, Control Video Corporation, is promoting a subscriber
service for video games. A $10 monthly fee enables the user to rent a Master Module
modem and download as many games as desired. Chin, supra note 68, at 21, col. 3.

75. Id.
76. "Encryption" is a process by which a program is encoded and information is
changed from one form to another to prevent easy access. " Decryption" is the process
of decoding.
77. The system is the Nabu Home Computer Network of Alexandria, Virginia,
near Washington, D.C. The company started with 380 subscribing families but expects 150,000 to sign up within two years. The business is an offshoot of a Canadian
company that solicited 2000 subscribers within its first year of operation. Nabu subscribers pay $27.95 per month for the service. Meyers, Software via Cable TV, INFOWORLD, Aug. 20, 1984, at 30, col. 1. The system works as follows:
A digital signal representing the Nabu programs goes from a minicomputer
to a modulator for conversion to an FM signal. That signal is relayed to a
satellite, which beams it back to cable TV operators. Nabu equipment at the
cable transmission station remodulates the signal into OQPSK (Offset Quad-
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nology that allows it to transmit more than 6.3 million bits of
computer information per second to cable operators. 7 8 The
existence of such a system raises the issue of home copying as
well as an inquiry into whether licensing agreements and retention of title are feasible in such transactions.

III
The Federal Copyright Law
Federal copyright law is the primary means of protection for
mass-marketed software. An examination of the scope of copyright law protection as well as its limitations under the first
sale doctrine provides valuable background for an analysis of
the possible role of state protection of software.
Copyright law stems from the grant of power in the Constitution "to Promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."7 9 The
purpose of the Copyright Act is to effect a balance between
competing forces.8 " While the creator of the computer program
rature Phase Shift Keying). A Nabu adaptor in the home converts the FM
signal back to a digital signal.
Id. at 30, col. 2.
78. The signal was originally from Ottowa via Telesat Canada's Anik I satellite.
As of mid 1984, negotiations were underway for use of the Galaxy I or Satcom II
satellites to originate the signal from Alexandria. Id.
79. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The current protection is a result of the Copyright
Revision Act of 1976, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (codified as 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-801 (1982)). The
copyright owner has both the right to reproduce and distribute the copyrighted work
and may grant those privileges to others. N. BOORSTYN, COPYRIGHT LAW § 1:1 (1981).

See also 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982). The policy rationale is that without such protection,
unauthorized copying would undermine the economic incentive for the author. This
would ultimately lead to the creation of fewer new works. N. BOORSTYN, supra § 1:2.
Although copyright does not protect ideas, it protects the various expressions of ideas.
1 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.03[D] (1983).
80. Although the term "balance" has been used by the Supreme Court to describe
the responsibility of Congress in defining the scope of the limited copyright monopoly,
the method actually applied resembles a benefit maximization approach. Sony Corp.
of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) [hereinafter Sony]. The
term "balancing" implies the weighing of competing conflicting interests or rights. In
contrast, " 'rights' of parties involve judgments which are difficult to define on any
objective criterion, let along [sic] to quantify. A still more difficult question than
'What rights exist?' is 'What rights should exist for each of the parties?'" Analysis,
supra note 34, at 151. This "Conflict-of-Rights" model assumes the existence of
"rights on both sides, and weighs the awards in favor of the side with the greatest
rights. Viewing the issue as a conflict of rights has drawbacks. The major drawback is
the normative nature of the approach, and the inherent, subjective nature of any resolution of the conflict." Id. at 150. In contrast, the Supreme Court's approach is ori-
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has an interest in controlling and exploiting the economic potential of the software, society has a "competing interest in the
free flow of ideas, information and commerce."8' 1 As a reward
and incentive, the creator is given a limited monopoly.8 2
However,
[t]he monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize are
neither unlimited nor primarily designed to provide a special
private benefit. Rather, the limited grant is a means by which
an important public purpose may be achieved. It is intended to
motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors by the
provision of a special reward, and to allow the public access to
the products of their genius after the limited period of exclu83
sive control has expired.
The focus of the monopoly granted by the copyright statute is
on "the general benefits derived by the public from the labors
of authors." 4 Contrary to the copyright owner's perspective,
the owner's monetary reward is a "secondary consideration" to
the public's interest in enrichment via a wide dissemination of
information." Although seeking profit may be the primary factor motivating the copyright owner, it falls outside of the purpose of the copyright law where it ceases to be a means and
86
becomes a goal unto itself.
ented toward achieving "an important public purpose." Sony, 464 U.S. at 429. The
Maximizing Benefits to the Public model considers
benefits to producers only to the extent that they are members of the public.
The size of the costs and benefits to individual members of each group from
various policies is considered as is the relative size of each group. The "public" is defined as all those persons who gain from the provision or use of copyrighted material. The ratio of producers to the relevant public is typically
very small.
Analysis, supra note 34, at 150. The Analysis report favored the Benefit model because "benefits may be more easily defined than rights" and are based on more objective criteria than rights. Id. The report concluded that "the optimal amount of
protection of copyrighted work is that which [is] necessary in order to maximize benefits for the public .... Id. A recognition of the Supreme Court's use of the Benefit
model can prove to be a useful analytical tool in examining current copyright issues.
81. Sony, 464 U.S. at 429.
82. "In economic policy-certainly within any form of market system-there is
always a presumption against the granting or extension of monopoly power: the burden of proof is on him who would see monopoly expanded." Analysis, supra note 34,
at 117.
83. Sony, 464 U.S. at 429.
84. Fox Film Corp. v. Royal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1975).
85. United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1947).
86. The Supreme Court warned of this in a footnote:
Lord Mansfield's statement of the problem almost 200 years ago in Sayre v.
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The Nature of Copyright Protection

The copyright monopoly is limited in both its scope and duration. The protection given extends only to "original works of
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now
known or later developed, from which they can be perceived,
reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with
the aid of a machine or device. ' '87 The list of works of authorship in section 102 of the 1976 Copyright Act includes a category for "literary works. ' 8 A computer program is a "literary
work," protected from unauthorized copying,8 9 whether in
source or object form. 90 Even though the legislative history of
Moore, quoted in a footnote to Cary v. Longman, 1 East 358, 362n(b), 102 Eng
Rep 138, 140n(b) (1801), bears repeating:
(We must take care to guard against two extremes equally prejudicial; the
one, that men of ability, who have employed their time for the service of the
community, may not be deprived of their just merits, and the reward of their
ingenuity and labour; the other, that the world may not be deprived of improvements, nor the progress of the arts be retarded.
Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 n.6 (1975).
87. Copyright Revision Act of 1976 § 102, 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1982). "A work is fixed
in a tangible medium of expression when its embodiment in a copy.., is sufficiently
permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
88. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1982).
89. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1249 (3rd
Cir. 1983). See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula International, 725 F.2d 521 (9th Cir.
1984).
90. Canned consumer software is distributed in object code form. The terms
"source" and "object" refer to phases of a computer program:
The first phase is the development of a flow chart which is a schematic
representation of the program's logic. It sets forth the logical steps in solving
a given problem. The second phase is the development of a 'source program'
which is a translation of the flow chart into computer programming language, such as FORTRAN or COBOL. Source programs may be punched on
decks of cards or imprinted on discs, tapes or drums. The third phase is the
development of an 'assembly program' which is a translation of the programming language into machine language, i.e., mechanically readable computer
language. Unlike source programs, which are readable by trained programmers, assembly programs are virtually unintelligible except by the computer
itself. Finally, the fourth phase is the development of an 'object program'
which is a conversion of the machine language into a device commanding a
series of electrical impulses. Object programs, which enter into the mechanical process itself, cannot be read without the aid of special equipment and
cannot be understood by even the most highly trained programmers. J.
BROWN & R. WORKMAN, HOW A COMPUTER SYSTEM WORKS 149-75 (1976);
Keplinger, Computer Intellectual Property Claims: Computer Software &
DataBase Protection,WASH. U.L.Q. 461, 464 (1977); M. Pope & P. Pope, Protection of ProprietaryInterests in Computer Software, 30 ALA. L. REV. 527,
530-31 (1979).
Data Cash Systems, Inc. v. JS&A Group, Inc., 408 F. Supp. 1063 (N.D.Ill. 1979).
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the 1976 Copyright Act expresses the view that computer programs are copyrightable subject matter, 91 the National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works
(CONTU) recommended that the statute be amended "to make
it explicit that computer programs, to the extent that they embody an author's original creation, are proper subject matter of
copyright." 92 The 1980 amendment to the 1976 Copyright Act
defines "computer program" in section 101 and grants special
rights pertaining to archival copies and adaptations to owners
of a copy of a program under section 117.11
The copyright monopoly does not give the software author
complete control over every conceivable use of the software.9 4
The monopoly is limited to the five exclusive rights extended to
91. S. REP. No. 473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) [hereinafter Senate Report]; H.R.
REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) [hereinafter House Report], reprinted in
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5659 (1976); H.R. REP. No. 1733, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1976), [hereinafter Conference Report], reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 5810 (1976).
92. CONTU FINAL REPORT 54 (July 31, 1978) [herinafter CONTU Report].
CONTU was created by Congress prior to enacting the 1976 Copyright Act to analyze
the feasibility of copyrighting software. Act of Dec. 31, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-53, tit. II,
88 Stat. 1973 (1974). Several of the recommendations made were incorporated into the
1980 Amendment of the 1976 Copyright Act. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 117 (1982).
93. 1980 Computer Software Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 10, 94 Stat. 3028
(1980) (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 117 (1982)). The amendments are as follows:
§ 101. Definitions... A computer program is a set of statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a
certain result.
§ 117. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 106 it is not an infringement
for the owner of a copy of a computer program to make or authorize the
making of another copy or adaptation of that computer program provided:
1. That such a new copy or adaptation is created as an essential step in the
utilization of the computer program in conjunction with a machine and that
it is used in no other manner, or
2. That such new copy or adaptation is for archival purposes only and that
all archival copies are to be destroyed in the event the continued possession
of the program should cease to be rightful.
Any exact copies prepared in accordance with the provisions of this Section
may be leased, sold, or otherwise transferred, along with the copy from
which such copies were prepared, only as part of the lease, sale or other
transfer of all right in the program. Adaptations so prepared may be transferred only with the authorization of the copyright owner.
17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 117 (1982).
94. It is important to note the distinction between copyright ownership and the
ownership of a copy:
Ownership of a copyright, or of any of the exclusive rights under a copyright is distinct from ownership of any material object in which the work is
embodied. Transfer of ownership of any material object . .. does not itself
convey any rights in the copyrighted work embodied in the object; nor, in the
absence of an agreement, does transfer of ownership of a copyright or of any
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the copyright owner by section 106.11 These exclusive rights include the right to reproduce copies; the right to prepare derivative works; the right to distribute copies by sale, other transfer
of ownership, or rental, lease or lending; the right to perform;
and the right to display. 6
The copyright monopoly does not extend for an unlimited
time period. The Constitution requires that copyright be for
"limited Times."9' 7 Under the 1976 Copyright Act, the protection arises automatically on the creation of the work and lasts
the life of the author plus fifty years. 98 Additionally, the exclusive rights may be limited in duration by the operation of other
sections of the statute. 99
B.

The First Sale Doctrine

The exclusive right to distribute a particular copy of the
copyrighted work endures only until the first sale of the
copy. 100 This principle, known as the "first sale doctrine," is
central to the purpose of copyright law. 10 The copyright law
exclusive right under a copyright convey property rights in any material

object.
17 U.S.C. § 202 (1982). This concept continues the distinction expressed in section 27
of the 1909 Copyright Act. Congress acknowledged the basis for this distinction when
it noted "the multitude of material objects in which it [the original work] can be embodied." House Report, supra note 91, at 53.
95. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982).
96. Id.
97. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
98. 17 U.S.C. § 302(2) (1982).
99. Section 106 "sets forth the copyright owner's exclusive rights in broad terms
... and then ... provide(s) various limitations, qualifications or exemptions in the 12
sections that follow." House Report, supra note 91, at 61. The five exclusive rights
are "subject to sections 107 through 118." 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982). The provisions most
relevant to this note are sections 109 and 117, which go into effect after the first sale
grants ownership of the specific copy to the purchaser. Section 109 cuts off the copyright owner's exclusive right of distribution as to the specific copy. Section 117 negates the copyright owner's exclusive right of reproduction as to an archival copy
made from the specific copy. It also negates the copyright owner's exclusive right to
prepare derivative works as to a specific copy used as an "essential step."
100. Section 107 allows some exception to this under the "fair use" doctrine. 17
U.S.C. § 107 (1982).
101. Section 109 limits exclusive rights. The effect of transfer of a particular copy
or phonorecord is as follows:
(a) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106(3), the owner of a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this title, or any other person
authorized by such owner, is entitled, without the authority of the copyright
owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy or
phonorecord.
(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106(5), the owner of a particu-
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contemplates that if the author is given an economic reward, he
will allow the public access to his copyrighted work. 10 2 However, the scope of the public's access to any given work is inversely proportional to the exclusive rights that the copyright
owner maintains in the work. The five exclusive rights which
comprise the "bundle of rights" given under the copyright law
may be owned and enforced separately'013 and it is not until after the expiration of all of the rights that the work enters the
public domain. A work that is in the public domain may be
copied freely.
A distinction must be made between the right to distribute
copies and the right to transfer a copy after the first sale. The
right to distribute copies remains in the copyright owner until
the expiration of the copyright fifty years after the death of the
creator of the work. However, the copyright owner's exclusive
right to distribute a particularcopy ends after the first sale.
Although the public enjoys greatest access to the work as a
whole after the expiration of the entire copyright, access to a
particular copy is enhanced after the first sale because the copy
can be freely alienated by the owner of the copy. 10 4 The public
lar copy lawfully made under this title, or any person authorized by such
owner, is entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to display
that copy publicly, either directly or by the projection of no more than one
image at a time, to viewers present at the place where the copy is located.
(c) The privileges prescribed by subsections (a) and (b) do not, unless authorized by the copyright owner, extend to any person who has acquired possession of the copy or phonorecord from the copyright owner, by rental, lease,
loan, or otherwise, without acquiring ownership of it.
17 U.S.C. § 109 (1982).
102. "It is said that reward to the author or artist serves to induce release to the
public of the products of his creative genius." United States v. Paramount Pictures,
Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1947). Under the current copyright statute, the author has a
choice of distributing the work to the public by "sale or other transfer of ownership by
rental, lease, or lending." 17 U.S.C. § 106(3)(1982). "The immediate effect of our
copyright law is to secure a fair return for an 'author's' creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public
good." Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975).
103. House Report, supra note 91, at 61. The exclusive rights may be "subdivided
indefinitely." Id.
104. Evidence of the growing second-hand market in software can be seen by reading the classified ads in the newspaper. The used computer market is also growing. It
is estimated that 3% of all computer sales are used machines and that figure is expected to grow as "innovation in new machines drops off." Bartimo, Used Computers
Are Selling, INFOWORLD, June 18, 1984, at 58, col. 1. One dealer estimates that used
computers will take a 50% share of the market in three to five years. Id. It should be
noted that transfer of a given program in the secondary market will only continue as
long as the software has market value. It seems doubtful that much software will
have market value by the time its copyright term expires. The market life of software
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does not enjoy any of the other exclusive rights after the first
sale, but it can be said that the ability to alienate the copy results in wider dissemination of information and greater public
access.
The copyright law uses the incentive of monetary gain both
as a means to encourage the author to disseminate the work to
the public and as a cut-off point for the author's control over
the particular copy. Once a copy is sold and the copyright
owner has reaped his economic benefit, the new owner of the
copy may dispose of the copy without the consent of the copyright owner. 10 5 In other words, once the economic incentive
has triggered the desired behavior by the copyright owner (distribution of the work), the purpose of the statute has been satisfied and "it would be most unwise to permit the copyright
proprietor to exercise any control whatever over the article
which is the subject of copyright after said proprietor has made
'10 6
the first-sale.
Although the copyright law ensures that the copyright owner
will only have the benefit of the statutory monopoly for a limited number of years, without encouragement to the copyright
owner to actively perform, display and distribute the work,
such a grant would only benefit the public after the expiration
of the lengthy monopoly. It is the purpose of encouraging the
ongoing access to the work by the public that the right to distribution facilitates and the first sale accomplishes. The statute
grants a monopoly no broader than is necessary to accomplish
107
the purpose of copyright law.
The purpose behind the first sale doctrine was illustrated by
is short compared to the term of copyright. See Caruso, supra note 29, at 81, col. 1.
However, it is the consumer's ability to effectively use and transfer the individual
copy, during the copyright term, that must be weighed against the policy of allowing
software licenses to purport to control the copy perpetually. Protection for unpublished works under state law was capable of indefinite duration under the 1909 Copyright Act, which allowed state copyright protection. Under the 1976 Act, however,
state copyright has been abolished for all works fixed in a tangible form, and the only
protection is under federal law. The Constitution mandates that this protection is for
a limited time. See 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1982).
105. This concept is currently codified in section 109 and is referred to as the "first
sale" doctrine. The statute states that "the owner of a particular copy ... lawfully
made.. ., or any person authorized by such owner, is entitled, without the authority of
the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy. . .
17 U.S.C. § 109(a)(1982).
106. H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1909). See Lantern Press v. American Publishing Co., 419 F. Supp. 1267 (E.D.N.Y. 1976).
107. The classic argument is as follows:
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8
The Court
the Supreme Court in Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus.10

reasoned as follows:
What does the statute mean in granting "the sole right of
vending the same?" Was it intended to create a right which
would permit the holder of the copyright to fasten by notice in
a book or upon one of the articles mentioned within the statute, a restriction upon the subsequent alienation of the subjectmatter of copyright after the owner had parted with the title to
one who had acquiredfull dominion over it and had given a
satisfactorypricefor it? It is not denied that one who has sold
a copyrighted article, without restriction, has parted with all
right to control the sale of it. The purchaser of a book, once
sold by authority of the owner of the copyright, may sell it
again, although he could not publish a new edition of it.10 9
It is important to note that the copyright owner still retains
the exclusive right of distribution as to the copyright even
though the distribution right has been cut off as to the specific
copy. ° Ownership of the copy in no way affects ownership of
the copyright.

C. The Historical and Policy Perspectives of the
First Sale Doctrine
An understanding of the policies to be effectuated by the first
sale doctrine requires an inquiry into the origin of the doctrine
and its original scope. The reference in Bobbs-Merrill to "vending the same" is to an early version of the copyright statute
which the Court quoted as follows:
Any citizen of the United States or resident therein, who shall
be the author, inventor, designer, or proprietor of any book,
It is good that authors should be remunerated; and the least exceptional
way of remunerating them is by a monopoly. Yet monopoly is an evil. For
the sake of the good we must submit to the evil; but the evil ought not to last
a day longer than is necessary for the purpose of securing the good.
Cohen, Duration, 24 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1180, 1186 (1977) (quoting 8 THE WORKS OF
LORD MACAULEY 195, 197-99 (1866)). Lord Macauley espoused this viewpoint in his
speeches against the proposed amendment of British Copyright from 28 years after
publication to 60 years after death of the author (a term closely resembling our current copyright duration under the 1976 Act). Id. at 1185. Although Macauley was
addressing the statutory duration of the entire copyright as a single bundle, the same
principle encompasses all aspects of duration under the current divisible copyright,
including the duration of each exclusive right up until the point at which it is cut off
by the first sale. Id.
108. 210 U.S. 339 (1907).
109. Id. at 349-50 (emphasis added).
110. 17 U.S.C. § 202 (1982).
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map, chart, dramatic or musical composition, engraving, cut,
print or photograph or negative thereof, or of a painting, drawing, chromo, statue, statuary, and of models or designs intended to be perfected as works of the fine arts, and the
executors, administrators, or assigns of any such person, shall,
upon complying with the provisions of this chapter, have the
sole liberty of printing, reprinting, publishing, completing,
copying, executing, finishing and vending the same."1
This passage gives insight into the original nature of the "right
to vend."
The first sale doctrine arose as a judicial interpretation which
limited the "right to vend.

' 112

The Supreme Court sought to

effectuate the legislative intent behind copyright in the following passage from Bobbs-Merrill:
The owner of the copyright in this case did sell copies of the
book in quantities and at a price satisfactory to it. It has exercised the right to vend. What the complainant contends for
embraces not only the right to sell the copies, but to qualify the
title of a future purchaser by the reservation of the right to
have the remedies of the statute against the infringer because
of the printed notice of its purpose so to do unless the purchaser sells at a price fixed in the notice. To add to the right of
exclusive sale the authority to control all future retail sales, by
a notice that such sales must be made at a fixed sum, would
give a right not included in the terms of the statute, and, in our
view, extend its operation, by construction, beyond its meaning, when interpreted with 1a13view to ascertaining the legislative intent in its enactment.
The 1909 revision of the copyright law continued the first
sale doctrine in section 27 which provided:
The copyright is distinct from the property in the material object copyrighted, and the sale or conveyance, by gift or otherwise, of the material object shall not of itself constitute a
transfer of the copyright, nor shall the assignment of the copyright constitute a transfer of the title to the material object;
but nothing in this title shall be deemed to forbid, prevent, or
restrict the transfer of any copy of a copyrighted work, the possession of which has lawfully been obtained." 4
The imprecise phrase, "the possession of which has been law111. Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. at 348.

112. The first sale doctrine was first codified in 17 U.S.C. § 27 (repealed 1976). The
first sale doctrine is currently codified at 17 U.S.C. § 109 (1982).
113. Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. at 351.
114. 17 U.S.C. § 27 (repealed 1976).
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fully obtained," was troublesome because it implied that the
copyright holder could lose protection merely by bailment,
which is a form of lawful possession. The Second Circuit ad-

dressed the problem in Plattand Munk Co. v. Republic Graphics, Inc. by concluding that the legislative history of the 1909 act
required a first sale, not mere possession, to divest the exclusive right to vend the particular copy.1 15 The 1909 House Report stated:
Section [27] is not intended to change in any way existing law,
but simply to recognize the distinction, long established, between the material object and the right to produce copies
thereof. The concluding clause in the section, that "nothing in
this act shall be deemed to forbid, prevent or restrict the transfer of any copy of a work copyrighted under this act the possession of which has been lawfully obtained," is inserted in order
to make it clear that there is no intention to enlarge in any way
the construction to be given to the word "vend" in the first
section of the bill. Your committee feels that it would be most
unwise to permit the copyright proprietor to exercise any control whatever over the article which is the subject of copyright
after said proprietor has made the first sale.1 16
Sections 109 and 202 of the 1976 Copyright Act embody the
first sale doctrine. 7 The House Report addresses the need for
a full transfer of ownership in order to trigger the first sale and
emphasizes that section 109(a)
restates and confirms the principle that, where the copyright
owner has transferred ownership of a particular copy or phonorecord of a work, the person to whom the copy or phonorecord is transferred is entitled to dispose of it by sale,
rental, or by any other means. Under this principle, which has
been established by court decisions and section 27 of the present law, the copyright owner's exclusive right of public distribution would have no effect upon anyone who owns a
particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this title
and who wishes to transfer it to someone else or to destroy
8
it.

11

Under the 1976 Copyright Act, the key to the first sale doc115. Platt and Munk Co. v. Republic Graphics, 315 F.2d 847 (2d Cir. 1963). See also
U.S. v. Wise, 550 F.2d 1180 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 929 (1978); American
International Pictures Inc. v. Foreman, 576 F.2d 661 (5th Cir. 1978); Lantern Press Inc.

v. American Publishing Co., 419 F. Supp. 1267 (E.D.N.Y. 1976).
116. H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1909).
117. See supra notes 101 and 94 respectively.
118. House Report, supra note 91, at 79.
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trine is "ownership."'1 9 Thus, authority to sell the particular
to persons who acquire
copy is a privilege that is not extended
120
possession by rental, lease or loan.
From the copyright owner's perspective, rental provides a restricted opportunity for economic gain, which is more beneficial
than not distributing the copies at all, but not quite so lucrative
as a retail sale. The economic reward from rental is spread out
over time in the form of monthly payments. In contrast, in a
sale, the copyright owner sells the work in quantities and gets a
price" while the consumer gets "full
one time "satisfactory
2
dominion.' '
D.

The Software Transaction

Under an analysis placing form over substance, the rights of
the parties in a software transaction are defined by the label
that is put on the transfer. If the transaction is labeled a "sale,"
the consumer becomes the owner of the copy and the copyright
owner's exclusive right to distribution is cut off as to that copy.
The copyright owner thus gives up the control of the copy in
exchange for a "satisfactory price.' 22 If the transaction is labeled a rental, lease or bailment, then the copyright owner retains the exclusive right of distribution as to the copy and the
consumer has only the ordinary incidents of possession which
are spelled out in the contractual agreement. Under this scenario, while the copyright owner gives up some control over the
copy in return for payments over time, the first sale doctrine is
not triggered. The copyright owner can rent, lease or lend the
copy or keep it to himself because there is no requirement that
there be a first sale. 23 If the statutory copyright monopoly encouraged the copyright owner to keep the work to himself, the
public interest in dissemination would not be advanced. As the
copyright law is written, if the author has any desire to make a
profit, he must decide how much control over the copy to relinquish. While a sale will force the author to give up all rights as
to distribution, rental and lease rights provide some continuing
control for the copyright owner.'2 4 By taking the time to form
119.
120.
121.
122.

17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (1982).
Id.
Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. at 350.
Id.

123. 2 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.12[B] (1978).

124. Both rental and lease denote periodic payments over a period of time, for the
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contractual relationships with each lessee, the copyright owner
gets pecuniary reward over time instead of a one time payment,
avoids the first sale doctrine, and thereby maintains some degree of control. The nature of a rental is such that the author
must consider the return of all the copies distributed at the end
of the rental term. It is possible that the returned copies will
have little or no market value. The costs of remarketing and
storage could prove to be unprofitable. The consumer, on the
other hand, benefits from a rental or lease arrangement by obtaining the copy for a limited period of time and under conditions of restricted use, yet has the burden of returning the copy
to the copyright owner.
In contrast to the rental or lease arrangement, an outright
sale features a one time price, the possibility of distribution
through the mass market and no requirement that the object
be returned. In such a case, the purchasing public has the ability to alienate the copy without limitation.
A problem arises when the transaction "looks like a sale and
acts like a sale" but is labeled "Agreement." In such a transaction the copyright owner seeks to receive a "satisfactory price"
and to retain control of the copy. Therefore, the legal effect is
neither that of a sale nor a lease, rental or bailment. The copyright owner, who is in the best position to structure the transaction, creates this "sale in bailment's clothing" by licensing the
copy to the consumer. This situation closely resembles the type
of activity disapproved by the Supreme Court in Bobbs-Merrill
Co v. Straus.'2 5
A license is "the permission by competent authority to do an
act which, without such permission, would be illegal, a trespass
or a tort."1'26 It has also been defined as a privilege to do what
the general public is prohibited from doing.' 2 7 The use of the
term license implies that the copyright owner has rights which
right to use or possess the software. The general definition of a lease of tangible personal property is "a contract by which one owning such property grants to another the
right to possess, use and enjoy it for a specified period of time in exchange for periodic
payment of a stipulated price, referred to as rent." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 800 (5th
ed. 1979). Rent is "the compensation or fee paid, usually periodically, for the use of
any property, land, buildings, equipment, etc." Id. at 1166.
125. 210 U.S. 339, 349-50 (1907). The Supreme Court disapproved of an owner's
attempt to restrict subsequent alienation by one who had acquired full dominion and
given a satisfactory price for a book. Id. See supra text accompanying note 109.
126. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 829 (5th ed. 1979).
127. Hohfield, Some FundamentalLegal Conceptions as Applied in JudicialReasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 39 (1917).
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the consumer does not. Under section 106, the copyright owner
has the exclusive right to authorize persons to reproduce, distribute, adapt, display and perform the copyrighted work. Licensing these rights to the consumer is a positive authorization
for the consumer to exercise one or more of the exclusive
rights listed under section 106. However, when a consumer engages in a section 106 activity without copyright owner authorization, it is a copyright infringement unless the consumer
1 2 has statutory authorization
inherently
under sections 109 or
117.129 Conversely, any activity which the consumer engages in
which is not a section 106 activity is not a copyright infringement because the copyright owner's authorization is not
needed. Conceivably, consumers can contract away rights that
they inherently have when engaging in a sales transaction with
the copyright owner. However, such an agreement is not a license because the consumer inherently holds those rights and
is not receiving positive authorization. Instead, the consumer is
agreeing to restrict or narrow the rights granted to him by the
copyright statute at the moment of sale.
The rights that the consumer can obtain by license are determined by the transaction in which the consumer gains access to
the software. If it is a sale, the consumer needs a license to
make unlimited copies but not to make an archival copy. 130 The
consumer also needs a license to sell copies made under a license to reproduce, but does not need a license to sell the copy
purchased. However, if the transaction is a lease or rental, the
consumer needs a license to make any copies including the archival copy.
License agreements attached to retail software often flatly
prohibit future sales of the copy. In theory, such a restraint
against alienation is a contract term which is not valid in the
face of the copyright law's first sale doctrine. The consumer
has the right under copyright law to sell the copy purchased
because that copy is withdrawn from the protection of the copyright owner's exclusive right of distribution under the first sale
doctrine. However, a copyright owner can contract with a con128. The term "inherently" is used to emphasize the fact that because the consumer is specifically given the right by statute, permission by the copyright owner is
frivolous.
129. See supra note 101 (quoting the text of section 109, the first sale doctrine,
which permits redistribution of the copy); supra note 93 (quoting the text of section
117 which permits the making of archival copies and adaptations).
130. See 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1982), supra note 93.
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sumer regarding the conditions under which the future disposition of an original copy or copies will take place in spite of the
fact that the initial transaction may represent a sale. 3 1 The
conditions under which the future disposition of the copy may
occur can be the subject of a contract which will limit the consumer's right to freely alienate the particular copy. By contract, the consumer could agree to dispose of the copy by rental
only; if he violates the terms of this agreement and sells the
purchased copy outright, his action would be a breach of contract, 132 not a copyright infringement because copyright law
does not forbid the sale or distribution of a purchased copy after the first sale. If the initial transaction between the copyright owner and the first purchaser is in actuality a sale, the
copy can legitimately be further disseminated, either by a subsequent outright sale without contractual restraints, or by a
transaction subjecting the second purchaser to some restrictions, not necessarily enforceable against the third purchaser.
A consumer who rents or leases a copy is subject to terms
restricting disposition. An outright sale by the lessee of the
original copy leased would certainly violate the original transaction entered into between the copyright owner and the consumer. The lessee could be licensed to distribute the original
copy or to make copies under the copyright owner's exclusive
rights of distribution and reproduction. The lessee would need
this license because, as a lessee, he has no statutory right to
distribute or reproduce the copy. The use of the term "license"
in this situation is appropriate because the copyright owner is
giving positive permission to the lessee to do something which
he otherwise has no right to do under copyright law.
The license does not define or control the original transaction
in which the commercial relationships of the parties as seller/
buyer or lessor/lessee were determined; it only defines what
can be done with the copy after the relationship between the
parties has been established by the original transaction. There
is a significant difference between the terms "contract" or "license" as applied to a transaction which has crossed the threshold of a first sale. A license grants a privilege where there
previously was none, and is therefore not applicable to copy
owners who already have limited rights to dispose of the copy
131. House Report, supra note 91, at 79.
132. Id.
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and to make archival copies under sections 109 and 117. Contractual restrictions, on the other hand, may be effective in restraining those section 109 and 117 rights which the consumer
obtains as a result of the sale, but may be enforced only in a
breach of contract action and not in an action for copyright
infringement.1 3 3
To determine whether or not a copyright has been infringed,
it is helpful to ask: (1) does the party inherently have the right
to do this activity under the federal copyright law? (2) if not, is
the activity a section 106 activity? and (3) if so, has the party
been authorized by the copyright owner? Thus, under a federal
copyright analysis, distribution not in accordance with the
terms of the agreement is not authorized and therefore infringes the copyright. 3 At the same time, copyright law contemplates that exclusive rights will be exercised pursuant to
state contract law principles since the statute uses the word
"authorize." However, a state law contract claim which seeks
to protect section 106 rights is redundant and is subject to preemption by the 1976 Copyright Act which abolishes state rights
under common law or statute that are equivalent to section 106
rights. 3 5 Under the same reasoning, copyright law contemplates that the rights of the copyright owner and the party on
the other side of the transaction will be contingent on state
commercial law principles which define whether or not a sale
has occurred and thus the roles of the parties. An expansion of
the role of the copyright owner necessarily expands the scope
of section 106 rights.
133. The landmark case of Harrison v. Maynard, Merrill & Co., 61 F. 689 (2d Cir.
1894) discusses this point:
[T]he right to restrain the sale of a particular copy of the book by virtue of
the copyright statutes has gone when the owner of the copyright and of that
copy parted with all his title to it, and has conferred an absolute title to the
copy upon a purchaser, although with an agreement for a restricted use. The
exclusive right to vend the particular copy no longer remains in the owner of
the copyright by the copyright statutes. The new purchaser cannot reprint
the copy. He cannot print or publish a new edition of the book; but, the copy
having been absolutely sold to him, the ordinary incidents of ownership in
personal property, among which is the right to alienation, attach to it. If he
has agreed that he will not sell it for certain purposes or to certain persons,
and violated his agreement, and sells to an innocent purchaser, he can be
punished for a violation of his agreement; but neither is guilty, under the
copyright statutes, of an infringement.
Id. at 691. See infra note 355 and accompanying text.
134. 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (1982).
135. House Report, supra note 91, at 130.
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It is important to recognize that a state statute permitting a
copyright owner to enforce restrictions in a transaction, which
appears to be the economic equivalent of a sale, by means of a
declaration that no ownership was transferred, extends the
limited copyright monopoly beyond its intended bounds. Such
an expansion of section 106 rights under state law should be
preempted. Because of the strong congressional prohibition
against parallel state legislation, state statutes which deal with
copyrightable subject matter are suspect as attempts to manipulate and redistribute privileges equivalent to section 106
rights. Since the Louisiana Software Enforcement Act deals
with the subject matter of software, its provisions must be examined to determine whether it will be preempted by federal
copyright law.

IV
The Louisiana Software Enforcement Act
Software licensing agreements originally contemplated "the
grant of the right to make, use, or sell the copyrighted work."13' 6
Such licenses were used by the copyright owner to "authorize"
others to reproduce, adapt or distribute the program.'3 7 The
agreements licensed the copyright rights, not the copy. 133 The
copy is the material object in which the copyrighted work is
136. U.S. v. Wells, 176 F. Supp. 630, 634 (S.D.Tex. 1959).
137. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982).
138. Attempts to license the mass-marketed copy closely resemble the old scenarios involving restrictions on chattels such as safety razor blades. Notices on safety
razors stating that they were not to be resharpened were attempts to restrict use.
Although the major benefit to the producer was an increase in profits due to increased
razor sales, the procedure was offered in the guise of a consumer satisfaction approach. The argument was that such an admonition was necessary to preserve the
manufacturer's business reputation as a source of sharp blades.
The razor blade restriction is similar to an equitable servitude involving the "imposition of restrictions on land in the original recorded deed, of which later purchasers
are bound to take notice." Note, Equitable Servitudes on Chattels, 41 HARV. L. REV.
946, 953 (1928) [hereinafter Equitable Servitudes]. The licenses placed on software
resemble the notice placed "on the chattel or its container, specifying the restriction
which was to bind all later owners and in this way, anyone who acquired the article,
no matter how numerous the intervening sales, was prevented from being a purchaser
without notice of the restriction." Id.
Restrictions on use limit freedom of alienation, "which is regarded as an essential
incident of ownership of chattels." Id. at 982. An attempt to restrict future purchasers by retention of title and acceptance of labelled goods is not new. Such attempts
have failed, primarily because assent is necessary to a contract. Id. at 984 (citing Garst
v. Wissler, 21 Pa. Super. 532 (1902)). Attempts to impose equitable servitudes by no-
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fixed. 1 39 It is not clear exactly what effect licenses have on retail software.14 ° The term "license" is especially vague in a retice have been rejected by the Supreme Court in statutory monopoly cases. Equitable
Servitudes, supra at 955 n.25.
A distinction between patent and copyright cases should be noted. A patent allows
restrictions on the right to make, use and sell the article. Id. at 1000. Copyright allows restrictions on making, adapting, selling, displaying and performing the copyrighted work, but not on use. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982). Any use restrictions constructed
in the nature of an equitable servitude must arise in contract and require legally cognizable assent.
139. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
140. Theoretically, the copyright owner is capable of licensing his section 106 rights
by granting a privilege to the consumer which she would not otherwise be allowed to
enjoy under the Copyright Act. Technically, the consumer does not need permission
to do any act which is inherent in ownership of a chattel or which the Copyright Act
permits, such as the rights under sections 109 (the right to distribute the particular
copy) and 117 (the right to make an archival copy). The confusion occurs when the
license uses language that sounds like the granting of a privilege but is actually restricting rights which the consumer would inherently have if the initial transaction
was a sale. Even though the license claims that there was no sale, often in the face of
contrary economic realities, it often contains redundant language which seeks to restrict actions which the copyright law inherently forbids if the consumer does not
have the status of owner of the copy. The following examples offer a glimpse into the
wide spectrum of language found in such "licenses":
MicroComputer Consultants Single Processor End User Software License
Agreement:
MC grants CUSTOMER a non-exclusive right to use this serialized copy of
the SOFTWARE on a single COMPUTER at a single location so long as CUSTOMER complies with the terms of this LICENSE Agreement.... CUSTOMER owns the diskette(s) on which the SOFTWARE is recorded, but
under the terms of this LICENSE MC shall continue to own all copies of the
SOFTWARE regardless of the form in which they may exist.
Digital Research End User Program License Agreement:
You may: a) use the program on a single machine; b) copy the program into
any machine readable or printed form for backup or modification purposes in
support of your use of the program on a single machine.
Office Solutions, Inc. Program License Agreement:
to one
The enclosed software program is licensed by Office Solutions, Inc. ..
customer for his/her use only on the terms set forth below.... You have a
non-exclusive right to use the enclosed program.
Micro Focus Software License Agreement:
Micro Focus ... licenses the person identified below ("Licensee") to use the
computer programs . . . subject to the following terms and conditions ....
Micro Focus grants the Licensee a non-exclusive, nontransferrable license to
use the Software in object code form on the single computing machine owned
or leased by Licensee... for Licensee's own programs .... Micro Focus and
its suppliers have and will retain all ownership rights in the Software, including all patent rights, copyrights, trade secrets, trademarks, service marks, related goodwill and confidential and proprietary information. Licensee will
have no rights in the Software except as explicitly stated in the Agreement.
IBM Program License Agreement (Florida):
Terms and Conditions of Sale-If you do not agree with these terms and conditions, please do not purchase products from this catalog [The Directory] ....
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tail setting where the consumer
pays for the software and
141
walks out with a sales slip.

IBM provides this program and licenses its use in the United States and Puerto Rico.... You May: a) use the program on a single machine; b) copy the
program into any machine readable or printed form for modification purposes in support of your use of the program on the single machine ....
Agreement for IBM Licensed Programs (NY):
IBM will . ..3) grant to Customer a non-transferable and non-exclusive license to use licensed program materials .... The term 'use' in this Agree-

ment shall mean copying any portion of the licensed program materials into a
machine and/or transmitting them to a machine for processing of the
machine instructions or statements contained in such materials.
Honeywell License for Program Products: Honeywell grants to the customer a
non-exclusive, nontransferable license to use, perform, execute or copy such program
product in machine readable form ....
Peachtree Software Incorporated Limited Use License Agreement:
PSI provides the computer software program contained on the medium in
the package .. .and licenses its use .... You are granted a personal, non-

transferable and non-exclusive license to use the Program under the terms
stated in the Agreement. Title and ownership of the Program and documentation remain in PSI.
Lifeboat Associates, Terms and Conditions of Sale: 1) All sales are final. 2) The
sale of each proprietary software package conveys a license for use on one computer
system .... All software is sold subject to a license agreement.

Mark Williams Company Software License Agreement:
MWC grants you a license to: a) use the software on a single machine; b)
copy the software .... [W]e grant you the right to include portions of the
MWC Runtime Library (as defined below) in software programs that you
develop, called Composite Programs, and to use, distribute and license Composite Programs to third parties without payment of any further license fee.
AT&T Information Systems, Limited Use Software License Agreement:
In the event that you disagree with any of the terms of this Agreement, return your sales receipt and the SOFTWARE with the seal unbroken to the
location where you obtained the SOFTWARE and your money will be refunded.... 1. TITLE AND LICENSE GRANT: Notice is hereby given that

the SOFTWARE contains copyrighted and/or proprietary information protected by the laws of the United States. All SOFTWARE will remain the sole
property of AT&T-IS. AT&T-IS hereby grants you a personal, non-transferable and non-exclusive right to use, in the United States, all SOFTWARE, in
whatever form recorded, which is furnished to you under or in contemplation
of this Agreement.
141. Some insight into the motivation behind the use of software licenses in a retail
setting can be gained by reviewing the analysis put forth by one commentator.
Although written in another era, it focuses on the timeless goal of producers that
"standardized goods should pass to the ultimate consumers through well regulated
channels, and often times that they should be used by the consumers in such a manner as to aid in the maintenance of a complex marketing system." Equitable Servitudes, supra note 138, at 946. The reasoning is as follows:
To put the matter in another way, the strictly legal situation corresponds
inadequately with the practical situation. Actually, the manufacturer by his
advertising and other commercial devices has brought the consumers into a
direct relation with himself. He is trying to make them buy his product. Legally, it ceased to be owned by him some time before it reaches them, for he
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In order to resolve such an ambiguity, Louisiana became the
first state to enact a "shrink-wrap" licensing law with the passage of Act No. 744 on July 13, 1984.142 Under the statute, anyone who either uses software or opens a sealed software
package is deemed to have accepted all the terms of the license
agreement, provided the statutory notice provisions are met.'4 3
is separated from them by a succession of sales through wholesalers and retailers. These intervening passages of title have their importance for some
purposes. For example, the risk of insolvency, the methods of credit, the
manufacturer's power to control the management of his dealer's stores, his
liability on warranties, might all be very different if he was selling to the
public through agents of his own. But for the purpose of maintaining the
reputation of his product, the existence of these intermediaries has very little
significance. Consequently, what he wants is a new legal (or equitable) device which will enable him to throw a bridge across to the consumers over
the heads of these intervening dealers, so that he can be sure that his product
as it reaches the public will correspond in all its aspects with the product he
has led them to expect. He wants to make the intermediary transfers of title
legally immaterial to his scheme, and to be able to treat the entire process of
marketing his goods from the factory to the consumer as a unified transaction, in which the successive sales are merely incidental breaks serving only a
limited purpose which does not affect the reputation of his goods. Furthermore, he desires that his dealers, though not agents, shall be interrelated
members of a unified selling organization, which will run much less smoothly
and steadily if they are constantly differing with each other or with him as to
the margin of profit and other details. He wishes to restrict the effects of the
transfers of title to the purposes which lead him to reject an agency system;
and to create a legal (or equitable) unity, both vertically to the public and
horizontally among his dealers, which shall be coextensive with the unity of
his business plan (citation omitted).
Id. at 947-48.
142. Software License Enforcement Act, tit.51, ch.27, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 195156 (West Supp. 1985). The legislation was being promoted by Vault Corporation, a
software protection company in Westlake, California. "This campaign is connected to
Vault's concerns as a marketer of the Prolok Software Protection System to software
developers." Watt, Software-ProtectionPush, INFOWORLD, May 7, 1984, at 14, col. 1.
Louisiana is pioneering this legislation despite the fact that it is a "state without a
computer industry." Id. Louisiana state representative Al Ater recognizes the irony
in a "smokestack industry" state being an early advocate of copyright protection specifically for computer software. "But we want to show this industry we are aware of
the problems they face and invite them to locate here," says Ater. Id., col. 3. A
number of states including Illinois, Hawaii, Washington, Arizona and Georgia have
considered such legislation.
The statute seeks to avoid the classic contract issues raised by "box-top" licenses by
providing for clear and legible notice of the terms under § 1955. LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 1955 (West Supp. 1985).
143. Any person who acquires computer software or a copy thereof shall be
conclusively deemed to have accepted and agreed to all the terms of the license agreement for such software or copy thereof, including any applicable
provisions contained in R.S. 51:1954, if:
(1) A written legend or notice is affixed to or packaged with the software
or copy thereof in such a manner that the legend or notice is clearly and
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The statute defines the terms "computer software," "license
agreement," "reverse engineering," "decompiling" and "disas'
It further imposes requirements that must be
sembling."144
met before terms of the license agreement can be enforced.14
For instance, software must have a notice affixed that is
"clearly and conspicuously visible upon cursory examination"
and which is printed in capital letters in "language which is
readily understandable to a person of 'average literacy.'"146
Furthermore, the notice must state that opening or using the
software will constitute acceptance and explain that if a party
conspicuously visible upon cursory examination of the software and related
packaging; and
(2) The legend or notice is prominently displayed in all capital letters and
in language which is readily understandable to a person of average literacy;
and
(3) The legend or notice states clearly that: (a) any use of the software or
copy thereof will constitute acceptance of the terms of the accompanying license agreements; or, (b) any opening of a sealed package, envelope, or
container in which the software or copy thereof is contained will constitute
acceptance of the terms of the accompanying license agreement; and
(4) The legend or notice states clearly that anyone who receives the
software or a copy thereof and does not accept and agree to the terms of the
accompanying license agreement may, within a reasonable time, return the
unused, unopened software or copy thereof to the party from whom it was
acquired, or to some other identified party, for a full refund of any consideration paid; and
(5) The person acquiring the software or copy thereof takes such action as
is stated in the legend or notice to constitute acceptance of and agreement to
the terms of the accompanying license agreement.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1953 (West Supp. 1985)
144. For purposes of this Chapter the following terms shall have the meanings
set forth herein:
(1) "Computer software" means a set of statements or instructions to be
used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain
result, in any form in which such statements or instructions may be fixed, by
any method now known or hereafter developed, regardless of whether such
statements or instructions are capable of being perceived by or communicated to humans, together with any associated documentation and materials.
(2) "License agreement" means any written document on which the word
"license," either alone or in combination with other words, appears prominently at or near the top of such document in such a position of prominence
so as to be readily noticeable to a person of average literacy viewing such
document.
(3) "Reverse engineering, decompiling or disassembling" means any process by which computer software is converted from one form to another form
which is more readily understandable to human beings, including without
limitation any decoding or decrypting of any computer program which has
been encoded or encrypted in any manner.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1952 (West Supp. 1985).
145. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1953 (West Supp. 1985).
146. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1953(1), (2) (West Supp. 1985). See supra note 143.
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"receives" the software and does not accept the terms, he may
return the unopened, unused software "for a full refund of any
consideration paid."' 4 7
A.

Circumvention of the First Sale Doctrine

The heart of the Software Enforcement Act (Software Act) is
found in section 1954 which designates the contractual terms
deemed accepted when a software package is opened or
software is used.'4 8 A license agreement may contain any or all
of the terms listed by the statute. 1 49 The most critical licensing
term which is deemed to be accepted, if included, is the one that
provides for "retention by the licensor of title to the copy of
computer software. ' 150 The obvious purpose of enforcing such
a term in a license agreement is to nullify the effect of the actual retail transaction, in order to eliminate the first sale. The
theory is that if the owner of the copyright retains title to the
copy, then the retail purchaser of the mass-marketed software
147. LA. REV. STAT. ANN.

§ 1953(3), (4) (West Supp. 1985). See supra note 143.

148. Terms of which shall be deemed to have been accepted under R.S. 51:
1953, if included in an accompanying license agreement which conforms to
the provisions of R.S. 51:1955, may include any or all of the following:
(1) Provisions for the retention by the licensor of title to the copy of the

computer software.
(2) If title to the copy of computer software has been retained by the licen-

sor, provisions for the prohibition of any copying of the copy of computer
software for any purpose and/or limitations on the purposes for which copies
of the computer software can be made and/or limitations on the number of
copies of the computer software which can be made.
(3) If title to the copy of computer software has been retained by the licensor, provisions for the prohibition or limitation of rights to modify and/or
adapt the copy of the computer software in any way, including without limitation prohibitions on translating, reverse engineering, decompiling, disassembling, and/or creating derivative works based on the computer software.
(4) If title to the copy of computer software has been retained by the licensor, provisions for prohibitions of further transfer, assignment, rental, sale,
or other disposition of that copy or any other copies made from that copy of
the computer software, provided that terms which prohibit the transfer of a
copy of computer software in connection with the sale or transfer by operation of law of all or substantially all of the operating assets of a licensee's
business shall to that extent only not be deemed to have been accepted under
R.S. 51:1953.
(5) Provisions for the automatic termination without notice of the license
agreement if any provisions of the license agreement are breached by the
licensee.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1954 (West Supp. 1985).
149. Id.
150. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1954(1) (West Supp. 1985).
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cannot become the "owner" of the copy. 15 1

If the Software Act prevents a consumer from becoming the
owner of the copy, the normal incidents of ownership, such as
the right to alienate, do not attach."5 2 The resulting effect is to
enlarge the scope of the copyright owner's exclusive right of
distribution beyond the intended cut-off point of the first
sale.15 3 Thus, under the Software Act, the copyright owner can
receive economic reward which is equivalent to that of a sale
without facing the limitation imposed by the first sale doctrine.' This approach conflicts with copyright case law which
emphasizes that economic reward is not the primary purpose of
the copyright law but only the means used to achieve the end
1 55
which is "the free flow of ideas, information and commerce.

If the "ultimate question under the 'first sale' doctrine is
whether or not there has been such a disposition of the copyrighted article that it may fairly be said that the copyright pro151. See Davidson, supra note 24, at 384.
152. A broad disapproval of the running of restrictions on chattels was espoused in
Park v. Hartman, 153 F. 24 (6th Cir. 1907). In that case, the manufacturer of
medicines sought to bind sub-purchasers by contract, in order to fix the price at which
the wholesale and retail druggists would resell the medicine. The court declared:
A prime objection to the enforcibility of such a system of restraint upon
sales and prices is that they offend against the ordinary and usual freedom of
traffic in chattels or articles which pass by mere delivery.
The right of alienation is one of the essential incidents of a right of general
property in movables, and restraints on alienation have been generally regarded as obnoxious to public policy, which is best subserved by great freedom of traffic in such things as pass from hand to hand. General restraint in
the alienation of articles, things, chattels, except when a very special kind of
property is involved, such as a slave or an heirloom, have been generally held
void. 'If a man,' says Lord Coke, in Coke on Littleton § 360, 'be possessed of a
horse or any other chattel real or personal, and give his whole interest or
property therein, upon condition that the donee or vendee shall not alien the
same, the same is void, because his whole interest and property is out of him
so as he hath no possibility of reverter; and it is against trade and traffic and
bargaining and contracting between man and man.' It is also a general rule
of the common law that a contract so restricting the use or controlling subsales cannot be annexed to a chattel so as to follow the article and obligate
the subpurchaser by operation of notice .... A convenant which may be valid
and run with land will not run with or attach itself to a mere chattel.
Id. See also Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park, 220 U.S. 373, 404 (1911), affg 164 F. 803 (6th
Cir. 1908).
153. Not only is it extended beyond the cut-off point, it is extended as a perpetual
right. Thus, if the copyright owner attempted to sue the consumer for a copyright
infringement based on the exclusive right of distribution, he would be attempting to
enforce a perpetual right under federal law. The Constitution mandates that protection be for "limited Times." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
154. See supra text accompanying note 112.
155. Sony, 464 U.S. at 429.
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prietor has received his reward for its use,"'5 6 then it would
seem that in a mass market transaction involving a consumer
who pays a one time "satisfactory price" and "acquires full dominion" over the fungible copy of software, there has indeed
been a first sale.1 57 The Software Act seeks to avoid this result
by using semantics to redefine the transaction after it has occurred under other existing state commercial law. 5 ' The Act
thus transmutes both the state commercial law and copyright
law when the consumer either opens or uses the software.
B.

Retention of Title

Retention of title, as permitted by the Software Act, is the
foundation of the other four contractual terms that may be
deemed accepted under the statute. Subsection 2 of section
1954 allows provisions in agreements that prohibit "any copying
of the copy of computer software for any purpose," as well as
"limitations on the purposes for which copies of the computer
software can be made" and the numbers of copies made. 159 This
subsection permits the copyright owner to override the provisions in section 117 of the 1976 Copyright Act which grant
rights to the copy owner to make archival copies. 6 °
This subsection contains circular provisions. In order to be
able to enforce terms in an agreement which limit the consumer as described in the subsection, the statute requires that
title must have been reserved by the copyright owner.' 6 ' If the
copyright owner retained title, and if that effectively prevents
the consumer from qualifying as the owner of the copy, then it
is immaterial whether the consumer is forbidden by the
Software Act to do the activities described by the subsections
since retention of title continues the prohibition of the activity
under federal copyright law.'6 2 In other words, the terms in
the license merely echo the words of the copyright law and restrict the consumer in the same way that he is already restricted by the copyright law from the moment of fixation of
156. Burke & Van Heusen, Inc. v. Arrow Drug, Inc., 233 F. Supp. 881, 884 (E.D.Pa.
1964).

157. Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. at 339, 350 (1907).
158. The result is that a "sale" of software is to be treated differently than any
other retail transaction under state commercial law.
159. See supra note 148.
160. See supra note 93.
161. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1954(1) (West Supp. 1985).
162. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (1982).
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the work. 63 If the retention of title by the Act is legally effective, there is no need to proscribe the activities described in the
subsection since, without ownership of the copy, the consumer
has no federal statutory right to make an archival copy.
The only time that the consumer would have any rights for
subsection 2 to restrict would be if the consumer was the owner
of a copy. Section 117 of the 1976 Copyright Act allows the copy
owner the right to make an archival copy and thus limits the
copyright owner's exclusive right of reproduction.1 64 However,
if the consumer is at any given moment the copy owner, the
license agreement dissolves that status, as previously established by the first sale, either when the package is opened or
when the software is used. The circular legal path is as follows:
The state's commercial law designates the transaction as a sale
and the consumer as a copy owner; simultaneously, federal
copyright law is triggered and grants the copy owner the right
to make an archival copy; finally, the Software Act removes the
right the copyright law granted under the first sale. 65
Unfortunately, subsection 3 follows the same circular reasoning as subsection 2.166 Subsection 3 relies on the retention of
title in order to permit "prohibition or limitation of rights to
modify and/or adapt the computer software in any way, including without limitation prohibitions on translating, reverse engineering, decompiling, disassembling, and/or creating derivative
works based on the computer software.'1 67 This subsection

seeks to nullify the language of section 117 which allows the
owner of a copy to make an adaptation of the computer program as long as it is an "essential step in the utilization of the
computer program" or is for "archival purposes only.'

6

8

The

privilege granted to the copy owner by section 117 also acts as a
163. The impact that the change from publication to fixation as the "trigger for
federal copyright protection has on such an analysis is pervasive. No longer is there
uncopyrighted, copyrightable subject matter. Subject matter falls either inside or
outside of federal copyright upon creation. 17 U.S.C. § 302 (1982). The effect is to
severely limit state protection to "unfixed" works.
164. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1982). By attempting to limit the rights of the consumer, the
statute implies that there are rights to be limited. If the copyright owner contractually limits rights that the Copyright Act gives to the consumer, can the consumer look
to those rights as a defense in a breach of contract claim?
165. To finish this circular reasoning, if the consumer were a copy owner, he would
also be within his rights if he made copies under section 117 of the Copyright Act.
166. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1954(3) (West Supp. 1985).
167. Id. See also supra note 148.
168. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1982). See supra note 93.
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limitation of the copyright owner's otherwise exclusive right to
169
prepare derivative works.
The policy reasons behind allowing adaptations and reverse
engineering 170 revolve around a recognition that consumers
may want access to the structure and logic of a program that is
mass-marketed because the program is developed for a general
use and does not meet their particular needs. 1 ' The software
may not be compatible with the consumer's hardware or operating system or may have "bugs" in it.' 7 2 Prohibition of reverse
engineering effectively prohibits access to the structure and
logic of the software and thus protects the underlying ideas. 73
This is contrary to the purpose of copyright law which seeks to
7 4
protect the expression and leave ideas in the public domainY.
It should be noted that the restrictions that subsection 3
seeks to impose are already imposed by the copyright law on
persons who are not copy owners because no one but the copyright owner has the exclusive right to prepare derivative
works. 7 ' The exception is the copy owner, but if the Software
Act permits the license agreement to prevent the consumer
169. See supra note 93.
170. For an informative discussion of reverse engineering, see Laurie & Everett,
Protectionof Trade Secrets in Object Form Software: The Case for Reverse Engineering, 6 THE COMPUTER LAWYER 1, 2 (1984). See also Grogan, Decompilationand Disassembling: Undoing Software Protection, 1 THE COMPUTER LAWYER 1 (1984).
171. Laurie & Everett, supra note 170, at 2. The authors conclude:
Under both the idea/expression and the fair use doctrines, an act of decompilation or disassembly performed in order to gain access to the internal
structure and logic of object form software is not copyright infringement.
The structure and logic of software are ideas that are available for use, according to the balance struck between the public policies of promoting creativity and providing free access to ideas. Decompilation or disassembly is an
essential step in reverse engineering object form software in order to gain
access to the structure and logic of the software, and is, therefore, not copyright infringement. In addition, any trade secret cause of action based on
decompilation or disassembly is preempted by section 301 of the Copyright
Act, in the absence of a contractual or confidential relationship.
Such a result is fair to all concerned. Innovation through investment in
software development is encouraged. The software producer is protected
against pirates. The software user is permitted to debug and adapt the
software and to learn from the programming techniques used therein. The
software competitor is permitted to develop and sell compatible software.
The computer industry benefits from increased competition and exchange of
knowledge, while avoiding unproductive constraints.
Id. at 10-11.
172. Id. at 2.
173. Id. at 7.
174. Id. at 5.
175. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (1982).
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from becoming a copy owner, then the consumer is restricted
law and the provision in subsection 3 is
under the copyright
176
redundant.

The fourth subsection of section 1954 also relies on the retenassignment, rental, sale or any
tion of title to prohibit "transfer,
other disposition of the copy.'"177 It seems logical that if the
consumer is not the owner of the copy, under a basic property
law analysis, she would not be permitted to alienate the copy.17
However, such a result is already dictated under the copyright
law since only the copyright owner has the exclusive right to
distribute copies.1 79 The Software Act seeks to restrict distribution by use of contract terms which are redundant when examined next to the copyright law. If there is a first sale and the
Software Act removes the consumer from the status of copy
owner at the moment when the copy is opened or used, then
the copyright law will not allow the consumer to alienate the
copy and there is no need for the subsection 4 prohibition.18 0
Subsection 4 seeks to take away the copy owner's right to alien176. Instead of contractually abrogating the consumer's rights under section 117 of
the Copyright Act, the Software Act contractually restricts the consumer's right to be
an owner under state commercial law and thereby controls the result under copyright
law. The consumer, defined as "not the owner" under state commercial law, is thus
restricted directly by copyright law and, indirectly, by the contract. Under this analysis, the copyright owner is contractually getting access to copyright remedies. The
question is whether, in the absence of the license agreement, the person would have
been a copy owner under commercial law. If so, the copyright owner is extending his
monopoly by contract. There is a difference between seeking a contract remedy for
something for which the copyright law doesn't provide a remedy and contractually
seeking a copyright remedy for something the copyright law doesn't otherwise
encompass.
177. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1954(4) (West Supp. 1985). See supra note 148. Note
that an exception is made where the software is transfered "in connection with the
sale or transfer by operation of law of all or substantially all of the operating assets of
a licensee's business." LA. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 1954(4) (West Supp. 1985). What about
the individual who wants to sell her entire computer and upgrade to a new system?
Why should she be unable to sell the software with it? As used computers take over a
larger share of the market, such a restraint would not seem reasonable. See supra
note 104.
178. See supra note 152.
179. 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (1982).
180. Again, the statute is being used to manipulate the result so that the limitations on the consumer fall under the scope of the copyright law instead of state contract law. However, it must be kept in mind that seeking a remedy under copyright
law means that the perpetual license protection is being enforced under federal law,
despite the mandate of the Constitution that such protection must be for "limited
Times." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. Previous cases, reasoning that contractual perpetual
protection for unpublished materials was acceptable under state copyright law, were
based on the fact that federal law did not cover the area prior to January 1, 1978.
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ate the copy after the first sale doctrine has already been triggered under section 109 of the Copyright Act.'8 ' This expands
the copyright owner's exclusive right in a situation that is the
economical equivalent of a first sale and thereby extends the
monopoly indefinitely. 8 2
Subsection 5 provides for "automatic termination without no83
tice" if any provisions of the license agreement are breached.
While the implications of this subsection are beyond the scope
of this commentary, it should be recognized that the license
seeks to contractually effect a termination of rights granted
under sections 109 and 117 of the copyright law. The breach of
any of the terms, if found enforceable, apparently would result
in damages for breach of contract but would not be labeled an
infringement since they are created by a state statutory gloss
on the federal section 106 rights. The distinction between damages for breach of these contractual terms and federal copyright law's statutory damages is significant if the damage done
can be ascertained in the first instance.
C.

The Effect of the Software Enforcement Act

An analysis of the legal impact of the Software Act is difficult without applying the statutory terms to a given factual licensing situation. It is clear, however, that the statute is
intended to make certain terms, which mirror those described
in section 1954, "enforceable" when used on software packages. 8 4 The use of the section 1954(1) retention of title term in
an agreement resembles the effect of a condition subsequent.'
The consumer has already paid for the retail software and appears to be the owner of the copy when the acceptance by opening or using occurs. The acceptance signifies an agreement to
give up the rights which attach to an owner of a copy. If the
software is received in the retail transaction in exchange for
money, there is no evidence of any further consideration given
to the consumer in return for giving up his rights as owner of
the copy.8 6 This interpretation causes a forfeiture of the con181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
(1984).
186.

17 U.S.C. § 109 (1982).
See supra note 180.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1954(5) (West Supp. 1985).
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1953 (West Supp. 1985).
Davidson, "Box-Top" Software Licenses, 41 BENCH & B. MINNESOTA 9, 10
Id.
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sumer's rights and is not a preferable construction of the
Software Act." 7
Another factor which will affect the analysis of the Software
Act is whether the consumer is seen as contracting with the
retailer or the software author directly." If the consumer is
contracting directly with the retail seller and the notice on the
package is adequate, the consumer could be seen as giving
money and a promise to read the terms of the agreement as
consideration for the software. 8 9 Then, opening the package or
use would be seen as a condition of the sale. 190 Under this interpretation, the software author would be a third party beneficiary of the agreement.' 9 ' The software author would have to
weigh the advantages and disadvantages of becoming a third
party beneficiary. Application of the first sale doctrine would
complicate matters if the software author had "sold" the copies
to the retailer, who in turn sold the copies to the public. 92 The
restraints that the software author places on the retailer would
only be enforceable, if at all, against the retailer. 93 Any194attempt to control the copy beyond the first sale would fail.
At first glance the Uniform Commercial Code seems to offer
a good argument for the successful formation of an agreement
utilizing the terms of the Software Act. 195 An offer to make a
contract is construed as inviting acceptance in any manner or
by any means reasonable under the circumstances. 96 A contract for sale of goods may be made in any manner sufficient to
show agreement even though the moment of its making is undetermined. 97 Inviting acceptance by opening a shrink-wrap
package or using the software seems reasonable. 9 8 A determi187. Id. (citing State v. Allen, 625 P.2d 844 (1981)).
188. See supra note 141.
189. Davidson, supra note 185, at 10.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. See Equitable Servitudes, supra note 138, at 951-52.
193. See id.
194. The failure may go beyond that of a legal argument. The benefits to be gained
by contractually restricting the first purchaser may not be worth the time and effort if
the amount at stake is low. Another consideration is the negative effect that such
attempts may have on the marketing and promotional scheme. See supra text accompanying notes 15-22.
195. Davidson, supra note 185, at 10-11.
196. U.C.C. § 2-206 (1981).

197. U.C.C. § 2-204 (1981).
198. The argument would be that consumers who buy software are familiar with
such procedures and that the custom is industry wide. However, just because every-
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nation under the UCC, however, that there was indeed a sale of
goods in such a situation, would not be thwarted by an attempt
to retain title and would most likely invoke the first sale doctrine despite the language of the license.' 99 If the consumer is
the owner of the copy under commercial law before opening
the software or using it, the license should not discharge the
rights of the consumer. 00
The treatment of the transaction as a sale elevates substance
over form.20

1

From a substantive standpoint, the software au-

thor appears to have divested himself of substantial rights by
placing the software into the retail chain of distribution. The
use of the word "title" in the license is formalistic and contrary
to current commercial law. Further confusion would result
from an attempt to avoid the first sale through retention of "title" since the concept of title has been set aside by the UCC for
most purposes. To reinstate such a concept for application in
the modern retail software market would not be productive.
The retention of title in goods shipped and delivered is limited
in effect to reservation of a security interest under UCC section
2-401.202 The preface to UCC section 2-401 states that the provione is doing it, does not always prove to be a good argument, especially where con-

sumer goods are involved.
199. A sale is "the passing of title from the seller to the buyer for a price," U.C.C.
(1981) (emphasis added). In the context of a self service store, a transaction in
goods for a one time payment to the cashier resembles what a reasonable person
would consider to be a "sale."
200. Davidson, supra note 185, at 11.
201. Id
202. U.C.C. § 2-401 (1981). For an overview of the seven sections which refer to
"title," see R. NORDSTROM, LAW OF SALES 376 (1970). Title is not the primary tool for
resolving a sales dispute. Evans Products Co. v. Jorgensen, 245 Or. 362, 421 P.2d 978
(1966).
The official comment to section 2-401 states that the section deals with the "issues
between seller and buyer in terms of step by step performance or nonperformace
under the contract for sale and not in terms of whether or not 'title' to the goods has
passed." The purpose is to "avoid making practical issues between practical men turn
upon the location of an intangible something, the passing of which no man can prove
by evidence and to substitute for such abstractions proof of words and actions of a
tangible character."
Consideration should be given to the effect of placing computer software into a retail market situation. Obtaining a program from a self-service retail store is a stark
contrast to negotiating with a hardware dealer and consummating the deal with a
signed contract. Although the software licensing can be called part of the custom and
usage of the trade which historically originated with programming as a service under
a contract, there is also a strong history in the retail field which labels a transaction
for a one-time, up-front payment as a sale. The question is, when these two "histories" collide, as software is sold in retail stores, which custom and usage should prevail? There is merit to the argument that when a business person who is familiar with

§ 2-106
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sions of the Article with regard to rights, obligations and remethe software industry buys software, he knows that he is only obtaining the copy
under a license to use and does not own the copy. Conversely, the home user is accustomed to purchasing products and owning them. It is obvious that trying to categorize
a purchaser by who he is would be difficult since all types of purchasers can come into
a retail store. If on the other hand, the line was drawn by the type of marketing
scheme used to make the "sale," it is easier to agree that the custom and usage of
retail should apply to all customers of a retail store.
In a typical retail transaction such as the sale of soft drinks in a self-service grocery
store, courts have found that the evidence was sufficient to show that the placing of
the bottles on the retailer's shelf with the price stamped on them manifested an intent to offer them for sale. Fender v. Colonial Stores, Inc., 138 Ga. App. 31, 225 S.E. 2d
691 (1976). The court construed the terms of the offer to be that title would pass to
the customer when the goods were taken to the checkout counter and paid for. Id. at
33, 225 S.E.2d at 693. The court concluded that the customer's act of taking physical
possession of the goods with an intent to purchase them manifested an intent to accept the offer and a promise to take them to the checkout and pay for them. Id. at 33,
225 S.E.2d at 693-94. In the court's view, acceptance could occur in three ways: by
delivering the goods to the checkout counter and paying for them; by the promise to
pay for the goods, as evidenced by the physical delivery to the checkout counter; and
by the promise to deliver the goods to the checkout counter and to pay for them there,
as evidenced by taking physical possession of the goods by their removal from the
shelf. Id. at 33-34, 225 S.E.2d at 694. The court stated that a reasonable person would
conclude that the customer's taking physical possession with the intent to pay for
them was a reasonable mode of acceptance. Id. at 34, 225 S.E. 2d at 694. The court
found the taking of possession and delivery to the checkout as a promise to pay the
stated price and found that promise to be sufficient consideration to support the contract. Id. Although the line of cases using this type of reasoning could be labeled
"result oriented" since the court saw the need to protect a consumer who was physically injured when the soft drink bottles blew up in the store, the reasoning is appealing. The analogy is helpful if it is used as insight into the custom and usage of retail as
a marketing scheme, as previously discussed. If the comparison is made on the product level, one thing soft drinks and software have in common is that they both might
contain trade secrets, yet there is no attempt to license the use of the soft drink to the
consumer!
Actually, it could be argued that software is a consumer product. A consumer product is:
any article, or component part thereof, produced and distributed (i) for sale
to a consumer for use in or around a permanent or temporary household or
residence, a school, in recreation, or otherwise, or (ii) for the personal use,
consumption or enjoyment of a consumer in or around a permanent or temporary household or residence, a school, in recreation, or otherwise.
15 U.S.C. § 2052 (Supp. 1985).
Software is used by consumers in their homes and schools, for business, education
or recreation. A finding that retail software is a consumer product lends credence to
the argument that the transaction should be examined based on what (a consumer
product) is purchased and perhaps by whom but not where it is purchased. If this is
the logical approach to take, a consumer transaction for a product to be used at home
or for school appears to be a "sale." An attempt to label it anything but a sale might
tend to erode the positive image that the software producers are trying to create
through advertising and marketing plans. A counter argument is that the definition
of consumer product only encompasses the media (the floppy disc) and not the intangible "contents."

No. 2]

LOUISIANA SOFTWARE ENFORCEMENT ACT

213

dies of the seller, buyer, puchaser, or third party apply
irrespective of title of the goods unless the provision notes
otherwise. In recognition of the careful balance created by
Congress between the copyright owner and the public, the provisions of the copyright law which govern the rights in software
should not be readjusted on the basis of the form of the
transaction. °3
The overall impact of the terms in section 1954 on a retail
transaction is to avoid the first sale in a situation which is the
economic equivalent of a sale. Although contractual agreements can avoid a first sale by structuring the transaction as a
rental or lease, the burden of arranging such a relationship between the parties is much greater than the alternative of allowing the retail market to create copy owners through first
sales. Traditionally, creating a transaction which avoids a first
sale requires a one-on-one transaction, signatures, time and cooperation at the point of sale by the retailer and consumer. 0 4
Such an approach may serve to inhibit effective mass-marketing techniques.0 5
In light of such considerations, many copyright owners prefer
to forego the formalities and give up control in order to obtain
the benefits and volume of mass-marketing. Such a trade-off is
a decision which is up to the copyright owner to make by balancing greater economic rewards against loss of control. Massmarketing can be a valuable tool for furthering the goal of
copyright law by allowing increased financial incentives to
copyright owners while giving increased access to the public.
The Software Act goes against this reasoning and the goals of
copyright law and seeks to allow the copyright owner to retain
total control of the copy while receiving the economic rewards
203. See supra text accompanying notes 80-86. See also Atari Inc. v. JS&A Group
Inc., 597 F. Supp. 5, 9 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (interpreting "owner of a copy" to mean "rightful
possessor of a copy" in the context of archival copies.)
204. Retail sales personnel may have little interest in aiding in the process. The
alternative of relying on the consumer to sign paperwork and send it in may not be
successful. The failure of consumers to cooperate may be a good indication of an intent on the part of reasonable consumers not to subjectively accept such restrictive
terms.
205. Other attempts to control the consumer through the technology of copy protection have created friction between the consumer and software firms. Customers
interpret the protection as an implication that they are "crooks." Dvorak, Uselessness
of Copy Protection,San Francisco Examiner, Feb. 3, 1985, at D12, col. 1. Additionally,
copy protection can be "just a slight road block for the bootleggers and a terrible
inconvenience for the legitimate users." Id. at col. 4-5.
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of mass-marketing. °6 The purpose of copyright is to motivate
creative activity of authors by providing financial gain through
a limited period of exclusive control. 20 7 This state statute

reverses these priorities and makes the reward to the author
the primary objective. 2 8 Although the mass-marketing of
software has the potential to alter the environment in which
the copyright law functions, copyright must still be construed
in light of its basic purpose. Thus, a statute which allows a
copyright owner to interact in the mass-market, as though no
sale occurred and without the burden of forming such agreements as would preclude a sale, has extended the exclusive
rights granted by the copyright law and altered the crucial balance. The critical question, however, is whether the state statute, in redistributing the rights between consumers and
copyright owners, has created rights which are "equivalent" to
section 106 rights. If so, the statute is preempted by the 1976
Copyright Act.

V
Preemption of the Louisiana Software
Enforcement Act by Federal
Copyright Law
The preemption doctrine ultimately determines whether the
Louisiana Software Act may be enjoined. This doctrine stems
from the supremacy clause of the Constitution which declares
federal law to be the "supreme law of the land.

' 20 9

The pre-

emption doctrine requires that state legislation which conflicts
with federal law be overridden by the federal law.210 Congress
may specifically prohibit parallel state legislation as well by de206. See 2 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.11-8.13[D] (1978); Blazon, Inc. v.
Deluxe Game Corp., 268 F. Supp. 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Platt & Munk Co. v. Republic
Graphics, Inc., 315 F.2d 847 (2d Cir. 1963).
207. Sony, 464 U.S. at 429.
208. See supra text accompanying notes 79-86.
209. The supremacy clause states:

This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made
in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under
the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land;
and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
210. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 292 (2d ed. 1983).
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claring an intent to "occupy the field.

215

211

Problems arise when Congress enacts legislation that invades
areas which were traditionally protected by state laws. The
courts must discern the congressional intent in enacting such
legislation and will invalidate state laws which "impair federal
superintendence of the field" and stand "as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress. ' 212 Despite the development of judicial standards to measure Congress's preemptive intent,2 1 3 the diversity
of the preemption conflicts which arise under the various fedcan be no one crystal clear
eral statutes suggests that "there
21 4
formula.
distinctly marked
Congress, of course, can avoid the need for judicial interpretation of intent to preempt by explicitly stating that the federal
statute preempts state law. Even then, judicial interpretation
may be necessary to refine the explicit legislation in order to
apply it to multifarious situations. The preemptive effect of the
1976 Copyright Act is no exception.
A.

Preemption Under the Copyright Act of 1909

Under the Copyright Act of 1909, publication determined
whether and when federal copyright attached.21 5 Until January 1, 1978, when section 301 of the 1976 Copyright Act became
effective, publication divested the application of state common
211. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
[Where the federal government, in the exercise of its superior authority in
the field, has enacted a complete scheme of regulation and has therein provided a standard for the registration of aliens, states cannot, inconsistently
with the purpose of Congress, conflict or interfere with, curtail or complement, the federal law, or enforce additional or auxilary regulations. [This]
Court, in considering the validity of state laws in the light of treaties or federal laws touching upon the same subject, has made use of the following expressions: conflicting; contrary to; occupying the field; repugnance;
difference; irreconcilability; inconsistency; violation; curtailment; and
interference.
Id. at 67.
212. Id.
213. Chief Justice Warren presented the analysis as a three pronged inquiry which
looked at the following elements: the pervasiveness of the federal regulatory scheme,
federal occupation of the field as necessitated by the goal of national uniformity, and
the danger of conflict between state laws and the administration of the federal program. Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 502-05 (1956).
214. Hines, 312 U.S. at 67 (cautionary note of Justice Black).
215. Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 9, Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075. See H.R.
REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. (1909).
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law copyright.2 1 Because federal preemption occurred only after the release of the copyrighted work to the public, publication was the legal act which triggered federal preemption of
state copyright law. 217 Thus, once released to the public, the
copyrighted work was protected only by federal law. The copyright owner had to comply with the federal standards in order
to acquire copyright protection for his work.2 1 The question of
what constituted publication raised complex issues which often
obscured the dividing line between state and federal copyright
protection. 2 9 The issue of publication no longer serves as the
trigger for federal copyright protection and has thus been removed as the focus of controversy. New section 301 contains
the preemptive nucleus of federal copyright law.220
B.

Preemption Under the 1976 Copyright Act

Under the 1976 Copyright Act, state law is no longer needed
to protect a work prior to publication because federal copyright
protection attaches the moment the work is first fixed in a tan-

gible medium.221 Section 301 expressly preempts "all legal and
216. Copyright Act of 1909 §§ 10, 12, 61 Stat. 656 (1947) (formerly codified at 17
U.S.C. §§ 10, 12 (repealed 1976)). See 1 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 4.02[c]
(1980).
217. See supra note 163.
218. Compco Corp. v. Day Brite Lighting Co., 376 U.S. 234, 238 (1964).
219. Goldstein, Federal System Ordering of the Copyright Interest, 69 COLUM. L.
REV. 49, 50-51 (1969).
220. Section 301 reads as follows:
(a) On and after January 1, 1978, all legal or equitable rights that are
equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as specified by section 106 in works of authorship that are fixed in a
tangible medium of expression and come within the subject matter of copyright as specified by sections 102 and 103, whether created before or after that
date and whether published or unpublished, are governed exclusively by this
title. Thereafter, no person is entitled to any such right or equivalent right in
any such work under the common law or statutes of any State.
(b) Nothing in this title annuls or limits any rights or remedies under the
common law or statutes of any State with respect to(1) subject matter that does not come within the subject matter of copyright as specified by sections 102 and 103, including works of authorship not
fixed in any tangible medium of expression; or
(2) any cause of action arising from undertakings commenced before January 1, 1978; or
(3) activities violating legal or equitable rights that are not equivalent to
any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as specified by section 106.
17 U.S.C. § 301 (1976).
221. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1982). "Copyright in a work created on or after January 1,
1978 subsists from its creation." Id. "A work is fixed in a tangible medium of expres-
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equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive
rights within the general scope of copyright as specified by section 106. '' 222 Congress intended to abolish not only common
law copyright but also to "preempt and abolish any rights
under common law or statutes of a state that are equivalent to
copyright and that extend to works coming within the scope of
federal copyright law. ' 223 The purpose of creating a single system was to eliminate the "anachronistic, uncertain, impractical
and highly complicated dual system" under the 1909 Copyright
22 4
Act.
Although Congress intended to articulate the preemptive
power of section 301 "in the clearest and most unequivocal language possible, so as to foreclose any conceivable misinterpretation of its unqualified intention that Congress shall act
preemptively, and to avoid the development of any vague borderline areas between State and Federal protection, '225 there
exists some uncertainty as to just what rights are "equivalent."
During the legislative proceedings resulting in the formulation of current section 301, four main arguments in favor of a
single federal system of copyright were presented. They are as
follows:
1. One of the fundamental purposes behind the copyright
clause of the Constitution, as shown in Madison's comments in
the Federalist, was to promote national uniformity and to
avoid the practical difficulties of determining and enforcing an
author's rights under the differing laws and in the separate
courts of the various States. Today, when the methods for dissemination of an author's work are incomparably broader and
faster than they were in 1789, national uniformity in copyright
protection is even more essential than it was then to carry out
the constitutional intent.
2. "Publication," perhaps the most important single concept under the present law [the 1909 copyright statute], also
represents its most serious defect. Although at one time when
sion when its embodiment in a copy ... by or under authority of the author, is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced or otherwise
communicated for a period of more than transitory duration." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
222. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (1982). The exclusive rights are found in 17 U.S.C. § 106

(1982). Section 102, 17 U.S.C. § 102, defines the subject matter of copyright.
223. House Report, supra note 91, at 130.
224. House Report, supra note 91, at 130. According to one court, prior to the 1976
Copyright Act, preemption "was in a state of disarray." Orth-O-Vision, Inc. v. Home
Box Office, 474 F. Supp. 672, 683 n.11 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
225. House Report, supra note 91, at 73.
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works were disseminated almost exclusively through printed
copies, "publication" could serve as a practical dividing line between common law and statutory protection, this is no longer
true. With the development of the 20th century communications revolution, the concept of publication has become increasingly artificial and obscure. To cope with the legal
consequences of an established concept that has lost much of
its meaning and justification, the courts have given "publication" a number of diverse interpretations, some of them radically different. Not unexpectedly, the results in individual
cases have become unpredicatble and often unfair. A single
federal system would help to clear up this chaotic situation.
3. Enactment of section 301 would also implement the "limited times" provision of the Constitution [Const. art. 1, § 8, cl.
8], which has become distorted under the traditional concept of
"publication." Common law protection in "unpublished"
works is now perpetual, no matter how widely they may be
disseminated by means other than "publication;" the bill would
place a time limit on the duration of exclusive rights in them.
The provision would also aid scholarship and the dissemination
of historical materials by making unpublished undisseminated
manuscripts available for publication after a reasonable period.
4. Adoption of a uniform national copyright system would
greatly improve international dealings in copyrighted material.
No other country has anything like our present dual system.
In an era when copyrighted works can be disseminated instantaneously to every country on the globe, the need for effective
international copyright relations, and the concomitant need for
national uniformity, assume ever greater importance.2 2 6
This summary must be considered when construing the preemptive effect of section 301. Section 301 embraces a twopronged analysis to determine whether preemption is present.
The subject matter analysis under the first prong is relatively
straightforward. The equivalent rights analysis is more complex and requires some understanding of both congressional intent and the development of case law.
1.

Subject Matter Analysis Under Section 301

The first prong of the section 301 analysis examines whether
the work is within the subject matter of copyright. Section 102
extends copyright protection to "original works of authorship
226. Id., at 72.
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fixed in any tangible medium of expression."2 2' 7 "Works of authorship" includes software.2 If a work fits within the subject
matter of copyright, a state is thus precluded from protecting it
if the rights granted by the state are found to be "equivalent" to
the exclusive rights granted by federal copyright law.22 9
2.

Equivalent Rights Analysis Under Section 301

The second prong of the preemption analysis addresses
whether the state law rights to be enforced are "equivalent to
any of the exclusive rights in the general scope of copyright as
specified in Section 106... ,"230 These exclusive rights include
the rights to reproduce copies, prepare derivative works, and
distribute copies,23 1 all of which impact computer software.
In order to ascertain the intent of Congress and determine
the appropriate meaning of the term "equivalent," it is necessary to examine the legislative history of section 301. The history of the revision of the copyright law is long and
convoluted. 3 2 Moreover, the specific portions which may have
aided in interpreting the final consensus behind the term
"equivalent" in section 301 were subject to some events which
have left the meaning uncertain. Because there were numerous drafts and revisions, only the highlights of the process will
be presented in an effort to illuminate the origin and meaning
of the term "equivalent."
The original need for a preemption provision was generated
by the "publication" provision in the 1909 act.23 3 Initially, the
Copyright Office contemplated replacing "publication" as the
227. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1982).
228. "[A] computer program, whether in object code or source code is a literary
work and is protected from unauthorized copying, whether from its object or source
code version." Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1249
(3rd Cir. 1983).
229. 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1982). See Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enterprises,
501 F. Supp. 848, 851 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); infra text accompanying note 258.
230. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982).
231. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1), (2) & (3) (1982).
232. In the mid-1950's, the Copyright Office began the task of revision by commissioning studies of the various aspects of Copyright law and orchestrating panels to
discuss specific problems. The process resulted in a draft bill introduced in Congress
in 1964. Preliminary Drqft for Revised U.S. Copyright Law, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1964) (Judiciary Committee Print) reprinted in REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, Pt. 3 (1964), [hereinafter Preliminary Draft].

233. GeneralRevision of the U.S. CopyrightLaw, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 39, 40 (1961)
(Judiciary Committee Print) reprintedin REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, COPYRIGHT LAW

REVISION (1961) [hereinafter General Revision].
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trigger for federal protection with the concept of "public dissemination. 2 34 This would have retained the dual system of
copyright governed by both state and federal laws. 2 3 As a re-

sponse to sharp criticism regarding the continuation of the dual
system, the 1964 preliminary draft presented a unified system.
The proposed system provided that "all rights in the nature of
copyright in works for which copyright protection is available
...

whether published or unpublished shall be governed exclu-

sively by this title" and established that "no person shall be entitled to copyright, to literary or intellectual property rights, or
to any equivalent legal or equitable right in any such work
under the common law or statute of any state.

'236

The preliminary draft noted that rights or remedies with respect to "breaches of trust, invasion of privacy, or deceptive
trade practices including passing-off and false representation"
would not be annulled by the copyright law.237 Section 19(a) of
the 1964 Revision Bill contained similar language but added
"breaches of contract" and "defamation" to the list of state
rights permitted.238 Section 19(a) defined the list of causes of
action as illustrative examples only, not as a comprehensive list
of permissible state rights as had been done in the preliminary
draft.239
The same illustrative listing language was repeated in section
301 of the 1965 Bill. 240 The 1975 Senate Bill expanded the illus234. Id. at 43.

235. Id.
236. Preliminary Draft, supra note 232, at 18. See also Supplementary Report, infra note 240, at 82.

237. Id.
238. H.R. 11947, S. 3008, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964) (introduced simultaneously on
July 20, 1964).

239. Id. The preliminary draft had stated in section 19(b) that "[n]othing in this
title shall annul or limit any rights or remedies under the law of any state... [w]ith
respect to activities constituting breaches of trust, invasion of privacy, or deceptive
trade practices including passing off and false representation." The 1964 Revision Bill
stated in section 19(b) that "[niothing in this title annuls or limits any rights or remedies under the law of any state with respect to ... activities violating rights that are
not equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as
specified by section 5, including breaches of contract .... "
240. H.R. 4347, S. 1006, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1965) (introduced on February 4,
1965). See Supplementary Report of the Registrarof Copyrights, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.
323 (1965) (Judiciary Committee Print) reprintedin REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, Pt. 6 (1965) [hereinafter Supplementary Report]. The report

stated:
While the third clause of section 301(b) is not intended to represent an
exhaustive listing, its purpose is to illustrate rights and remedies that are
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trative list in (b)(3) (the counterpart of former 19(a) of the 1964
Revision Bill) to include "misappropriation not equivalent 241
to
any of such exclusive rights," "trespass," and "conversion.
The Bill also changed "all rights in the nature of copyright" to
"all legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the
exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as specified by section 106 .... ,,42 That language was incorporated into
the 1976 Copyright Act.243
3. A Question Of CongressionalIntent
The major difficulties in interpreting what rights are
"equivalent" stem from a deletion without clear explanation of
the illustrative examples of nonequivalent rights just prior to
the passage of the final version of the 1976 Copyright Act.244 It
is not clear what effect the deletion has on the interpretation of
equivalent rights.
The deletion came about because the Justice Department disagreed with the final 1975 Senate Bill wording of section
301(b)(3). 4 5 The Department felt that language which would
allow state protection under the theory of misappropriation
and other language which would decrease the preemptive efdifferent in nature from copyright and that are preserved under state common law or statute. Some examples might include, depending upon the particular circumstances in the case: "The unauthorized exploitation of a
person's name or photograph for commercial advertising;
The unauthorized use of the title of a work in such a way as to constitute
passing off a fraud;
The unauthorized disclosure and exploitation of a trade secret."
The language of clause (3) has been worded very carefully in an effort to
avoid saying too much or too little.
Id.
241. S. 22, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
242. Id.
243. 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1982).
244. 122 CONG. REC. H10,910 (1976). The House and Senate Judiciary Committees
took no action in response to the Justice Department's disapproval of the illustrative
examples. The full House removed the list from its version of the bill via a floor
amendment by Congressman Seiberling. The lack of objection by the bill's sponsors
can be attributed to the desire to insure passage since the 94th Congress was nearing
its end. The House amendment was adopted by the Senate and House Conference
Committee. Conference Report, supra note 91, at 79.
245. Letter from Michael M. Uhlmann, Assistant Attorney General for Legislative
Affairs, Department of Justice, to Chairman Kastenmeir (July 27, 1976) [hereinafter
Letter to Sen. Kastenmeir], 122 CONG. REC. 2042 (1976), reprintedin Note, The MisappropriationDoctrine After the Copyright Revision Act of 1976, 81 DICK. L. REV. 563,
640 (1977).
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feet on sound recordings had anti-competitive implications.246
These concerns were addressed in a letter to Representative
Kastenmeir, the chairman of the subcommittee which had considered the bill.247 Although the thrust of the argument was
aimed at misappropriation as a cause of action, viewing the text
of the Justice Department letter as impetus for deletion of the
illustrative list is helpful in determining appropriate treatment
for breach of contract causes of action which might be raised
under the Software Act.2 48
In explaining its opposition to the misappropriation doctrine,
the Justice Department stated:
The 'misappropriation' theory is vague and uncertain. The
'misappropriation' provision of section 301 does not indicate
what it is that is not to be appropriated. It may extend beyond
an appropriation of the forms or styles of ordinary merchandise to include an appropriation of mere ideas, or technology or
other know-how long in the public domain. Neither the INS
case, 249 other cases, nor proposed paragraph (3) adequately defines the conduct prohibited, or establishes any standard for
distinguishing improper, as opposed to proper, copying.250
The concern expressed, that it is not clear "what" should not
be appropriated, parallels the potential dilemma raised by a
breach of contract as to "what" is the subject of the contract.
Contracts are formed by parties as "private law," between two
individuals, to protect a virtually unlimited range of duties.
What if the contract in question prohibits copying or selling or
renting the copy which are the substance of the section 106
rights? The Justice Department letter did not specifically focus on breach of contract but one passage touched on this issue
as raised by the inclusion of breach of contract in the illustrative list. The letter stated:
Apparently what is meant is that, for example, one may sue
246. Letter to Sen. Kastenmeir, supra note 245, at 644.
247. Id.
248. Commentators have come to differing conclusions regarding the significance
of the deletions. Professor Nimmer chose to dismiss the proposed draft and focus on
whether the state cause of action required any element other than the mere act of
reproduction, distribution, adaptation, performance or display. 1 M. NIMMER, NIMMER
ON COPYRIGHT § 1.01[B] 1-11 (1980). On the other hand, Mr. Milgram states that because there was no change in the operative provisions of the statute, there was no
change in the substantive effect. MILGRAM, TRADE SECRETS, 12 BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 2.06[A][3], at 2-72.14 n.67 (1980).

249. International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
250. Letter to Sen. Kastenmeir, supra note 245, at 645.
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to enjoin reproduction of an uncopyrighted book if there is a
contract between the parties prohibiting the defendant from
reproducing it. Thus reproducing the literary expression itself
may be prohibited under a cause of action for breach of
contract.2 5 1
The letter does not address the implications of a contract which
forbids the copying of a copyrighted book,25 2 but the letter goes
on to compare the result in the previous breach of contract example to another cause of action included in the illustrative list,
misappropriation. According to the letter:
This apparently would permit states to prohibit the reproduction of the literary expression itself under a 'misappropriation' theory. 'Misappropriation' would stand in the place of
breach of contract as a cause of action in the book example
above. Any copying of copyrightable subject matter that has
not been federally protected could be 2prohibited
under the
3
amorphous theory of 'misappropriation.'
This comparison of the prohibition of reproduction under the
theories of misappropriation and breach of contract demonstrates that the same right can be protected under different labels. The letter continues:
The Senate Report states that reproduction of 'the literary
expression' itself should be preempted and should not be able
to be prohibited under the 'misappropriation' theory; yet that
is what inclusion of the term 'misappropriation' in paragraph
(3) would prohibit. The preemption sought by the omnibus
Copyright Act revision bill would be nullified by paragraph
(3).254

Assuming that the prohibition of reproduction of the literary
expression under a misappropriation theory is to be preempted,
the inquiry is whether a contract cause of action that attempts
to prohibit reproduction of the literary expression should also
be preempted.2 5 5 Touching on this issue, the letter concluded:
251. Id.
252. This example reflects the old distinction between a published and unpublished book and the availability of federal copyright protection.
253. Letter to Sen. Kastenmeir, supra note 245, at 645.
254. Id.
255. The implication is that if a copyright owner wanted to simply sue for a breach
of contract and obtain damages, but not an injunction or any of the copyright remedies, that cause of action might be construed as seeking to assert one of the five exclusive rights. The question is when a copyright owner would prefer to sue in contract
rather than in copyright. The author might not want to register the copyright because
of potential disclosure of trade secrets if the source code would need to be deposited
on registration. Under this scenario, a suit under the contract would be a safer alter-
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While 'misappropriation' is almost certain to nullify preemption, any of the causes of action (emphasis added) listed in paragraph (3) following the phrase 'as specified by section 106'
may be construed to have the same effect (emphasis added).
For example, a court could construe the copying of an uncopyrighted published book to be an invasion of the author's
right to privacy, i.e., the right to keep control of the publication
of his book privately to himself.2 56

The warning that any of the causes of action in the illustrative
list may be construed to nullify preemption should be considered when analyzing whether a right sought to be enforced is
"equivalent" to one of the exclusive rights under copyright.
The purpose of a state right or statute may not be to abrogate
preemption, but if the effect would be to do so under a particular set of facts or a specific state statute, the state right should
not be permitted to interfere with the scheme of copyright
protection.
C.

Preemption Under Section 301 in the Courts

Court decisions since the passage of the 1976 Copyright Act
have struggled with the determination of just exactly what is
meant by an "equivalent" right. Some of the cases have wrestled with the same concerns that the Justice Department letter
foreshadowed. An examination of some of the cases involving
the relationship of preemption under section 301 to causes of
action such as misappropriation, conversion, tortious interference with contract and unjust enrichment will prove helpful in
analyzing the effect of section 301 on breaches of contract.
native. Moreover, failure to register the copyright before the infringement (unless
the registration is made within three months after the first publication) would prevent the copyright owner from receiving statutory damages and attorneys fees. 17
U.S.C. § 412 (1982). The available remedy would be limited to actual damages and the
profits of the infringer which may be minimal and difficult to prove. 17 U.S.C. § 504
(1982). In such a situation, a suit brought under contract might be attractive. Finally,
the copyright owner might prefer the procedural aspects, such as statutes of limitations, of state court over federal court.
An examination of the "right" at issue must be made to determine whether it is (a)
one of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner; (b) one of the affirmative rights
the copyright law grants to the copy owner; or (c) a right not addressed by the copyright law. If it seems feasible that the copyright system of protection could be replaced by equally attractive contract rights, either in a situation where the software is
copyrighted, or where the formalities of copyright are ignored, then state law would
divert individuals from the copyright system. Such a diversion is forbidden. Kewanee
Oil v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 489 (1974).
256. Letter to Sen. Kastenmeir, supra note 245, at 645.
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Such causes of action are representative of the various types of
interests which state common law and statutes have traditionally sought to protect. The judicial reasoning behind the decisions to preempt or not to preempt under section 301 can be
applied by analogy to the breach of contract cause of action.
1.

The "Different in Kind" and "Elements" Test

In Harper& Row Publishersv. Nation Enterprises,one publisher sued another publisher for violation of the Copyright Act
and for both conversion and tortious interference with contract.2 57 The state law claims were found to be equivalent to
the exclusive section 106 rights to produce and distribute for
sale and thus were preempted by the copyright law.2 58 On appeal, the Second Circuit held that Harper & Row could not prevail on either state law claim.2 59
257. Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises, 501 F. Supp. 848, 849 (S.D.N.Y. 1980),
affd, 723 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 105 S.Ct. 2218 (1985) [hereinafter the district court opinion will be cited as Harper& Row I, and the circuit court
opinion as Harper& Row II].
258. Harper& Row I, 501 F. Supp. at 854.
259. Harper& Row II, 723 F.2d at 201. The Second Circuit exposed the attempt to
rephrase the copyright claim as a state conversion claim:
With regard to the issue of conversion, [Harper & Row and Reader's Digest]
seem unable to decide how to plead the factual elements supporting their
claim. Their amended complaint asserted conversion based on the unauthorized publication of The Nation article. In this court they propound a theory
which rests the tort upon the unlawful possession of the physical property of
the Ford manuscript. In doing so, they have placed themselves neatly upon
the horns of a dilemma. If unauthorized publication is the gravaman of their
claim, then it is clear that the right they seek to protect is coextensive with
an exclusive right already safeguarded by the Act-namely, control over reproduction and derivative use of copyrighted material. As such, their conversion claim is necessarily preempted.
Id. The court went on to note that alternatively the claim would not stand as one for
conversion because the elements of exercise of unauthorized dominion and control
and complete exclusion of the rightful possession were not present. Id.
As to the claim of tortious interference with contractual relations, the court found
an "infirmity" on the face of the complaint which alleged the commission of a tort "by
destroying the exclusive right of an author and his licensed publishers to exercise and
enjoy the benefit of the pre-book publication serialization rights." Id. The court reasoned as follows:
If there is a qualitative difference between the asserted right and the exclusive right under the Act of preparing derivative works based on copyrighted
work, we are unable to discern it. In both cases it is the act of unauthorized
publication which causes the violation. The enjoyment of benefits from derivative use is so intimately bound up with the right itself that it could not
possibly be deemed a separate element.
Id. The court noted that the attempt to plead the additional elements of awareness
and intentional interference which are not part of a copyright infringement claim
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The district court advised that, in determining whether a
state cause of action is equivalent to a federal section 106 right,
the rights to be protected under the state and federal laws must
be compared."' The court noted that in making this comparison "the fact that the state cause of action is composed of fewer
elements of proof' 26
than
a copyright infringement claim is not in
1
itself dispositive.

The court reviewed that part of the legislative history which
commented on some of the "evolving common law rights"
26 2
which had been contained in the deleted illustrative list.

Congress had stated that such rights would "remain unaffected
as long as the cause of action contains elements, such as invasion of personal rights or a breach of trust or confidentiality,
that are different in kind from copyright infringement. '

263

Ac-

cording to the court, the question to be asked was whether the
state cause of action protects rights under the facts of the case
that are different in kind or qualitativelydiferent from exclusive section 106 rights such as reproduction, distribution and
adaptation protected by the copyright statute.2 64 This approach
created judicial standards against which the various state
causes of action can be applied in a preemption analysis. If the
causes of action do not meet the Harper& Row standards, they
will be deemed to be equivalent.
The court looked at the essence of the plaintiff's conversion
claim.265 The claim stated that the defendants had obtained a
copy of the unpublished manuscript, copied portions in an article which they published and, by such unauthorized use, deprived the plaintiff of the profits under its contract with a third
publisher to reproduce the manuscript. 6 6 The court stated that
"goes merely to the scope of the right; it does not establish qualitatively different
conduct on the part of the infringing party, nor a fundamental nonequivalence between the state and federal rights implicated." Id
260. Harper & Row I, 501 F. Supp. at 852.
261. Id. Section 501(a) of the Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1982) provides that anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner, as
provided in section 106, is an infringer of the copyright. In order to establish copyright infringement, a plaintiff must prove his ownership of a copyright and that the
defendant "copied" the plaintiff's work. Ferguson v. National Broadcasting Co., Inc.,
584 F.2d 111, 113 (5th Cir. 1978) (citing 3 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §§ 13.01,
13.02(A) (1978)).
262. Harper& Row I, 501 F. Supp. at 852.
263. Id. See also House Report, supra note 91, at 132.
264. Harper& Row 1, 501 F. Supp. at 852.
265. Id.
266. Id.
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this conversion claim did not address the right to physical possession of the manuscript but instead sought to protect the exclusive rights to reproduce and distribute the manuscript and
was therefore preempted by section 301.267 The court of appeals also found that "the right they seek to protect is co-exten'268
sive with an exclusive right already safeguarded by the Act.
The court next examined the claim for tortious interference
with contract. 26 9 The claim alleged that the defendants were
aware of the plaintiff's contract with the third publisher and
intentionally interfered when they published their article.
The court found this claim to be closely analogous to the exclusive right to prepare derivative works and to distribute by sale
or other transfer of ownership.2 7 1 The court of appeals concluded that it was the unauthorized publication which caused
the violation in both instances; thus the appellate court could
discern no qualitative difference between them. 2
This claim contained the same factual allegations as the conversion claim, as well as the additional elements of awareness
(knowledge) and intentional interference (intent).2 7 3 The
lower court noted that the tortious interference claim was redundant because the two additional elements required by state
law did not afford the plaintiffs rights that were different in
kind from the exclusive rights protected by the copyright
law; 27 4 a state law claim may require elements not required by a
copyright claim, but if the rights sought to be protected by the
267. Id.
268. Harper & Row II, 723 F.2d at 201. See supra note 259.
269. Harper & Row I, 501 F. Supp. at 852.
270. "To be liable for interference with contractual relations, one must be aware of
the existence of the contract... and additionally must know or be substantially certain that one's acts will cause a breach of contract or dimunition in the value of contractual rights." Id. at n.12 (citations omitted).
271. Id. at 853.
272. Harper & Row II, 723 F.2d at 201. See supra note 259.
273. Harper& Row I, 501 F. Supp. at 853.
274. Harper& Row I, 501 F. Supp. at 854. The court noted that the additional elements were not pleaded under the copyright claim because they are not required
under the copyright law and that the mere presence of additional elements would not
preclude a finding of preemption. Id. The careful analysis shown by the court was
reduced to a shorthand version in Kamakazi Music Corp. v. Robbins Music Corp., 522
F. Supp. 125 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). The Kamakazi court's treatment of the section 301 issue
consisted of a statement that "the tortious interference with contract claim is based on
the same factual allegations as the copyright infringement claims, that it does not
afford plaintiffs rights 'different in kind' from those protected by the copyright laws
and thus that it is preempted under the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 301." Id. at 137
(citing Harper & Row 1, 501 F. Supp. 848).
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two claims are not different in kind, the claim will be preempted.275 In support of this view, the Harper& Row court relied on an excerpt from the 1976 House Report which stated
that "[n]othing in the bill derogates from the rights of parties to
contract with each other and to sue for breaches of contract,
however, to the extent that the unfair competition concept
known as 'interference with contract relations' is merely the
276
equivalent of copyright protection, it would be preempted.
As a final step in the preemption analysis, the court examined the measure of recovery under the copyright act as
compared to that available under state tort law and found it to
be equivalent.277 In a copyright infringement action, the copyright owner can recover "[t]he actual damages suffered by him
or her as a result of the infringement, and any profits of the
infringer that are attributable to the infringement and are not
taken into account in computing the actual damages.

' 278

The

court noted that "[b]ecause copyright infringement is 'in the nature of a tort'" the term "'actual damages' is given the same
meaning as with other torts.

'279

The court concluded that the

tortious interference claim provided the same measure of recovery as a copyright infringement claim; therefore, the tort
rights and remedies would be equivalent to those available
under copyright law.28 °
275. Harper & Row I, 501 F. Supp. at 853-54.
276. House Report, supra note 91, at 132.
277. Harper & Row I, 501 F. Supp. at 853. Support for this approach can be found
in the 1976 House Report which states that "the examples in clause (3), while not
exhaustive are intended to illustrate rights and remedies (emphasis added) that are

different in nature from the rights comprised in a copyright and that may continue to
be protected under state common law or statute." House Report, supra note 91, at 132.
278. 17 U.S.C. § 504(b) (1982).
279. Harper& Row I, 501 F. Supp. at 853, n.15 (citing Screen Gems Columbia Music
Inc. v. Metlis and Lebow Corp., 453 F.2d 554 (2d Cir. 1972) (referring to copyright
infringement as in the nature of a tort); Aladdin Mfg. Co. v. Mantle Lamp Co. of
America, 116 F.2d 708, 716 (7th Cir. 1941) (referring to actual damages under the
trademark laws)).
280. Id. at 853. The court concluded its examination of the remedies issue in a
footnote as follows:
Thus, damage to contractual relations caused by a tort, measured by the
lost profits that would have accrued to plaintiffs, are recoverable in tort actions. Sperry Rand Corp. v. ATO, Inc., 447 F.2d 1387, 1394 n.4 (4th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1017 (1972). Lost profits are available as a measure of
damages both in copyright infringement cases and in interference with contract cases. Compare 3 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 14.02 at 14-7

(1979) with Lurie v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 70 N.Y. 379, 382, 1 N.E.2d
472, 473 (1936) (attorney's damages for inducement by insurance company of
breach of retainer agreement by client is contractually agreed contingent
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The Harper & Row analysis was taken a step further in
Schuchart & Associates v. Solo Serve Corp.2 8 '
The district
court applied the Harper& Row "different in kind" and "qualitatively different" standards and then went on to discuss the
rationale for preemption under an additional independent
basis. 8 2
The case involved actions charging a conspiracy to infringe
copyright, infringement of copyright, unfair competition and
unjust enrichment (quantum meruit). The plaintiffs, architectural and engineering firms, alleged the unauthorized use of
copyrighted architectural and mechanical drawings and specifications previously prepared for a different shopping center
project.2 8 3
The court initially outlined the elements of the unfair competition cause of action for misappropriation and applied the
"different in kind" and "qualitatively different" standards of
Harper & Row.2 84 The court asserted that the plaintiff must
prove that the defendant copied the work in order to be able to
establish copyright infringement and that the same facts must
be established in the misappropriation action.2 81 The court concluded that just because "the cause of action for misappropriapercentage of client's eventual recovery); Simon v. Royal Business Funds
Corp., 34 App. Div. 2d 758, 760, 310 N.Y.S. 2d 409, 411 (1st Dept. 1970), affd 29
N.Y.2d 692, 275 N.E.2d 21, 325 N.Y.S.2d 649 (1971); Anthony v. George T. Bye,
Inc., 243 App. Div. 390, 277 N.Y.S. 222 (1st Dept. 1935) (damages are limited to
full payment for services performed by plaintiff under contract and are not
recoverable if he has been paid); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766, comment t (1979).
Id. at 853 n.15.
281. 540 F. Supp. 928 (W.D.Tex. 1982).
282. Id. at 946.
283. Id. at 934.
284. The elements outlined by the court are:
(1) the Plaintiff created his product through extensive time, labor, skill or
money;
(2) the Defendant used Plaintiff's product in competition with Plaintiff,
gaining a special advantage (a free ride) because the Defendant bore little or
no burden of the expense of development; and
(3) that Defendant's use of Plaintiff's product caused commercial damage to
Plaintiff.
Id. at 943-44 (citing Synercom Technology, Inc. v. University Computing Co., 474 F.
Supp. 37, 29 [sic 39] (N.D.Tex. 1979)). The "different in kind" and "qualitatively different" standards are found in Harper & Row I, 501 F. Supp. at 852; see supra text
accompanying notes 257-64.
285. This redundancy concept was used in Mitchell v. Penton, 486 F. Supp. 22 (N.D.
Ohio 1979). The Mitchell court also analyzed the potential problem with allowing a
misappropriation cause of action even if the copyright claim failed:
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tion also includes the element of Defendants' use of Plaintiffs'
product in competition with Plaintiffs to the commercial damage of Plaintiffs, does not render 'different in kind' the rights
' The court noted that the plainunder state and federal law."286
tiffs had charged that "[d]efendants did not independently create, produce, or distribute said architectural and engineering
drawings and specifications.

' 28 7

In the court's view, this lan-

guage implicated the same conduct (copying) which was the basis of the copyright infringement action and therefore, despite
possible additional elements, the cause of action for misappropriation was preempted.288
The court stressed that the comparison of the elements of the
causes of action must be in the context of the specific facts in
the case at bar. The argument that the same state cause of action might, under a different set of facts, protect different
rights "does not answer the directive of Section 301. "1289 In
other words, the preemption analysis must be based on a case
by case examination and "not hypothetical rights that might
290
truly differ from the exclusive rights of copyright.

However, should plaintiff Mitchell fail to prove infringement or if infringed, defendant should show that the copyrights are invalid, then Sears
and Compco come into play. These cases hold that once patent protection
(similarly copyright protection) is denied, the alleged infringer has "every
right to" copy the patented product or copyrighted work of authorship.
Plaintiff alleges "misappropriation by Penton of 'many of the factual recitations contained within Records Retention.'" If proved, such a claim asserts
in effect, if not in substance, what Stiffel and Sun-Brite unsuccessfully
claimed in Sears and Compco.
Id. at 26.
286. Schuchart & Assoc. v. Solo Serve Corp., 540 F. Supp. 928, 944 (W.D.Tex. 1982).
The "additional element" concept was given unusual treatment in Suid v. Newsweek
Magazine, 503 F. Supp. 146 (D.C. 1980). The court in Suid explained that the "additional element" could not rely on a nonexistent doctrine:
More specifically, plaintiff alleges that Newsweek copied from his book
without giving him proper attribution and that failure to do so damaged him
monetarily. Plaintiff says that failure to attribute constitutes an additional
element, separate from the act of reproduction and outside the general scope
of copyright, and therefore there is no preemption. See 1 NIMMER, NIMMER
ON COPYRIGHT § 1.01(B) at 1-11 (1979). This argument must fail because
plaintiff does not cite, and this court has been unable to locate, any case recognizing a common-law action for failure to attribute or misappropriation
without attribution. Certainly a non-existent doctrine cannot supply the additional element needed to save a common-law action from preemption.
Id. at 149.
287. Schuchart, 540 F. Supp. at 944.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Id. at 944 n.12.
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Next, the court applied the Harper& Row "different in kind"
and "qualitatively different" standards to the action for unjust
enrichment or quantum meruit.291 The court concluded that
the cause of action for unjust enrichment or quantum meruit
did not involve rights within the scope of copyright.2 9 2 The
court outlined the elements for recovery under quantum meruit and declared that the recovery was based "upon the promise implied by law to pay for beneficial services rendered and
knowingly accepted. '293 The court characterized the services as
the "architectural and mechanical services rendered by defendant's acceptance and use of the plaintiff's drawings and specifications. ' 294 According to the court, the rights sought to be
enforced under quantum meruit were the rights to recover the
value of services rendered and not the exclusive rights to copy
and distribute the plaintiff architectural and engineering firms'
plans and drawings. 29 The court examined the measure of recovery sought by the plaintiff and found that there was no attempt to recover damages analogous to the actual damages
available under section 504(b) of the copyright statute.2 9 6 The
court concluded that the cause of action for unjust enrichment
was not preempted.2 9 7
291. "The cause of action for quantum meruit 'is founded upon the principle that it
is inequitable for one to refuse to pay for benefits received or work performed and
accepted with his knowledge and consent by a person who should expect remuneration therefore from him.'" Id. at 945 (citing Simon v. L.D. Brinkman & Co., 449
S.W.2d 90, 92 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1969), rev'd on other grounds, 459 S.W.2d 190
(Tex. 1970)).
292. Schuchart, 540 F. Supp. at 945.
293. Id. According to the court, the elements required for recovering under quantum meruit are as follows:
(1) valuable services were rendered or materials furnished,
(2) to the person sought to be charged,
(3) which services and materials were accepted by the person sought to be
charged, used and enjoyed by him,
(4) under such circumstances as reasonably notified the person sought to be
charged that the Plaintiff, in performing such services was expecting to be
paid by the person sought to be charged.
Id. (citing Montes v. Naismith and Trevino Construction Co., 459 S.W.2d 691, 694 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1970, writ refd n. r. e.)).
294. Schuchart, 540 F. Supp. at 945. The plans were to be utilized to construct the
structure depicted in the drawings. Id. at 933-34.
295. Id. at 945.
296. 17 U.S.C. § 504(b) (1982). See supra notes 266-69 and accompanying text.
297. Schuchart, 540 F. Supp. at 945.
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2. An Independent Basis for Preemption
The Schuchart court did not end its examination of the unjust enrichment claim with an analysis under section 301 and
the Harper & Row standards. To further buttress its finding
that the claim was not preempted, the court reviewed Supreme
Court preemption cases and looked at the purpose of copyright
law.

298

The court initially referred to the Supreme Court's holding
in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co. 299 that "state laws are preempted when their scheme of protection 'clashes with the
objectives of the federal patent [or copyright] laws' " as "an independent basis for preemption."' 30 The court then looked to
the Supreme Court's language in two opinions, Sears and
Compco v. Day-BriteLighting,301 and stressed that "[t]he Court
held in both cases that state law could not be used to extend
patent protection where such protection would interfere with
the system of laws passed by Congress to balance the promotion of invention and authorship while preserving free
298. Id at 946. It is interesting to note the point at which the court enters into this
"independent basis" analysis. The court did not utilize this test after finding the misappropriation cause of action preempted. Rather, the independent basis was examined after the court had found the unjust enrichment cause was not preempted.
The court regarded this second step of general preemption analysis to be necessary
only if no preemption is found first under section 301 and the Harper & Row standards. By this analysis, the court implies that, although a cause of action may be preempted by the statutory section 301 standard, it may still fall prey to the underlying
principles of preemption which were in effect prior to the enactment of section 301.
See id.
299. 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
300. Schuchart, 540 F. Supp. at 946 (citing Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376
U.S. 225, 231 (1964)). In both Sears and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376
U.S. 234 (1964), the issue was "whether a state could, under principles of a state unfair
competition law, preclude the copying of mechanical configurations which did not
possess the qualities required for the granting of a federal design or mechanical patent." Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 569 (1973). The Sears opinion contained
the following reasoning:
[T]he patent system is one in which uniform federal standards are carefully
used to promote invention while at the same time preserving free competition. Obviously, a state could not, consistently with the Supremacy Clause of
the Constitution, extend the life of a patent beyond its expiration date or give
a patent on an article which lacked the level of invention required for federal
patents. To do either would run counter to the policy of Congress of granting
patents only to true inventions, and then only for a limited time. Just as a
State cannot encroach upon the federal patent laws directly, it cannot, under
some other law, such as that forbidding unfair competition, give protection of
a kind that clashes with the objectives of the federal patent laws.
Sears, 376 U.S. at 230-31 (footnotes omitted).
301. 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
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competition."3 °2
The Schuchart court also examined Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp1.30 3 in which the Supreme Court concluded that state
trade secret law is not preempted by patent law 0 4 In Kewanee
the preemption analysis was extended to examine the objectives of the federal and state laws in order to determine what
effect enforcement of state law would have on the purposes of
the federal law. 5 The Supreme Court determined that "the
patent policy of encouraging invention is not disturbed by the
existence of another form of incentive to invention. ' 30 6 Potential conflict was found to exist for patentable inventions, but
the Court felt that the broader protection of patent law would
make such conflict minimal or unlikely.0 7
The Supreme Court declared the two purposes underlying
the patent laws: "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts" by offering a limited period of exclusion as incentive,
and to insure full and adequate disclosure so that the public
could benefit after the patent expired.0 It was stated that the
function of the preemption inquiry was to determine whether,
under the circumstances of the particular case, the state law
"stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of
the full purposes and objectives of Congress. ' 30 9 The Schuchart
court viewed this statement by the Court as a rephrasing of the
preemption question.3 10
302. Schuchart, 540 F. Supp. at 946. The Schuchart court stated that "the section
[301] has not entirely superceded the analysis of prior case law." Schuchart, 540 F.
Supp. at 946. The court saw section 301 as expressly preempting redundant state
claims while prior case law preempted only state laws which clashed with copyright
law objectives. Id.
303. 416 U.S. 470 (1974). The case involved the development of a seventeen inch
crystal used in detecting ionizing radiation which was not sufficiently novel to fall
within the constructs of patent law. Id.
304. Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 493.
305. Id. at 479-93.
306. Id. at 484.
307. Id. at 491.
308. Id. at 480-81.
309. Id. at 479 (citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
310. Schuchart, 540 F. Supp. at 947. The Kewanee Court saw trade secret law as a
weaker form of protection and reasoned:
The interest of the public is that the bargain of 17 years of exclusive use in
return for disclosure be accepted. If a state, through a system of protection,
were to cause a substantial risk that holders of patentable inventions would
not seek patents, but rather would rely on the state protection, we would be
compelled to hold that such a system could not constitutionally continue to
exist. In the case of trade secret law no reasonable risk of deterrence from
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The purpose of the copyright was also examined. In ascertaining the purpose of the copyright law in relation to preemp31 1
tion, the Schuchart court looked to Goldstein v. California
and quoted as follows:
The objective [of copyright law] is to promote the progress of
science and the arts .... To accomplish [this] purpose, Congress may grant to authors the exclusive right to the fruits of
their respective works.... In other words, to encourage people
to devote themselves to intellectual and artistic creation, Congress may guarantee to authors and inventors a reward in the
form of control over the sale or commercial use of copies of
their works.3 12
The holding in Goldstein, however, was that states were free
to protect and encourage the works of their residents when the
Congress had failed to do so adequately. 3
Finally, the Schuchart court decided that allowing an unjust
enrichment claim would not "conflict unacceptably with federal copyright policy. ''31 4 The court asserted a Kewanee Oil argument that "[t]o the extent that the state law of unjust
enrichment protects and promotes intellectual endeavor, enpatent application by those who can reasonably expect to be granted patents
exists.
Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 489.
Thus, the question to be asked with software protection appears to be whether or
not the mass-marketed software license provides weaker protection for software than
copyright law. By purporting to retain title, the licenses allow the imposition of all
contract terms, perpetually, and attempt to provide access to copyright remedies for
breach of the terms.
311. 412 U.S. 546 (1973) (addressing the states' ability to protect music recordings
which were not the subject of copyright law).
312. Schuchart, 540 F. Supp. at 947. In Goldstein, the Court decided that Sears and
Compco did not apply to the preemption analysis because Congress had not explicitly
determined that recordings were not entitled to protection. Goldstein,412 U.S. at 57071. The court appears to be following a suggestion that in resolving the issues raised
by section 301, "courts should look to the analytical techniques of Goldstein and
Kewanee for practical guidelines" because "their spirit as well as their method will
properly form the touchstone for administration of section 301." Goldstein, Preempted State Doctrines,Involuntary Transfersand Compulsory Licenses: Testing the
Limits of Copyright, 24 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1107, 1121-23 (1977). The article suggested:
[Flor any state doctrine in dispute, some factually grounded questions [need]
be asked. Does the state law doctrine offer protection as rigorous as that
offered by the copyright law? Is the state law likely to divert investment
away from the objectives and limits set by copyright and toward those set by
other, conflicting systems? To be' sure, answers will be hard to come by. But
at least the inquiry will have some grounding in the purposes of copyright.
Id.at 1123.
313. Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 571.
314. Schuchart, 540 F. Supp. at 948.
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forcement of the action does not conflict with the congressional
purpose of encouraging intellectual and artistic creation."3 1' 5
The court concluded that the action for quantum meruit does
not conflict with the policy of copyright law to protect only expression and not ideas. 1 6
D.

State Contract Law and Section 301 in the Courts

The Software Act purports to set out the contract terms
which may be deemed accepted in software transactions.3 17 An
overview of cases which have grappled with the contract law/
copyright law preemption issues will bring the Software Act issues more clearly into focus.
In FantasticFakes, Inc. v. Pickwick Intern. Inc.,318 the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit addressed the relationship between Georgia rules of contract construction and federal
copyright law. 319 The copyright owner had brought an action
for copyright infringement and breach of the license agreement.32 0 The defendant allegedly had breached a term of his
contract to distribute copies by failing to affix proper copyright
notice.3 21 Because the parties had stipulated in the licensing
agreement that the contract was to be "construed and enforced
in accordance with the laws of the state of Georgia, ' 322 the
court was initially required to determine the extent to which
323
Georgia law would apply.
The court recognized that the rights and obligations created
by the copyright law could not be superseded simply by the use
of a contract clause designating a choice of law. 2 4 In support of
315. Id.
316. Id. In Werlin v. Reader's Digest Association, Inc., 528 F. Supp. 451 (S.D.N.Y.

1981), the court upheld a claim for unjust enrichment on the basis that the elements
of a quasi-contract claim are significantly different and the rights protected are qualitatively different than those protected by copyright. The author had been encouraged
to submit materials and ideas for articles over an extended period of time to a publisher. One of the ideas was developed into a new article by a staff writer and published. The preemption analysis was cursory and the court did not choose to examine
the claim under the independent basis test as was later done by the Schuchartcourt in
1982.
317. See supra note 143.
318. 661 F.2d 479 (5th Cir. 1981).
319. Id at 482-83.
320. Id. at 481.
321. Id.
322. Id. at 482.
323. Id
324. Id,at 483.
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this proposition, the court quoted the Supreme Court's opinion
in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co. 3 25 wherein
the Court stated that federal patent and copyright law, "like
other laws of the United States enacted pursuant to constitutional authority, are the supreme law of the land .... When
state law touches upon the area of these federal statutes, it is
'familiar doctrine' that the federal policy 'may' not be set at
naught, or its benefits denied' by the state law. 326
In the court's view, the choice of law provision in the contract
"merely designates the state whose law is to be applied to the
extent its use is not preempted or contrary to the policies of the
1909 and 1976 Copyright Acts. ' 327 Acknowledging that "the
context of the Copyright law in which the agreement exists
cannot be overlooked.. .," the court concluded that "application of Georgia's rules to determine contractual intent" (emphasis added) is not preempted nor violative of federal policy. 2
The court cited three cases, two pre-1978 copyright cases and a
Supreme Court patent case, to support this assertion. 2 9
The first case cited, Kingsrow Enterprises, Inc. v. Metromedia, Inc.,330 does not provide helpful reasoning to support
the Fantastic court's "contractual intent" conclusion. Kingsrow was simply a district court opinion which briefly and incorrectly summarized an earlier Second Circuit opinion as
"[b]uilding upon the broadly undisputed proposition that the
validity of a transfer of a copyright is to be determined by state
law."'331 The Kingsrow suit was filed to determine whether the
defendant acquired the copyright to 26 one-hour epoisodes of
"The Judy Garland Show" at a sheriff's sale. 332 Thus, the circuit court case cited was not critical to the outcome of the
Kingsrow case just as the Kingsrow case was not strong authority for the result in the Fantasticcase.
The second case cited by the Fifth Circuit in Fantastic,and
much more on point, was the same Second Circuit case dis325. 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
326. FantasticFakes, Inc., 661 F.2d at 483 (citing Sears, 376 U.S. at 229).
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. Id. It is important to note that section 301 of the 1976 Copyright Act took
effect January 1, 1978.
330. 397 F. Supp. 879 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)
331. Kingsrow Enterprises, Inc. v. Metromedia, Inc., 397 F. Supp. at 881 (S.D.N.Y.
1975) (citing Bartsch v. Metro-Goldwyn Meyer, Inc., 391 F.2d 150, 153-54 (2d Cir.
1968)).
332. Kingsrow, 397 F. Supp. at 880.
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cussed in Kingsrow, Bartsch v. Metro-Goldwyn Mayer, Inc.
In Bartsch, the copyright owner attempted to enjoin an assignee of motion picture rights from permitting a televised version to be broadcast. 3 4 The Bartsch court was required to
interpret the language of the licensing agreements and to determine whether the disputed rights were included within the
terms of the license.3 35 In deciding whether these issues should
be controlled by state or federal law, the court stated that
"[t]he development of a 'federal common law' of contracts is
justified only when required by a distinctive national policy and
...the general interest that copyrights, like all other forms of
property, should be enjoyed by their true owners is not enough
' '336
to meet this ... test.
333. 391 F.2d 150 (1968).
334. Id. at 151.
335. "[D]ecision turns rather on whether a broad assignment of the right 'to copyright, vend, license and exhibit such motion picture photoplays throughout the world'
includes the right to 'license' a broadcaster to 'exhibit' the copyrighted motion picture
by a telecast without a further grant by the copyright owner." Id. at 153.
336. Id. (citations omitted). The use of the term "owners" with regard to software
is such a situation. It is not a question of who the true owner is but rather whether a
certain person is an owner for the purposes of access to the rights provided to such
owners under the copyright law.
The issue of whether or not the status of copy owner is determined under state law
or federal law is similar to the issue examined by the Fifth Circuit when the need for
a "federal common law of contracts" was dismissed.
On some issues in private federal question cases, there may be compelling
reasons for ignoring state law and following an independent federal rule, as
where Congress has clearly indicated a substantive policy it wishes to have
followed, or there are indications of a leaning toward uniformity and there is
no significant state interest to be served by absorption of the state law as the
rule of decision. In other cases application of the state law may seem the
wiser choice. De Sylva v. Ballentine [351 U.S. 570 (1956)] was such a case.
The issue there was whether the illegitimate son of a copyright owner is one
of the "children" of the owner within the meaning of the copyright statute.
The Court recognized that the meaning of the word in the statute is a federal
question, but since there is no federal law of domestic relations, and this is
primarily a matter of state concern, the Court thought it best to draw on "the
ready-made body of state law" to define what Congress meant by "children."
The case shows, however, the greater flexibility that a court has when state
law is absorbed, as compared to the Erie-type situations where it is controlling of its own force. The court said that a state would not be entitled to use
the word "children" in a way entirely strange to its ordinaryusage, and that
only to the extent that there are permissible variations in the ordinary concept of "children" would the state definition be adopted. It also indicated
that the federal court is free to decide for itself which state's law is applicable-as it would not be if the Erie doctrine applied-although only one state
was involved in the De Sylva case and there was no need to make a conflict of
laws decision.
C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 395-96 (4th ed. 1983) (emphasis added) (citation
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The only language in Bartsch which even remotely resembles
the glib summary offered in the Kingsrow case was the statement by the court that "the fact that plaintiff is seeking a remedy granted by Congress to copyright owners removes any
problem of federal jurisdiction but does not mean that federal
principles must govern the disposition of every aspect of her
claim." ' 7 This language must be subjected to a tortured interpretation to reach the assertion that "the validity of a transfer
3 38
of a copyright is to be determined by state law.1
The Bartsch court recognized that because (1) the assignor
and original grantor of the copyright were dead and (2) the lawyer who drafted the license had no recollection of the negotiations forty years ago, reconstructing the actual intent of the
parties was impossible. 339 According to the court, the irony of
the situation was that "unfortunately, when we turn to state
law, we find that it offers little assistance. 3 40 The court concluded that "[i]n the end, [the] decision must turn, as Professor
Nimmer has suggested,... on a choice between two basic approaches more than on an attempt to distill decisive meaning
out of language that very likely had none. ' 3 41 The court was
forced to choose between a narrow interpretation that "a license of rights in a given medium.., includes only such uses as
fall within the unambiguous core meaning of the term" or a
broader interpretation under which "the licensee may properly
pursue any uses which may reasonably be said to fall within the
medium as described in the license. ' 3 42 The court opted for the
broader approach which permitted the licensee to pursue a new
use involving the broadcasting of a televised version. 4 3
The third case cited by the Fifth Circuit in Fantasticwas Aronson v. Quick PointPencil Co.3 44 The case involved an agreement by a novelty manufacturer to pay a five percent royalty in
return for the exclusive right to make and sell a key holder on
omitted). The question that must be asked is whether the use of the word "owner" of
a copy in the copyright laws is the same as one who has retained title under the Louisiana Software Enforcement Act, and if so, does the state statute use the term "in a
way entirely strange to its ordinary usage." C. WRIGHT, supra at 396.
337. Bartsch, 391 F.2d at 154.
338. Kingsrow, 397 F. Supp. at 881.
339. Bartsch, 391 F.2d at 155.
340. Id,at 154.
341. Id. at 155 (citation omitted).
342. Id.
343. Id.
344. 440 U.S. 257 (1979).
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which a patent was pending.345 The royalty was to be reduced
to two and one-half percent if the patent was not granted
within five years.3 4 6 The manufacturer sought to have the
agreement declared unenforceable, on the ground that "state
law which might otherwise make the contract enforceable was
'347
preempted by federal patent law.
The Aronson court determined that state law should apply
because the contract expressly stated an alternative obligation
should the patent not issue.3 48 According to the court,
[c]ommercial agreements traditionally are the domain of state
law. State law is not displaced merely because the contract related to intellectual property which may or may not be patentable; the states are free to regulate the use of such intellectual
property in any manner not inconsistent with federal law.34 9
The court found that the key holder had entered the public
domain on its manufacture and that the contract did not forbid
the copying of the idea by the public. 3 50 The court stated that
the contract "merely requires Quick Point to pay the consideration which it promised in return for the use of a novel device
which enabled it to pre-empt the market. '35' After concluding
that application of Georgia rules to determine contractual intent was not preempted, on the basis of Kingsrow, Bartsch and
Aronson, the Fantasticcourt commented that:
It is possible to hypothesize situations where applications of
particular state rules of construction would so alter rights
granted by the copyright statutes as to invade the scope of
copyright law or violate its policies. We need not, however, set
forth these extreme situations for it is clear that the application of Georgia rules of construction in the case at bar is not
one of them.35 2
The Fifth Circuit concluded that under Georgia law, the
promise to place a copyright notice on each copy was a covenant
of performance and not a condition precedent. 53 The distinction is important because "if a breach of a condition precedent
is found then the authority to manufacture and distribute copy345. Id. at 259.

346. Id.
347. Id. at 260.

348.
349.
350.
351.

Id. at 262.
Id.
Id. at 264.
Id.

352. Fantastic,661 F.2d at 483.

353. Id. at 484.
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righted material granted in the licensing agreement did not
vest.

'354

If so, the manufacture of the copies was without au-

thority of the copyright owner and thus an infringement. The
court recognized that a "mere breach of covenant may support
a claim of damages for breach of contract but will not disturb
the remaining rights and obligations under the license
includ'35 5
ing the authority to use the copyrighted material.

The Fifth Circuit apparently viewed the aspect of contract
law with which it dealt as mere rules of construction. Conflicts
arise, however, when the state law which is considered goes beyond rules of construction and a determination of the intent of
the parties. If the statute addresses the subject matter of copyright and equivalent rights, then it is preempted by the copyright law.356 It can be argued that state commercial law and
contract common law are not preempted because they are not
specifically tailored to address only the subject matter of copyright, and, although they may affect the outcome, they deal
with the relationship between the parties and not the exclusive
rights of the copyright owner. As recognized by the Fantastic
court, "[a]lthough the parties stipulated in the licensing agreement that Georgia law would govern the construction and enforcement of their contractual obligations, this does not mean
that all rights and obligations'357created by the copyright acts are
superceded by Georgia law.

The courts have encountered problems when the parties to a
suit have labeled their rights as being contractual in order to
avoid equivalent rights preemption analysis.38 An example of
such an attempt by a plaintiff can be found in Smith v. Weinstein,5 9 where a comedy writer alleged that a motion picture
company had used the writer's ideas and expression without
authorization.3

60

The writer brought claims for copyright in-

fringement, unfair competition, breach of contract (to pay for
ideas) and breach of confidential relationship. 61
354. Id. at 483.
355. Id. at 483-84 (citing 3A CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §§ 633, 635 (1960)).
356. 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1982). See supra note 216.

357. Fantastic,661 F.2d at 482-83. See supra note 312.
358. Editorial Photocolor v. Granger Collection, 474 N.Y.2d 964, 967, 463 N.E.2d

365, 368 (1984) ("Plaintiffs could not, by miscasting their causes of action, secure the
equivalent of copyright protection under guise of state law").

359. Smith v. Weinstein, 578 F. Supp. 1297 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
360. Id.
361. Id. The court granted summary judgment on the plaintiff's copyright infringement claim. Id. at 1308. The copyright claim was dismissed on the pleadings
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Addressing the breach of contract claim, the court stated:
To the extent plaintiff rests his contract claim not on breach of
the terms of the contract but on Weinstein's having copied his
property, the KKK script in making "Stir Crazy," it is of
course preempted. Plaintiff cannot merely rephrase the same
claim citing contract law and thereby obtain relief equivalent
to that which he has failed to obtain under copyright law.3 62
The court believed that the parties could contract to pay for
ideas because the rights contracted for are qualitatively different from copyright claims and no monopoly is created in the
ideas. 6 3
The court defined the breach of confidence claim as an obliand the state contract claims were dismissed as well because they were not appropriate for retention under pendent jurisdiction. Id. at 1304 (citing United Mine Workers
of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 727 (1966)). The court applied the rationale of Gibbs
which held that pendent jurisdiction exists whenever the state and federal claims "derive from a common nucleus of operative fact" and are such that a plaintiff "would
ordinarily be expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding." Gibbs, 383 U.S. at
725. The Weinstein court viewed the contract to pay for ideas as turning on "evidence
and legal principles that are largely different from and irrelevant to the federal
claim." 578 F. Supp. at 1305.
The Second Circuit has indicated that if the federal claims "could be disposed of on
summary judgment under F.R.CIv.P. 56, the courts should refrain from exercising
pendent jurisdiction absent exceptional circumstances." Kavit v. A.L. Stamm, 491
F.2d 1176, 1180 (2d Cir. 1974). In Walker v. Time Life Films, 615 F. Supp. 430
(S.D.N.Y. 1985), the court found such a set of "exceptional circumstances." The court
stated that because the state court had already had an opportunity to adjudicate the
issue of dismissal without prejudice as to the misappropriation, unfair competition
and trade practices, breach of confidence and judiciary relationships claims, the District Court was not "usurping the state court's role in deciding the state law claims."
Id. at 440. After dismissal of the federal claim, the question of whether the court
should exercise its discretion and dismiss the state court claim is especially interesting
in light of the ability of copyright owners to assert software copying claims under the
Software Enforcement Act. If the copyright infringement claim fails because the consumer is found to be the owner of the copy, should the breach of the license agreement be dismissed? The answer is dependent on whether the contract claim rests on
violation of a section 106 right such as copying the software. If so, it does stem from
the "common nucleus of operative fact" and the court could retain pendent jurisdiction as a matter of discretion. However, it is interesting to note that the judicial tests
that determine whether state claims are pendent and should be retained (i.e., "derive
from a common nucleus of operative fact") appear to mirror the "equivalent to any of
the exclusive rights" test of section 301. If so, the "common nucleus" test should enable the cause of action to be pendent and the "equivalent" test will then preempt the
claim.
The federal court would be the appropriate forum to hear the preemption issue.
"The federal preemption issue is one which seems peculiarly appropriate for a federal
court to consider so as to ensure that Congress' purposes are not undermined by statelaw causes of action." Weinstein, 578 F. Supp. at 1305.
362. Weinstein, 578 F. Supp. at 1307.
363. Id.
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gation not to disclose to third parties, and found that this obligation differs from section 106 copyright rights. 364 The court
noted that the obligation is imposed only on the party that accepts the relationship; therefore, no monopoly results. 6 The
364. Id.
365. Id. Contrast this reasoning with the actual effect of licensing agreements,
which purport to form a valid contract which is mass-marketed to the public. Is the
obligation only imposed on those who accept it, or is it imposed on the public at large
based on an inequality of bargaining positions? The effect of mass-marketing a license agreement is to take "private law," which is by definition that law administered
between citizen and citizen, such as the contractual expectations of the parties, and
enforce them against the public at large. The ability of software authors to create
these "mass contracts" resembles the legislation of a private monopoly that rivals the
statutory monopoly granted by copyright law. Can this private monopoly prove to be
more beneficial to the author and thus replace copyright?
Contracts of adhesion are not necessarily bad. In fact, with mass-marketing they
are one of the only reasonable methods of contracting available.
Through advance knowledge on the part of the enterprise offering the contract that its relationship with each individual consumer or offeree will be
uniform, standard and fixed, the device of form contracts introduces a degree
of efficiency, simplicity, and stability. When such contracts are used widely,
the savings in cost and energy can be substantial. An additional benefit is
that the goods and services which are covered by these contracts are put
within the reach of the general public, whose sheer size might prohibit widespread distribution if the necessary contractual relationships had to be individualized. Transactional costs, and therefore the possible prices of these
goods and services, are reduced.
In short, form contracts appear to be a necessary concomitant of a sophisticated, mass-consumption economy. They have social and economic utility.
Sybert, Adhesion Theory in California: A Suggested Redefinition and Its Applicability to Banking, 11 LOY. L.A.L. REV. 297, 298 (1978). The use of form contracts will
enable software producers to reach a broader market of consumers with general application products, such as word processing or game software, while reducing the
transaction costs. This will benefit the consumer if the reduction in marketing expense increases the income to the producer and thus provides economic incentives.
On the other hand, in the case of the shrink-wrap license agreements, because there
is no individual negotiation and the acceptanceis not by a signature,it is important to
scrutinize just what the Louisiana statute is doing to the rights of consumers.
Although the term "unconscionability" is generally associated with the phrase
"shocking to the conscience," it has been applied to everyday business transactions
involving business persons. A&M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 135 Cal. App. 473 (4th
Dist. 1982) (a contract between a diversified corporation and a small farming company). The court reasoned as follows:
[C]ourts have begun to realize that experienced but legally unsophisticated
businessmen may be unfairly suprised by unconscionable contract terms...
and that even large business entities may have relatively little bargaining
power, depending on the identity of the other contracting party and the commercial circumstances surrounding the agreement .... This recognition rests
on the conviction that the social benefits associated with freedom of contract
are severely skewed where it appears that had the party actually been aware
of the term to which he "agreed" or had he any real choice in the matter, he
would never have assented to inclusion of the term ....

No. 2]

LOUISIANA SOFTWARE ENFORCEMENT ACT

243

court concluded its analysis by stating that "[i]n short, these
claims, narrowly read, focus on the relationship between individual parties and make actionable breaches of agreements be-

tween parties, or breaches of the trust they place
in each other
'36 6

because of the nature of their relationship.
A final example of a case where the party argued that the

rights to be enforced were "equivalent to contract," can be
6 7 The State of Florida
found in Crow v. WainwrightY
attempted to prosecute the defendant for selling bootleg eighttrack tapes under a statute prohibiting dealing in stolen property.3 68 The defendant had "pirated" the recording and sold it
without paying royalties to the copyright owner.3 69 The state
characterized the stolen property rights as "contract rights," in
order to keep them out of the scope of the exclusive rights in
section 106.370 The court pointed out that the only contract involved was the one between the present copyright owner and
the singer who made the tape.3 7 1 The court reasoned that the
state, as a third party to the contract, could not maintain such
an action since not even the copyright holder, a party to the
contract, could sue under state contract law because the defendant was not a party to the contract. 2
In its analysis, the Crow court compared the elements of
copyright infringement to the elements of the crime of dealing
in stolen property and concluded that:
Despite the name given the offense, the elements essential to
establish a violation of the Florida statute in this case correspond almost exactly to those of the tort of copyright infringement. The state criminal statute differs only in that it requires
the prosecution to establish scienter, which is not an element
of an infringement claim, on the part of the defendant. This
distinction alone does not render the elements of the crime different in a meaningful way.... The additional element of sci-

135 Cal. App. at 489-90.
366. Weinstein, 578 F. Supp. at 1307 (emphasis added).
367. 720 F.2d 1224 (11th Cir. 1983).
368. Id. at 1225.
369. Id.
370. Id. at 1226. The state argued that the rights "belong to various performers,
not under federal copyright law but under various private contracts." Id. (citing Brief
for Appellee at 4 (citing Crow v. State, 392 So.2d 919, 920 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980))).
371. Crow, 720 F.2d at 1226.
372. Id. Additionally, the court stated that "[a]lthough state contract law could
constitutionally supply the rule of decision should Wynette sue CBS for breach of
contract ....state contract law both could not and would not allow CBS to prohibit
Crow from selling recordings of 'Golden Ring.'" Id. at 1226 (citations omitted).
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enter traditionally necessary to establish a criminal case
merely narrows the applicability of the statute. The prohibited
distributing a copyrighted work-remains the
act-wrongfully
3
same.

37

In summary, the courts are interested in looking beyond the
labels and rephrasings by the parties to ascertain whether the
parties are in actuality seeking relief based on one of the exclusive rights of copyright. The courts will seek to determine
whether the right being protected by state law is equivalent to
a section 106 right by applying the Harper & Row "different in
kind" and "qualitatively different" standards.3 74 It makes no
difference if greater or fewer elements are required by the
state claim than are necessary for the copyright cause of action
if the rights protected are in essence equivalent.3 7 The courts
will look to the effect of the state law to see whether it "clashes
with the objectives" of federal law3 78 or is an "obstacle" to accomplishment of the purposes of Congress.3 7 7 This independent basis will be used to buttress the finding of "equivalence"
under the section 301 analysis. The approach will be case by
case, 378 and rephrasing of the claim in contract terms in order
to obtain relief3 79 analagous -to copyright damages 380 will not be
tolerated. State contract rules of construction can be applied to
determine contractual intent but not to alter substantive
rights.38 1 Keeping these factors in mind, the Software Act will
be examined.

VI
Preemption Analysis of the Louisiana Software
Enforcement Act
An analysis of whether the Software Act is preempted by
federal copyright law must begin with the language of the preemption provision, section 301. 382 As outlined previously, the
preemption analysis has two prongs-the first addresses the
373.
374.
375.
376.
377.
378.
379.
380.
381.
382.

Id. (footnotes and citations omitted).
Harper & Row I, 501 F. Supp. at 852.
Id. at 852-54.
Schuchart, 540 F. Supp. at 946.
Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 561.
Schuchart, 540 F. Supp. at 944 n.12.
Weinstein, 578 F. Supp. at 1087.
Harper & Row I, 501 F. Supp. at 853 n.15.
Fantastic,661 F.2d at 483.
See supra note 220.
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subject matter of copyright
"equivalent" rights.
A.

and

the

second
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examines

Subject Matter Analysis

The first prong questions whether the subject matter addressed is within the scope of copyright. 3 The title, "Software
Enforcement Act," confirms that it is intended to apply to
software; it is reasonable to assume that parties who would invoke the aid of the statute would be litigating matters involving
software. Since computer software does fall within the subject
matter of copyright, the first prong of section 301 is met.
B.

Equivalent Rights Analysis

The second prong asks whether the rights sought to be enforced are "equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the
general scope of ... section 106. ''384 The first step under this
prong requires examination of the provisions of the statute and
a determination of whether the rights addressed resemble, on
their face, the exclusive rights of the copyright law. 85
Section 1954(2) refers to "prohibition of any copying of the
copy of computer software for any purpose and/or limitations
on the purposes for which copies of the computer software can
be made and/or limitations on the number of copies of the computer software which can be made."3 8 This language is similar
to the exclusive right of reproduction embodied in section 106
of the Copyright Act.
Similarly, the section 106 exclusive right to prepare derivative works is reflected in the language of section 1954(3) which
speaks of "prohibition or limitation of rights to modify and/or
adapt the copy of the computer software in any way, including
without limitation prohibitions on translating, reverse engi383.

17 U.S.C. § 301 (1982).

384. Id.
385. It can be argued that the Software Act essentially sets up the relationship

between the copyright owner and the consumer by retention of title in the copyright
owner and nothing more. Such an approach fails to explain the purpose of the specific
terms laid out in section 1954(2), (3), and (4) of the Louisiana Act, LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 1954(2)-(4) (West Supp. 1985). If the terms in section 1954(1) retain title in
the copyright owner, then (2), (3) and (4) are not necessary because the consumer is
not the owner of the copy and therefore has no rights under the copyright law. If
section 1954(1) fails, then (2), (3) and (4) are attempting to contractually remove the
rights that a copy owner gets under copyright law, 17 U.S.C. §§ 109, 117 (1982), as the
copy owner.
386. See supra note 148.
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neering, decompiling, disassembling, and/or creating derivative
'
works based on the computer software." 387
Finally, the section 106 exclusive right of distribution is addressed by the language of section 1954(4) which refers to
"prohibitions on further transfer, assignment, rental, sale or
other disposition of that copy or any other copies made from
388
that copy of the computer software.
On their face, the Software Act provisions appear to address
exclusive rights and in theory are equivalent. It is not enough,
however, to examine the provisions in a vacuum. It is important to apply the provisions to factual situations in order to assess their effect. It is not possible to predict all of the factual
situations which might arise under the Software Act, and, as
the Schuchart court warned, the comparison of the elements of
the causes of action must be in the context of the specific facts
in the case at bar. 3 9 However, the Schuchart case encompassed
claims brought under theories of state law which could conceivably accommodate unlimited fact patterns. On the contrary,
the fact patterns under the Software Act may vary only within
the parameters of the language of the terms which will be enforced as delineated by the statute. 39 0 Therefore, the rights
protected, the subsequent effect of the statute's application and
the nature of the damages available to the parties must conform to the outline of the statutory terms.
1.

The Harper & Row "Different in Kind" and
"Elements" Test

After examining the individual words and the provisions of
the Software Act on their face, the preemption analysis should
apply the statute as a whole to a factual situation in order to see
its effect. The starting point is the Harper & Row analysis
which questions whether the state causes of action are "different in kind" or "qualitatively different" from a claim for copyright infringement. 9 1
387. Id.
388. Id.
389. See supra text accompanying notes 285-86.

390. On the one hand, section 1954 encompasses the specific terms that will be enforced. See supra note 148. On the other hand, the introduction to section 1953 states
that the consumer will "be conclusively deemed to have accepted and agreed to all the
terms of the license agreement." See supra note 143. At any rate, the statute does
appear to impose a structure onto the terms which will appear in the license.
391. See supra text accompanying notes 263-64.
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A scenario can easily be imagined whereby a consumer
purchases software which contains a license agreement stating
that no copies may be made by the consumer. If the consumer
makes one copy, she has breached the terms of the license
agreement. 9 2 In a suit against the consumer, it is reasonable to
expect that the claim for breach of contract would require
proof of copying as would a claim for copyright infringement. 9 3
The act prohibited under both the breach of contract and the
copyright infringement causes of action is copying. The elements in the two claims do not appear to be different in kind
or qualitatively different.
An interesting aspect of the scenario is that the Software Act
enables the copyright owner to bring a breach of contract
suit.3 94 It is likely that without the aid of the statute, no enforceable contract would have been formed under the license
agreement since the consumer would appear to be the owner of
the copy under the usual commercial law applications. 9 5 To
prevail, the copyright owner would have to prove that the consumer had accepted the terms of the license agreement and
that under the statute, the subsequent opening of the package
or use of the software divested the consumer of the rights of
ownership.3 9 6
More importantly, without the aid of the statute, the copyright owner's only claim against the defendant would be a suit
for copyright infringement. The irony of this situation is that
under the copyright law, the consumer would not be liable for
392. The difficulty would be in knowing when such an infringement occurs, especially when the copying occurs at home. Copying also goes on in big corporations, but
software companies have hopes of educating such companies to be ethical. Bulkeley,
Software Firms Urge Big Buyers to Curb Illegal Copying of Programs by Employees,
Wall St. J., October 23, 1984, at 31, col. 4.
393. The duty that the consumer breached would be under section 1954(2) which
allows "provisions for the prohibition of any copying of computer software for any
purpose .... " The feasibility of such a suit may be called into question when the
damages to be gained are weighed against the cost and expense of a lawsuit and the
adverse publicity from suing a user.
394. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1956 (West Supp. 1985). With the ability to sue in
contract instead of under copyright, the suit could be brought in state court. It is
possible that some parties might feel that a suit in state court would be advantageous
if the license contained a particularly favorable liquidated damages clause. The question is, in such a situation, isn't the state suit replacing the role of the copyright statute? Such a result is not acceptable. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470,
489 (1974).
395. See supra note 336.
396. See supra text accompanying note 150.
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copyright infringement. Section 117 allows the copy owner to
make a copy of the software for archival purposes.3 9 7 If the
consumer steps outside of the language of section 117, he would
be liable for the act of copying. 98 Similarly, if the consumer
violates the terms of a license agreement by making more copies than the license terms allowed, he would likewise be liable
for the act of copying.3 99 Under either approach, the rights
sought to be vindicated are redundant.0 0
In Harper & Row, the court looked at the essence of the
claim.4 ° ' It seems that the essence of the claims that could be
brought under the Software Act would be limited to the contract terms which the statute deems to be accepted. A suit
against the consumer would therefore charge the party with a
breach of contract; the act prohibited would be necessarily defined by the terms of the statute, which in their very wording
appear to be equivalent to the exclusive rights of reproduction,
distribution and the making of derivative works. °2 As expressed by the court in Harper& Row, because both the copyright action and the breach of contract action would contain the
same factual allegations, the claims would clearly be
redundant. °3
2.

An Independent Basisfor Preemption

To further buttress any finding of preemption, or to find an
independent basis for preemption where the cause of action is
not clearly preempted by section 301, the analysis should address the scheme of protection under the state statute to determine whether it clashes with the objectives of the copyright
law.4 °4 The functioning of the Software Act is dependent on
the mechanism of retaining title of the retail software. 40 5 The
structure of the statute is such that the contract terms to be
enforced in subsections 2 through 5 can only be effective if title
397. See supra text accompanying note 160.
398. See supra note 93.
399. This is because the consumer did something that only the copyright owner can

authorize.
400. In such an instance, by doing the single act, the consumer has both breached a
contract and done something that only the copyright owner can authorize.
401. See supra note 257 and text accompanying notes 265-80.
402. See supra text accompanying notes 267-72.
403. See supra note 274.
404. See supra text accompanying notes 311-12.
405. See supra note 148.
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is retained as permitted by subsection 1.406 Both the purpose
and effect of subsection 1 is to nullify any provisions of the
copyright law which protect the rights of copy owners. Of major concern are the provisions of section 109 which are triggered by the first sale and the rights under section 117 which
allow the making of adaptations or archival copies of
software. 40 7 The structure of the Software Act prohibits actions
which are likewise prohibited by copyright law and even more
broadly those actions which are specifically allowed under the
copyright law.
The scheme of protection under the Software Act is much
broader than that of the Copyright Act. The Copyright Act
only prohibits the exercise of five exclusive rights by anyone
who does not have the authorization from the copyright owner
and endures for a period of the author's lifetime plus fifty
years. 4 8 The Software Act prohibits the activities described in
"terms deemed accepted," and incorporated into the license, by
anyone, perpetually. 40 9 This aspect of the statute may encourage the software author to bring a breach of contract claim
without alleging copyright infringement if a copyright claim
would fail because copyright law would permit the activities
that the contract restricts.
The Software Act expands the copyright owner's limited monopoly with respect to the rights protected, the duration and
the parties. 410 The duration of the rights has been expanded
because the rights secured under the license can be perpetual.41 1 Even if the copyright runs out fifty years after the death
of the author, the license is not based on the copyright and
therefore may continue. This goes against the policy of the
copyright statute which intends to offer a limited monopoly as
incentive.412 Italso contradicts the principle set out in Brulotte
v. Thys Co., where the Supreme Court emphasized that the monopoly granted under a patent could not lawfully be used to
406. Id407. Section 109 is examined supra note 101. Section 117 is presented supra note
93. See also supra note 148.

408. 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 302 (1982).
409. See supra note 148.
410. The 1976 Copyright Act only prohibits the exercise of five exclusive rights by
anyone who does not have the authorization of the copyright owner for a period of the
author's lifetime plus fifty years. The Software Act prohibits the activities described
in "terms deemed accepted," (as they appear in the license) by anyone, perpetually.
411. See supra note 148.
412. See supra notes 80-84 and accompanying text.
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'
"negotiate with the leverage of that monopoly."413
The Court's
concern was that "to use that leverage to protect those royalty
payments beyond the life of the patent is analogous to an effort

to enlarge the monopoly of the patent....",

It is clear that

use of a license agreement to allow the copyright owner to walk
away with more rights than he had before the contract, in a
situation which is the economic equivalent of a sale, thus enlarges the monopoly of the copyright owner.41
The licensing procedures embodied in the Software Act differ from the traditional copyright license agreements which
grant a privilege to the user, thereby permitting activities
which, in the absence of the license, the copyright law would
forbid.416 Such traditional licenses granted the user some of the
rights found in the "bundle of rights" possessed by the copyright owner and either left the bundle intact, via nonexclusive
licenses, or decreased the bundle, but never added to the exclusive rights.417
Although an argument can be made that contractual obligations do not create or expand a monopoly because they are enforceable only as to the party to the contract, in the mass
market, a shrink-wrap "mass" contract has an effect which parA mass
allels a legislatively granted statutory monopoly.41
abrogates
and
thereby
law"
"private
distorts
license
market
and replaces copyright law. 1 9 The discussion in this commentary has been limited to software transactions in a retail or
mass market setting, but the problems examined here can easily be applied to any of the other diverse methods of distribution discussed at the beginning of the commentary. 2 °
Software is a national, and indeed, an international prod413. Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 33 (1964).
414. Id.
415. From one perspective it seems that the copyright owner is taking advantage of
the rights afforded by copyright and seeking to extend them by contract. From another, it seems that the copyright owner might not need copyright protection at all
and therefore, is enlarginghis rights by use of the statute.
416. Such licenses utilize the language of section 106 which allows the copyright
owner to "authorize" any of the exclusive rights.
417. Terms on a software package which limit a consumer's rights add to the copyright owner's rights. Seeking to limit rights is very different from granting a privilege
under the copyright law.
418. See supra notes 364-65.
419. Id. Private law envisions undertakings between individuals, not legislative
mandates that bind the public at large.
420. See supra text accompanying notes 41-78.
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uct.421 Statutes such as the Software Act would tend to break
down the scheme of protection and disrupt the balance between
the rights of the copyright holder and the rights of the public
which the copyright law seeks to maintain.4 22 The legislative
history of section 301 reflects the aims of the 1976 Copyright
Act.423 The history expresses a desire to (1) promote national
uniformity, (2) develop a system in tune with the 20th century
communications revolution, (3) avoid distortion of the "limited
times" provision of the Constitution and (4) improve international dealings in copyrighted material.4 2 4 If the Software Act
obstructs these purposes, it fails under what the Schuchart
425
court recognized as an independent basis for preemption.
Proponents of the Software Act will argue that the statute
deals only with the relationship between and intent of the parties.426 As expressed by the Fifth Circuit in Fantastic,"the federal policy 'may not be set at naught, or its benefits denied' by
the state law. '427 There is already an existing body of state law
available in Louisiana as well as other states to which federal
courts can look to determine the intent of the parties and to
provide a basis for contract interpretation and construction.
The statute potentially eliminates the status of the copy owner
from the state of Louisiana with respect to retail transactions,
and thereby removes an ever growing number of consumers
from the protection of copyright law. While it is expected that
from state to state there will always be permissible variations
of the concept of a sale, the Software Act enforces a result
which is far from the ordinary usage of the word. 42 8 Despite
attempts to characterize the rights as state contract rights, the
prohibited acts violate rights which are equivalent to the exclusive rights under the 1976 Copyright Act. Even assuming that a
particular cause of action did not obstruct the purpose of copyright law or protect a right equivalent to that of a copyright, a
violation of the state law would not be copyright infringement
421. One of the arguments in favor of a single federal copyright system was improved international dealings. See supra text accompanying note 224. See generally,
Davidson, supra note 23, at 414-15.
422. See supra text accompanying note 81.
423. See supra note 240 and accompanying text.
424. See supra note 240.
425. See supra text accompanying notes 282-90.
426. See supra text accompanying notes 327-64.
427. Fantastic,661 F.2d at 483 (citing Sears, 376 U.S. at 229). See supra note 326
and accompanying text.
428. See supra note 326.
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but rather a breach of contract over which the court would not
retain pendent jurisdiction. Thus, the Software Act and similar
statutes should be found to be preempted on the basis that the
terms in the statute which the state guarantees to enforce are
equivalent to the rights either already protected by copyright
law or delegated to the copyowner. The effect of enforcement
of the statutory terms is to alter the balance between the copyright owner and the public and to obstruct the purposes of
copyright law.
The Software Act was conceived as a solution to diverse
problems confronting the present software market. If a viable
solution cannot be found in such a statute, where can the industry turn?

VII
An Alternative Solution
A.

The Record Rental Amendment as a Model

The record industry has been plagued by the same problems
which have affected the software industry, including home
copying and record rentals and resales. The record industry
has benefited from legislation passed on September 21, 1984,
which is intended to indirectly curb the losses from home taping by controlling record rentals. 2 9 Similar legislation may be
helpful to the software industry.
The purpose of the Record Rental Amendment of 1984 is to
require owners of phonorecords to have authorization from the
copyright holder before renting, leasing or lending the record
for direct or indirect commercial advantage. 430 The problems

experienced by the record industry parallel those which the
software producers are experiencing or predicting. The focus is
429. Record Rental Amendment of 1984, H.R. REP. No. 5938, 98th Cong., 2d Sess.
987 (to amend 17 U.S.C. with respect to the rental, lease or lending of sound
recordings).
430. [U]nless authorized by the owners of copyright in the sound recording
and in the musical works embodied therein, the owner of a particular phonorecord may not, for the purposes of direct or indirect commercial advantage, dispose of, or authorize the disposal of, the possession of that
phonorecord by rental, lease, or lending, or by any other act or practice in the
nature of rental, lease, or lending. Nothing in the preceding sentences shall
apply to the rental, lease or lending of a phonorecord for non-profit purposes
by a nonprofit library or nonprofit educational institution.
Id. at § 2 (amending 17 U.S.C. § 109) (emphasis added).
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on the first sale doctrine which divests the copyright owner of
any ability to control subsequent transfers of the record, despite a retention of the copyright.4 3 ' Prior to the enactment of
the new amendment, it was perfectly legal for the record owner
to dispose of the copy by rental, lease, lending or destruction.43 2
According to the Senate Congressional Record:
Congress originally adopted the doctrine to codify the common
law rule against restraints on the alienation of tangible property. It focused on contract and commercial law, not on copyright law. It worked well until technology changed the record
industry, and widespread home taping threatened to sap433its
strength by undermining its coin of the realm-copyright.
The Amendment specifically states that it is intended to address "commercial" transactions.4 3 4 It is not intended to encompass the swapping and borrowing that occurs among
friends. This commercial-noncommercial distinction has previously been made by the Supreme Court in Goldstein v. California.435 The Court stated that in order to encourage individuals
to "devote themselves to intellectual and artistic creation, Congress may guarantee to authors and inventors a reward in the
form of control over the sale or commercial use of copies of
their works. 43 6 One consideration for maintaining such a distinction is the enforcement problems involved in restricting
private individuals. The task could be overwhelming and could
violate privacy rights.
As viewed by the Congress, the problem to be solved by the
Record Rental Amendment was as follows:
Record rental shops rent popular albums for 1 or 2 days for a
dollar or two. This practice, which copyright owners can not
prevent under the first sale doctrine, displaces sales since the
customers go home and tape the records on their tape recorders. The industry's sales losses from home taping are estimated at 1 billion a year.
There are only 250 or so record rental stores in our country.
But in Japan, where record rental originated in 1980, there are
over 1,700 rental outlets- 20 percent of the entire record retail
industry. Conventional record sales in Japan in the vicinity of
431. 17 U.S.C. § 109 (1982).
432. Id.
433. 129 CONG. REC. S9375 (daily ed. June 28, 1983).
434. See supra note 423.
435. Goldstein, 412 U.S. 546 (1975).
436. Id. at 555.
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rental outlets have fallen by over 30 percent.1

The Congress concluded that the detriment caused to copyright owners by record rentals far outweighs any public good.438
The Senate record concluded that "subsequent taping is clearly
the motive behind the rental. '439 The fact that some record
stores include a blank tape in the deal supports such a
finding.

44 0

A similar amendment will solve the software rental dilemma. 44 1 A software rental bill, S. 3074, was introduced by
Senator Mathias on October 5, 1984. The bill stated that
unless authorized by a copyright owner, the owner of a particular computer program may not, for purposes of direct or indirect commercial advantage, dispose of or authorize the disposal
of, the possession of that copy by rent, lease, or lending or any
other activity in the nature of rental, lease or lending.4 42
After the demise of S. 3074, another software rental bill, H.R.
4949, was introduced by Representative Patricia Schroeder of
Colorado. The bill would amend the first sale doctrine to require an express grant of permission from the software owner
prior to subsequent rental of the program.4 4 Such an amendment would be harmonious with the goals expressed for the
1976 Copyright Act.44 4 Additionally, it could mimic the Record
Rental Amendment provision which requires royalties to be
paid to those copyright owners who do give permission for rentals to occur.4 45
Even with the enactment of software statutes patterned after

the Record Rental Amendment, the continuing problem of
home copying is only indirectly addressed. Consumers need to
be educated as to the legitimacy of copying under copyright
law.44 6 Schools are the focus of much of the current contro437. 129 CONG. REC. S9375 (daily ed. June 28, 1983).
438. Congress concluded that "the rented record clearly displaces a potential sale."
Id.
439. Id
440. Id.
441. 130 CONG. REC. S13707 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1985).
442. Id.
443. 130 CONG. REC. H3437 (daily ed. June 5, 1986).
444. See supra text accompanying note 80.
445. In addition to any royalty payable under clause (2) and chapter 8 of this
title, a royalty shall be payable by the compulsory licensee for every act of
distribution of a phonorecord by or in the nature of rental, lease, or lending,
by or under the authority of the compulsory licensee.
H.R. REP No. 5938, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 987, § 3 (amending 17 U.S.C. § 115(c)).
446. The concept of fair use is a provision in the 1976 Copyright Act that allows
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versy involving copying because of limited school budgets and
the high cost of obtaining adequate copies for classroom use.4 47
It is important that students do not inadvertently learn that
copying is the solution to the software market's refusal to recognize their needs.4 4 8 Corporations are another source of a
copying mindset when they do not keep close inventory on original and backup copies. 449 Corporations should arrange for
multicopy licenses at a discount and educate their employees as
to the parameters of copyright law.

VIII
Conclusion
The enactment of the 1976 Copyright Act and the 1981
amendments attempted to foresee potential problems which°
4
would develop as a result of rapidly advancing technology.
The copyright law should be looked to as the source of solutions to new infringements and, if found inadequate, should be
amended. Consolidation of protection for copyright under federal law offers the benefits of uniformity and predictability to
both national and international transactions involving intellectual property rights. Allowing states to protect such rights will
lead to a piecemeal and ineffective system in a field which is
critical to the future of the United States under both an economic and quality of life analysis. Software is part of a world
market and efficient transactions are dependent on federal protection. The states can retain their traditional roles as left intact by the 1976 Act but should not attempt to resolve dilemmas
which involve the section 106 rights via state legislation. Their
proper role is as proponents of change to the federal copyright
law.
By entering the mass market, the software industry has
opened itself up to all the benefits of the retail system as well
as to the purchasing whims of the fickle, trend-oriented public.
In a race to keep up with technology, Congress must not lose
copying for purposes such as "criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including
multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research .... " 17 U.S.C. § 107
(1982). This listing provides only illustrative examples of permissible use. Any use
must be examined under the four subsections of § 107.
447. Letters, Give Schools a Break, INFOWORLD, July 30, 1984, at 6, col 1.
448. Editorial, Software Licensing, INFOWORLD, July 2, 1984, at 5, col. 2.
449. Id.
450. See supra notes 5 and 10.
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sight of the difficult balance demanded by the Constitution.45 '
As it has so aptly been put, "[h]owever tired Congress may be
of the intricacies of copyright law and the importunings of
not seen the end of copycopyright lobbyists, it has probably
45 2
right revision in this decade.

451. See supra text accompanying note 80.
452. Ringer, Unfinished Business, 24 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 951, 977 (1977).

